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ABSTRACT 
This study examines decision making in large and 
small firms undertaking biotechnology innovation and 
identifies factors influencing innovation. It also 
considers aspects of environments external to firms, but 
relevant to the process of innovation. The study suggests 
that innovation is best understood as process of change 
both within the firm and in the external environment. 
Factors internal to firms influencing key decisions 
included economic and political evaluations, company 
culture, organization, and in large firms, previous areas 
of corporate activity. A scarcity of appropriate knowledge 
relating to technical and non-technical aspects of 
innovation acted as severe restraints to Dedicated 
Biotechnology Firms (DBFs). Factors external to firms 
shaping decisions about the technology included changes in 
the socio-economic and political environment, risk 
regulation and patenting. Lack of funding and difficulties 
associated with venture capital constituted additional 
hurdles for DBFs. 
The findings of the study highlight a series of 
erroneous assumptions built into the linear model of 
innovation. The cumulative nature of innovation and the 
importance of 'learning by doing' constitute elements of 
the critique of the linear model. For related reasons, 
some Post Fordist theories of current change in advanced 
industrialized countries, particularly those which advocate 
flexible specialization as a new model for industrial 
growth also prove problematic. 
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CHAPTER 1. THE MAKING OF BIOTECHNOLOGY: A 
CASE STUDY OF RADICAL INNOVATION. 
This thesis examines aspects of biotechnology 
innovation during the nineteen eighties and early nineteen 
nineties. Two general questions guided the study: What 
are the primary factors influencing biotechnology 
innovation in agricultural and food sectors? How does the 
study of biotechnology innovation inform theories of 
technical change? 
These questions translate into three more defined 
thesis objectives: 1) To identify the principal factors 
influencing decision making about biotechnology innovation 
in Dedicated Biotechnology Firms (DBFs) and large 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) interested in developing 
biotechnology products and processes; 2) To examine how 
market and non-market forces are influencing the rate and 
direction of food and agriculture - related biotechnology 
innovation. 3) To consider the implications of research 
findings for theories of innovation. 
The study is based on extensive, semi-structured 
interviews with managers in large and small firms involved 
in biotechnology innovation. This introductory chapter 
outlines the issues with which the thesis is concerned. 
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Chapter 2 discusses methodology. Chapter 3 describes and 
analyses factors influencing the rate and direction of 
innovation in DBFs and Chapter 4 does the same for MNCs 
included in the study. Chapter 5 examines institutions and 
markets emerging in conjunction with biotechnology and 
examines their interaction in the innovation process. 
Chapter 6 analyses debates about risk regulation and 
patenting of the technology and contending views about the 
impact which existing regulatory regimes have on 
innovation. Chapter 7 summarizes the findings and 
considers the theoretical implications. 
1.1. BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN OVERVIEW. 
Biotechnology has been defined in a number of 
different ways. Some definitions include all products of 
biology used for human ends and others restrict the focus 
only to products of genetic engineering. I will define 
the set of techniques in the following way: The body of, 
"knowledge and techniques involving the 
integrated use of biochemistry, microbiology, 
genetics and engineering sciences to achieve the 
technological application of capabilities of 
micro-organisms, cultured tissue cells and parts 
thereof" (Orsenigo, 1989: 32). 
This definition incorporates a range of knowledge and 
techniques rather than just genetic engineering. This is 
important. Many of the managers interviewed in this survey 
stressed that current techniques represented a 'knowledge 
revolution', based on a new understanding of biological 
sciences and opened up a host of previously unimagined 
possibilities. In this sense, new biotechnology is 
conceived as emerging from new procedures and rules for the 
biological sciences. However, while genetics played a 
central role in creating a new scientific paradigm, genetic 
engineering was not always an integral part of the work. 
Thus, this definition proves more congruent with the 
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perceptions of those incorporating the knowledge and using 
the new techniques than either very broad or very narrow 
definitions. Additionally, it focuses attention on the 
multi and interdisciplinary nature of the technology and 
its "strong scientific foundation" (Orsenigo: 1989: 32). The 
definition encompasses industrial activities based on 
fermentation, cell culture and biocatalytic processes, and 
includes biomedicine and agriculture in so far as they 
involve the application of cellular or molecular biology 
(Oakey et al, 1990: 5-6). 
Clearly, biotechnology spans a number of sectors. 
Indeed, the term 'biotechnology' industry is somewhat of a 
misnomer. Table 1 gives some idea of major applications of 
biotechnology in different sectors, apart from 
agriculture. Table 2 gives a more detailed account of 
agricultural inputs and provides estimated timelines 
(estimates made in late eighties) for development and the 
predicted effect on agricultural productivity. (Appendix 1 
contains explanation of some relevant scientific terms and 
components of biotechnology. ) 
The tables are by no means exhaustive and the 
difficulty of summarizing applications is further 
complicated by indications that biotechnology will 
encourage the development of new sectors. For instance, 
'pharmetics', the combination of various elements of both 
the pharmaceutical and cosmetic industries and new areas of 
healthcare that bring the pharmaceutical and food sectors 
much closer together. The use of animals in the healthcare 
sector, for instance the use of sheep to produce blood 
clotting agents and pigs to 'grow' human organs for 
transplants, blur the boundaries between agriculture and 
healthcare. 
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Sector Activities 
Chemicals (bulk) Ethanol, Acetone, Butanol 
Organic Acids 
Organic (fine) Enzymes, Perfumeries 
Polymers (mainly 
polysaccharides) 
Inorganic Metal benefaction, 
bioaccumulation and 
leaching (Cu, U) 
Pharmaceuticals Antibiotics 
Diagnostic agents (Enzymes 
antibodies) 
Enzyme inhibitors 
Steroids 
Vaccines 
Energy Ethanol (gasohol) 
Methane (biogas) 
Biomass 
Food Dairy, fish and meat 
products 
Beverages (alcoholic, tea 
Coffee) 
Baker's yeast 
Food additives 
Novel foods 
Mushroom production 
Amino Acids, vitamins 
Starch products 
Glucose and high fructose 
syrups, Functional 
modifications of proteins, 
pectins, Toxin removal, Rapid 
detection of microbial 
contamination 
Service Industries Water purification 
Effluent treatment 
Waste management 
Oil recovery 
Analytical tools. 
Adapted from (Orsenigo 1989: 37-38) 
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Development Likely Time scale of Effect on 
Implementation Agricultural 
Productivity 
Plant Breeding and 
Crop development 
Micropropagation Already in commercial To speed up 
use implementation 
of other 
developments 
Nitrogen Fixation 
-with non-leguminous Long term Input saving 
plant tissues 
-by free living soil 2000* Input saving 
bacteria 
-improving 1995* Input saving 
efficiency of 
nitrogen fixation 
within legumes 
-improving 1995* Input saving 
fertilizer 
uptake by 
cereal plants 
Harnessing 
microbial plant 
interactions 
-frost protection Undergoing trials Loss Avoidance 
-growth promotion Under development Increased 
productivity 
Extensions of 
classical plant 
breeding 
-insect and disease Under development Loss avoidance 
resistance in plants and input 
saving 
-improved stress 1995* Increased 
resistance productivity 
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-better storage Under development Loss avoidance 
New develop- 
ments in crop 
protection 
-biological control 
agents 
-herbicide 
resistance 
Animal Breeding 
and Health 
Improved 
disease control 
Embryo 
transfer 
-predetermined sex 
ratios among 
offspring 
-increased 
reproductive 
capacity of 
pedigree 
females 
Improved feed 
conversion, e. g. 
using natural growth 
hormones 
Developments 
in animal feeds 
1995* 
Under development 
Already available 
Already available 
Already available 
Under development 
Input saving 
Improved 
efficiency 
Increased 
productivity 
Improved 
efficiency 
Increased 
productivity 
Increased 
productivity 
1995 Use of crop 
wastes or 
non-crop 
products 
Industrial Developments 
Enzyme 
technology 
-high fructose corn Already in use Substitutionist 
syrup 
-rennet production Already in use Substitutionist 
16 
Microbial Already in use Substitutionist 
food production 
processes using 
non-agricultural 
substrates, e. g. 
single cell protein 
Energy Already feasible Land use diver- 
cropping (timing of implemen- sification 
tation dependent on 
oil prices) 
New sources 
of chemical 
industry feedstock 
-from plants Already in use on Land use 
small scale diversification 
-from animals Successful at Land use 
research stage diversification 
(Tait et al, 1990, adapted from J. J. North, 1986: 3-14) 
Some excellent explanations and histories of 
biotechnology exist, (Faulkner, 1986, Yoxen, 1986). Table 
1.3 summarizes the historical evolution of the technology, 
categorizing it into three generations. 
FIRST-GENERATION BIOTECHNOLOGY (c. 7000 BC) 
-Empirical practice, characterized by minimal 
scientific and engineering inputs. 
-Includes the traditional use of fermentation to 
produce food, drinks and energy. 
SECOND-GENERATION BIOTECHNOLOGY (1940s) 
- Characterized by the organization of scientific 
and engineering inputs to industrial-scale 
processes. 
-Based on the integrated application of 
industrial microbiology (using mutation and 
screening procedures), biotechnology and chemical 
engineering 
17 
N 
-Includes the use of fermentation, bioconversions 
and biocatalysis to produce pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals, fuels and food, and to process waste 
-Recent technical developments - immobilization 
and plant-tissue culture techniques 
THIRD GENERATION BIOTECHNOLOGY. (1970s) 
-Characterized by the production of 'novel 
genetic combinations' 
-Based on the application of molecular biology 
and the use of genetic engineering (recombinant 
DNA and hybridoma techniques) 
-Potential applications include all existing 
biological processes, as well as numerous novel 
products and processes. 
(Faulkner, 1986) 
While the development of third generation techniques, 
dates to the 1970s, the scientific roots of the new era can 
be traced much further back and the knowledge that 
characterizes each generation is cumulative. Gregor Mendel 
died in 1884 with no idea of the primary importance that 
his work would have on plant and animal breeding or 
genetics in general. Mendel's work in identifying 
'heredity factors' present in both parents of the pea 
varieties which he was working with showed that hereditary 
traits from parents do not blend in offspring, --but rather, 
separate (Hobbelink, 1991: 20). 
The first half of the century saw many improvements 
in the use of microbes for industrial production, which 
benefited enormously from Pasteur's discovery that 
fermentation involves living cells. This work laid the 
basis for 2nd generation technology. Post war development 
of fermentation processes for the production of antibiotics 
gave an impetus for continued progress and the 1940s and 
1950s saw continued advances in fermentation technology 
that inspired the development and refinement of other 
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biotechnological procedures, including bioconversion 
processes, and biocatalysis (Oakey et al, 1990: 9). The 
1940s also witnessed a major scientific breakthrough that 
built on Mendel's work and was the foundation of 3rd 
generation techniques. Oswald Avery, a Canadian doctor 
established that the hereditary factors, identified by 
Mendel, are located on the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). 
He and his colleagues began to transfer DNA from one micro- 
organism to another, thus proving that hereditary 
information is stored on it (Hobbelink, 1991: 20). 
Watson and Crick 'discovered' the double helix 
structure of DNA in 1953. This laid the basis for future 
research in important ways. Their findings account for the 
integration of biochemistry and genetics in the form of 
molecular biology and thus in some sense paved the way for 
the 1973 gene splicing experiments that represented the 
first successful use of recombinant DNA techniques (Oakey 
et al, 1990: 12-13). The other scientific 'event' that is 
closely associated with 3rd generation techniques took 
place in 1975 when Kohler and Milstein first produced 
Monoclonal Antibodies. While it is always misleading to 
suggest that isolated events can tell the whole story about 
the progression of a science or technology, the events 
described above do constitute landmarks in the life of what 
is both a very ancient and very modern set of techniques. 
The cluster of techniques that constitute 'new 
biotechnology' (including genetic engineering, 
bioprocessing, monoclonal antibodies, protein engineering, 
bioinformatics, tissue culture, biological sensors, 
protoplast fusion, immobilized enzyme and cell catalysis, 
biocatalytic reactors, computer linkage of reactors and 
processes) has attracted speculation about their potential 
to revolutionize whole sectors of industry,. and to 
transform the way goods and services are produced. 
19 
,I 
The Spinks report, published in 1980, provided 
recognition of this possibility in the UK: 
"Over the next two decades, biotechnology will 
affect a wide range of activities such as food 
and animal feed production, provision of chemical 
feedstocks, alternative energy sources, waste 
recycling, pollution control and medical and 
veterinary care" (ACARD, 1980: 160). 
Additionally, in the longer term, Spinks saw a much 
broader and profound shift taking place, 
"Genetic manipulation... has become a practical 
and quite general proposition... This advance in 
our view confers on biotechnology an importance 
comparable to that of atomic physics, 
electronics, and most recently, microelectronics. 
It has been said, that 'biology will launch an 
industry as characteristic of the twenty-first 
century as those based on physics and chemistry 
have been of the twentieth century" 
(ACARD, 1980: 160) . 
The report reflected a widely held belief that 
biotechnology would make short term and longer term 
contributions to industry and society. To be sure, an 
enormous amount of hype was generated much of it in an 
effort to whip up funds with which to exploit new 
opportunities (Tait et al, 1990). Despite this, the 
technology Lid promise to be a revolutionary force, 
changing both industrial, agro-industrial and agricultural 
process and offering a whole new range of products and 
sectors (Yoxen, 1986). There were a number of important 
contextual factors that contributed to the loudly voiced 
expectations that biotechnology would quickly become a 
pervasive technology. 
1.2. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT. 
Much of the optimism surrounding biotechnology within 
both business and academic communities had to do with 
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timing and context. Second and third generation techniques 
have been largely developed in technologically advanced 
capitalist societies and have been shaped by a complex web 
of interacting factors. In trying to understand any 
particular technology it is of vital importance to consider 
not only the techniques but also the social institutions 
with which they interact. As Noble points out, 
"... technology does not necessitate. It merely 
consists of an evolving range of possibilities 
from which people choose. A social theory of 
technology that explores beneath the appearance 
of necessity to illuminate these possibilities 
which technology embodies, reveals as well the 
contours of the society that realizes or denies 
them" (Noble, 1984: xiii, Quoted in 
Kloppenburg, 1988: 8). 
The focus of this thesis is on the firm and the 
manager as units of analysis. The approach taken here is 
constructed to shed light on how managers interpret their 
environments, internal and external to the company, 
considerations that influence their decisions and 
therefore, in turn, the rate and direction of innovation 
(chapter 2 discusses the relationships between manager, 
firm and external environment and considers methodological 
issues). The firm, however , cannot be considered in 
isolation; in order to understand the boundaries within 
which firms and managers work, and the perceived 
opportunities which biotechnology represented, some 
consideration of context is important. Thus, chapters 5 
and 6 examine aspects of the broader environment of 
biotechnology innovation. Additionally, although of course 
incomplete, this section identifies some of the particular 
elements of 'context' which contributed to the speculation 
that biotechnology would have a major impact on the global 
economy. 
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1.2.1. THE PATTERN OF INNOVATION IN AGRICULTURE. 
First, one of the primary reasons that biotechnology 
was perceived as a 'useful' set of techniques is that it 
would fit into and extend technological trajectories 
established in the agricultural and food sectors. Goodman 
et al (1987) predicted that biotechnology would contribute 
to long-standing dynamics governing capitalist agriculture. 
According to this theory, there are two main ways in which 
capital, unable to use mechanisms of control developed in 
industry, l deals with the peculiar and unpredictable 
constraints of agricultural production. 1) 
Substitutionism, which involves the substitution of 
industrially produced goods for agriculture, thereby by- 
passing the peculiar and unpredictable aspects of nature, 
inherent in agricultural production. Examples of this 
include, synthetic fibres for cotton, synthetic dyes for 
indigo. 2) Appropriationism, which involves the attempt by 
industrial capitals to take over discrete elements of the 
agricultural process, transform them into industrial 
activity and re-incorporate them into agriculture as 
purchased inputs, for example synthetic fertilizers. 
Kloppenburg, in his major study of the political 
economy of plant breeding, also sees the pattern of 
biotechnology innovation fitting into historical models. 
Capitalist agriculture uses both technical and social means 
1A long-standing debate exists over the extent to 
which capital has been able to penetrate agriculture. 
While Marxist schools of thought have focused on the 
question of social relations and neo-classical economists 
on factor endowments, Goodman et al look at the problem 
from a different angle. They say, ".. agriculture confronts 
capitalism with a natural production process... agriculture 
could not be directly transformed into a branch of 
industrial production. There was no industrial alternative 
to the biological transformation of solar energy into food. 
The industrialization of agriculture therefore took a 
decisively different path. " (Goodman et al, 1987: 1) 
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to achieve the 'commodification'2 of agricultural inputs 
and biotechnology would contribute further to the logic of 
accumulation established in agriculture. 
"The emerging social impacts of the new genetic 
technologies in the plant sector, are 
substantially, logical extensions of historically 
established processes. The logic is that of the 
capitalist mode of production: the concentration 
and centralization of capital in the seed 
industry, the commodification of the seed, the 
decline of the petty commodity producer, the 
struggle over the state apparatus, and the 
continued appropriation of the plant genetic 
resources of the Third World" 
(Kloppenburg, 1988: 277). 
History suggested that biotechnology, offering new 
techniques to make nature succumb to the control of 
capital, would be adopted as an extremely useful new tool 
by companies with interests in agricultural production. 
However, technological trajectories in agriculture and food 
have been established within a social framework of 
regulations, patents, and plant breeders' rights. 
Biotechnology innovators, regulatory. bodies and pressure 
groups clashed over the sort of framework within which 
innovation could and would take place. Moreover, 
biotechnology proved an emotive subject amongst pressure 
groups concerned both about control of agricultural 
production and with green issues. The struggle about how 
innovation should be controlled and who should control it 
has influenced both the rate and direction of innovation. 
These issues will be further discussed in chapter 6, which 
considers the impact of social and political factors, such 
as risk regulation and patents. 
2 Commodification is a key Marxist concept. The 
commodity is the form products take when they are exchanged 
in capitalist systems. (Marx: 1976) Kloppenburg writes, 
"The fundamental historical processes associated with the 
political economy of capitalism are... those of primitive 
accumulation, the separation of the worker from the means 
of production, and commodification, the extension of the 
commodity form to new spheres. " (Kloppenburg, 1988: 9) 
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1.2.2. COMMODITY CHEMICALS AND THE ADOPTION OF 
BIOTECHNOLOGY. 
Second, in terms of agricultural and food inputs, 
there seemed good reason to think that the time was ripe 
for adoption of new technologies during the late seventies 
and eighties. Since the early eighties the agrochemical 
industry has been entering the mature phase of its 
development, with insufficient growth in world-wide. markets 
to fund increasingly expensive R&D. New biotechnology was 
seen by some multinational companies as providing the 
springboard to set them off on a new growth curve and to 
prevent their 'decline' to producers of commodity chemicals 
(Tait et al, 1990). MNCs were therefore in a position of 
having to integrate new biotechnology products alongside an 
existing product range. In some cases, development of the 
new technology implied that old technologies would be made 
obsolete (i. e. development of insect-resistant plants or 
microbial pesticides). In other cases, MNCs would be able 
to create synergy'between different generations of 
technology as in the case of herbicide resistant plants. 
DBFs hoped to exploit niche markets that were too small or 
specialized to attract MNCs or to be able to retain control 
of a major new product and grow very rapidly as a result 
(Office of Technology Assessment, 1984). A whole range of 
factors discussed in the following chapters have made the 
actual path of innovation much more problematic than the 
predictions based on this reasoning indicated. The study 
indicates that, in a number of cases, MNCs were unwilling 
to undertake the economic or political risks involved in 
developing technology and that while DBFs where committed 
in theory to radical innovations, a number of internal and 
external constraints suppressed ambitions. 
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1.2.3. MICROELECTRONICS AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE. 
Biotechnology came hot on the heels of vast changes 
wrought by the new microelectronic techniques. It was 
compared with microelectronics and both, along with new 
materials, were seen as important technologies in future 
industrial sectors (Roobeek, 1987). Freeman and Perez 
considered that biotechnology could be one of the 'core' 
technologies in the fifth Kondratieff cycle (Freeman and 
Perez, 1988). In some cases, the comparison went beyond the 
general speculation that the technologies would both 
somehow lay the basis for the 'second industrial 
revolution' or changes in techno-economic paradigm. Yoxen 
considered that the technologies might be developed along 
similar lines and that the new paradigm created by micro- 
electronics would also give direction to biotechnology. 
"We are now at the stage where merely thinking of 
organisms as programmed systems is giving way to 
the activity of reprogramming them. Scientists 
can now intervene in nature, constructing to 
order, as a microchip designer might decide what 
functions to realize in a piece of silicon, or a 
computer engineer select a range of modules with 
which to build a data-processing system. The 
analogy is not trivial. As microbiology becomes 
industrialized as biotechnology, that kind of 
construction activity, which has already shown 
its prodigious potential in micro-electronics, 
computing, robotics and systems engineering, will 
take the foreground in the life sciences. As in 
the field of inanimate hardware, it is 
astonishing what becomes possible when you start 
combining modules and functions" 
(Yoxen, 1986: 30). 
Thus, it was thought that what could be done with 
microchips could also be achieved with living organisms. 
1.2.4. SMALL FIRMS AND THE CRISIS OF FORDISM. 
- Fourth, the emergence of biotechnology was linked 
with small innovative science firms at a time when the role 
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of small firms in industrial advanced economies was being 
reevaluated. Indeed, the comparison with microelectronics 
also revolved around the role which small firms could play 
in developing technologies. Biotechnology innovation 
during the seventies and eighties took place in both 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) and Dedicated 
Biotechnology Firms (DBFs), the latter often set up by 
university researchers specifically to exploit new 
scientific opportunities. Biotechnology was closely 
associated with scientific discoveries made in university 
laboratories. University scientists, looking for 
commercial success, research establishments and 
entrepreneurs have been important agents in trying to 
establish commercial outlets and develop the technology. 
Events in the electronics sector, where some small 
companies innovated rapidly and very successfully, forcing 
competition and change led a broad range of business people 
and academics to reevaluate the role of the 'heroic 
entrepreneur'. With this renewed interest in Schumpeter's 
work on 'creative destruction', the importance of small 
firms in initiating innovations in the new areas became 
apparent. Moreover, the association of new technology and 
small firms seemed promising to many. Piore and Sabel 
wrote enthusiastically about the Second Industrial Divide 
that would signify the end of mass production as the 
dominant principle of industrial organization and the 
emergence of flexible specialization and smaller production 
units (Piore and Sabel, 1984). 
It became apparent during the 1970's and 80's that 
western industrialized countries no longer enjoyed 
unchallenged industrial and economic supremacy. Economic 
difficulties in the United States and Western Europe were 
highlighted and compounded by Japan's astounding rise as an 
industrial power. While western governments focused on 
trying to resolve problems by disciplining labor and with 
various types of monetary policy, academics and business 
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people increasingly identified problems in terms of 
industrial structure and an inability to innovate 
competitively. 
The French Regulation School (FRS) and Neo- 
Schumpetarian thinkers such as Freeman and Perez (1988), 
developed new ideas about the interaction between economic, 
technological and social and political factors. They 
suggested that a specific regime of accumulation governed 
different periods of capitalist development. Harvey 
summarizes the FRS approach: 
A regime of accumulation describes the 
stabilization over a long period of the 
allocation of the net product between consumption 
and accumulation; it implies some correspondence 
between the transformation of both the conditions 
of production and conditions of reproduction of 
wage earners. (Harvey, 1989: 121) 
FRS thinkers also highlighted the importance of 
social and cultural factors in creating 'regimes of 
accumulation'. They diagnosed the current crisis as 
resulting from the breakdown of the Fordist regime of 
accumulation and analyzed the future either in terms of 
Neo-Fordism (which involves changing practices, but 
remaining within the broad boundaries of the Fordist 
paradigm) or various Post Fordist scenerios (involving a 
more radical shift away from Fordist norms) (Nielsen, 
1992). 
The crisis in mass production derives from rigidities 
associated with Fordist production techniques (Lipietz, 
1987, Aglietta, 1987). FRS thinkers identified efforts by 
Western producers to increase 'flexibility' and now forms 
of flexible accumulation. 
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"[Flexible accumulation increases 
flexibility] ... with respect to labor processes, labor markets, products and patterns of 
consumption. It is characterized by the 
emergence of entirely new sectors of production, 
new ways of providing financial services, new 
markets, and, above all, greatly intensified 
rates of commercial, technological and, 
organizational innovation". (Harvey, 1989: 147) 
FRS thinkers saw the crisis provoking changes in 
Fordism. Some perceived that there would be quite high 
levels of continuation between Fordist regimes and their 
successors, others saw a more radical shift. In addition 
to analysis of pervasive change from this quarter, Neo- 
Schumpetarian also thinkers saw widespread changes in 
technical, economic and social spheres (Freeman and Perez, 
1988). 
Piore and Sabel share some common ground with these 
authors. Their analysis differs in some fundamental ways, 
however. They see the future in terms of a Second 
Industrial Divide and the emergence of a radically 
different production structure based on flexible 
specialization, emphasizing the central role of small 
production units. Piore and Sabel contest that niche 
marketing will be an important feature of the new 
industrial environment and that this, combined with new 
opportunities afforded by information technologies, will 
give small firms the ability to out compete large firms in 
many cases (Piore and Sabel, 1984). Flexible specialization 
would incorporate the following characteristics; 'flexible' 
production, involving smaller batches of more specialized 
goods; new computer systems and managerial practices 
making production increasingly 'demand driven'; multi- 
skilled and more highly trained workforces contributing to 
continuous innovation and improvement in output; heavier 
reliance on science and technology in order to improve 
products, rather than concentrating solely on cost 
reduction; increased horizontal collaboration between 
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firms; 'just-in-time' production techniques that involve 
radically different approaches to stock holding and quality 
control. While some of these characertistics overlap with 
broader Post Fordist visions, flexible specialization 
places much more emphasis on smaller scale units and small 
batches. 
References to places where more flexible production 
strategies were succeeding included Japan and the Third 
Italy (Harvey, 1989; Best, 1990) . 
Piore and Sabel's ideas have been widely criticised 
and shown to be limited to relatively few regions. 
Moreover, other writers have begun to make more 
sophisticated distinctions between flexible specialization 
and Post Fordism (Nielsen, 1992). These distinctions are 
based partly on the observation that while the Third Italy 
may conform to Piore and Sabel's notion of flexible 
specialization, Japan does not. While Japan displays Post 
Fordist characteristics (new work organization, different 
forms of collaboration between firms, smaller batches, etc) 
it is still dominated by large producers. Thus, the point 
has been made that Post Fordism should not be equated with 
flexible specialisation; the later only applies to a few 
cases, while the former term encompasses a wider range of 
changes in social, economic and technical environments. 
Freeman and Perez characterize some aspects of this broad 
shift to new industrial formations in the following way: 
... a growing search for new social and political 
solutions in such areas as flexible working time, 
shorter working hours, re-education and 
retraining systems, regional policies based on 
creating favorable conditions for information 
technology (rather than tax incentives to 
capital-intensive mass production industries), 
new financial systems, possible decentralization 
of management and government, and access to data 
banks and networks at all levels and new 
telecommunications systems" (Freeman and Perez, 
1988: 61). 
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This set of debates, then, constitutes the fourth 
reason why biotechnology was viewed with such excitement. 
Two main points are particularly relevant; the renewed 
interest in small firms reflected well on DBFs and the 
identification of technology as an important part of 
structural change made biotechnology, along with its big 
brother, microelectronics, seem like a miracle to some and 
a menace to others but in any case a significant 
phenomenon. Thus, at a time when Western economies were 
undergoing considerable change, biotechnology, along with 
new materials and microelectronics, were identified as 
technologies congruent with socio-economic conditions that 
would, in turn, be key players in shaping the future 
(OECD, 1988, Roobeek, 1987) . 
'Global' analysis is usually of limited help when 
applied to specific cases and this instance is no 
exception. One of the aims of this thesis is to 
investigate the extent to which sectorally specific factors 
contribute to an understanding of how and why innovation 
occurs in particular ways. This is not to say that 
biotechnology will not be an important future technology, 
or that it can be viewed in isolation from structural and 
global trends, rather that the logic of its technological 
trajectory cannot be deduced from the pattern of other 
technologies' entry to the world; the interaction between 
'the general' and the particular properties of the 
technology create a different story in the case of 
biotechnology, than for instance, new materials or 
microelectronics. 
In the case of biotechnology, aspects of wider 
economic restructuring did, of course, have concrete 
consequences on the rate and direction of innovation. The 
type of restructuring which was taking place in many 
western capitalist countries during the eighties involved 
increased privatization and an effort to expand the rule of 
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the market into new areas. In the UK, for example, new 
efforts to make universities correspond to the 'economic 
needs' of society, meant cutbacks in government funding and 
encouraged academics to turn to the business community for 
money. Biotechnology, born in university labs, was 
marketable and thus became a vehicle whereby universities 
could commercialize their activities (Webster and 
Etzkowitz, 1991). Nevertheless as the following chapters 
demonstrate, the rate and direction of innovation has been 
patchy. The interaction between general trends and 
specificities related to the technology and particular 
settings is immensely complicated. 
The following section briefly examines some of the 
principal theoretical and policy perspectives that have 
been used to understand and guide innovation and their 
relation to this study. Theoretical perspectives on 
innovation will be further discussed throughout the thesis 
and in particular in chapter 7. 
1.3., THEORETICAL CONTEXT. 
Schumpeter distinguishes between invention (an idea 
or a sketch, or a model for a new or improved device, 
product, process or system) and innovation (the first 
commercial transaction involving the new product, process, 
system or device) (Clark, 1985: 96-97). The relationship 
between science and invention is often very straightforward 
and direct. The step between invention and innovation is a 
more complex one, which by definition involves social and 
economic factors rather than exclusively technical 
considerations. Innovation involves socio-economic 
institutions such as firms and markets. Additionally, 
innovation increasingly involves the state and 
international governmental bodies, such as the EC (in 
funding R&D, regulating products and setting patent 
protection standards, etc. ). Moreover, the techniques and 
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products of innovation are both shaped by and in turn shape 
societies. Thus, there is an intimate and complicated set 
of relationships between technological innovation, 
innovating institutions, public policy, cultural practices, 
social and political pressure (Roobeek, 1987). 
The nature of innovation, its relationship to socio- 
economic factors and its role in creating economic success 
has been in the past relatively understudied, particularly 
within the realm of economic analysis. A number of 
excellent critiques of Neo-Classical economics identified 
crucial gaps in the theory and developed new research 
paradigms. A fundamental problem of the Neo-Classical 
approach is that it considers technological change as 
exogenous to the economic system. This assumption makes 
technology an independent variable quite unrelated to the 
dynamics of the broader system. Innovation and technical 
change are, in the Neo-Classical tradition, seen as shifts 
in the production function curve. Here, production in the 
firm is conceptualized as the combination of inputs or 
'factors of production', usually labour and capital. The 
technology used at any one time determines the techniques 
available for production and thus also determines the 
maximum level of output which can be obtained from a given 
level of inputs. 
"A technique is therefore effectively defined as 
a particular combination of factors of 
production. Among the available techniques the 
firm will choose the one which, given existing 
factor prices, minimizes total production costs" 
(Coombs et al, 1987: 25) . 
Thus, the Neo-Classical approach 'assumes' that the 
generation of technology is unproblematic, and diffusion is 
an automatic process, taking place among 'perfectly' 
informed producers who adopt on the basis of price 
efficiency. Whereas Classical approaches acknowledged the 
importance of context and institutions in the generation 
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and diffusion of technology, Neo-Classical approaches claim 
that the free market ensures successful innovation. 
This approach ignores the thorny problem of why firms 
would naturally innovate at an 'appropriate' or socially 
desirable level. As Schumpeter recognized, profit- 
maximizing firms will normally prefer others to undertake 
costly research, rather than take on the risk and cost 
themselves (Schumpeter, 1947 and 1961). Walsh summarizes 
some other problematic Neo-Classical assumptions which 
ignore some basic characteristics of technological change 
and innovation in 'the real world': 
The assumption that information about the market 
is available, reliable and accurate, whereas it 
is often impressionistic and patchy. 
That the market and competitors can be defined, 
whereas market boundaries are often unclear. 
That supply and demand are stable relative to 
one another, whereas they are often changing 
quite rapidly. 
That firms make decisions that are objectively 
rational in an economic sense, whereas 
competitors' behaviour is often economically 
"irrational", rationality is bounded and search 
routines are limited (Walsh, 1991a: 7). 
The numerous difficulties with the Neo-Classical 
model became more and more apparent during the second half 
of the twentieth century. 
The Second World War represents a turning point in 
attitudes toward science and technology. "Government 
officials and scientists were equally impressed by the part 
research and development had played in winning the war 
[and] saw clearly the potentialities for peace-time 
development" (King, quoted in Massey et al, 1992: 66). While 
the potential was recognized and massive increases in R&D 
spending followed World War II, it became apparent that 
greater spending did not always lead directly to increased 
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growth (Coombs et al, 1987: 4). Thus, during the nineteen 
sixties and seventies, policy, particularly under Labour 
governments in Britain, began to reflect the concern with 
linking science, technology and innovation (Coombs et 
al, 1987, Massey et al, 1992). The problem was seen in 
linear model terms; the challenge was to translate British 
excellence and inventiveness in science into successful 
innovation. The model identified 'science' as activity 
which occurs in the remote halls of academe, a source of 
economic growth which needs tapping. The logic of the 
model is such that "Science leads to technology; basic 
research to development and diffusion" (Massey et 
al, 1992: 58). A social division of labour is implicit in 
the model, with "white-coated scientists" being conferred 
with high status, while 
"... as we move further along the innovation line, 
according to the linear model, we move further 
from the high-status work to work that includes 
more engineers, designers, technicians, craft and 
other production workers, and salespeople. 
Status, historically, has been associated with 
distance from direct production, sales, and 
manual work, and closeness to clean, white-collar 
lab-type environments" (Massey et al, 1992: 58). 
In line with this model, the thrust of government 
initiatives, therefore, was constructed to increase 
spending on science and R&D and close the gap between 
university based research and industrial concerns. 
However, attempts to intervene in a more 'hands on' manner 
in the private sector were strongly resisted, thus, 
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"In the 1960s and 1970s, as in the early post-war 
Labour government, though state funding was 
welcomed, any attempts to intervene actively to 
change the nature of British industry were 
resisted strongly by industrial owners. So 
attempts to pull together the stages of 
innovation in the UK led to further separations. 
Thus the introduction of management education in 
universities and polytechnics emphasized general 
management over management of production 
processes. And investment in universities, 
government research labs, nationalized 
industries, military and nuclear industries, 
though it produced islands of R&D excellence and 
career paths for another large group of post-war 
graduates in science and technology... always came 
up against the wall of a significant section of 
private industry that neither invested nor wished 
to invest" (Massey et al, 1991: 69). 
Massey et al carried out extensive research on 
Science Parks, which embody one of the latest attempts to 
link science and industry. Science parks, which first 
emerged in the US, offered a "new variant on the linear 
model of innovation". The science park is consistent with 
the linear model "based as it is on academe as the source 
of research ideas to be developed in park enterprises and 
manufactured elsewhere" (Massey et al, 1992: 71). It differs 
in that in some respects it is closer to a Post Fordist or 
flexible specialization type of model mentioned earlier in 
the chapter which involves small, dynamic and innovative 
companies engaged in niche marketing (Massey et 
al, 1992: 71). Thus, whereas other attempts to integrate 
science and industry were aimed primarily at vertically 
integrated industrial corporations, science parks invoked 
"the principle of the individual sci-tech entrepreneur". 
Instead of trying to take science to industry, this was an 
attempt to move the other way along the line and move 
commercial interests closer to science and academia. 
A number of constraints to successful innovation in 
firms located in science parks existed. One of the 
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problems was that firms failed to develop 'leading edge' 
technologies. 
"Many science-park enterprises operate under 
extremely short-term market pressures, 
drastically constraining their ability to 
undertake long-term and risky 'leading edge' 
innovation. In practice, many see themselves 
proudly more as shorter-term and smaller-scale 
commercialisers and advisers about technology 
than as leading-edge innovators" (Massey et 
al, 1992: 73) . 
Although the majority were not based-on science- 
parks, the firms I visited, like the companies studied by 
Massey et al, found it impossible to fulfill their assigned 
role in'the linear-model; DBFs found that the lack of long 
term funding, difficulties in negotiating regulatory 
hurdles, lack of management experience and uncertainty 
about how to deal with an uncertain patents situation, left 
them unable to develop more radical and higher-value 
techniques. Additionally, companies considered in both 
Massey et al's study and this research lacked 'tacit' 
knowledge about technical aspects of the development 
process; thus knowledge about 'scaling up' for example, was 
a problem in a number of cases. The problems experienced 
by DBFs and the small companies in the Massey et al study 
point to inadequacies of the model. 
An additional problem with the linear model which 
applies to both large and small firms, is that it largely 
overlooks sectoral differences in the way, in which 
innovation happens (Pavitt, 1984). Nor does it incorporate 
the numerous factors, internal and external to firms which 
can influence innovation and it disregards the fact that 
the starting point for innovation is not necessarily basic 
science, but sometimes 'the shop floor (Vincenti, 1984). 
There has been increasing recognition among policy 
makers, academics and business people that innovation and 
technological change need to be analyzed rather than simply 
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assumed as an extension of scientific invention which will 
be guided by the market. Analyzing related problems in 
terms of inadequacies of purely market based solutions and 
speaking specifically about biotechnology, Webster writes, 
"There is little point in having policies for 
technology if, at the same time, policies for 
industry are ignored: as recent analyses have 
shown... the market is a relatively poor mechanism 
through which the exploitation of R&D is effected 
(Webster, 1990: 382). - 
Analysis of institutions, such as"firms, in which 
innovation occurs has been inadequately conceptualized in a 
range of theoretical approaches to innovation. The FRS 
approach provides a valuable, but very general, 
methodological and theoretical framework which links 
technological trajectories and patterns of production and 
consumption. Perspectives developed in the field of social 
shaping of science and technology, while useful, tended to 
focus on the technology itself and ignore the role of the 
firm in innovation. Sectoral perspectives, for instance 
those articulated in widely referred to work by Pavitt 
(1984), are important in that they demonstrate that 
sectoral characteristics impact on the rate and direction 
of innovation. However, various authors (Coombs and 
Richards, 1991, Amendola and Bruno, 1990) have pointed out 
that the approach does not account for differentiation 
amongst firms within sectors the different ways in which 
firms respond to changing sectoral characteristics. In 
recent writings, Coombs and Richards (1991) Green (1991) 
and Amendola and Bruno (1990) have attempted to introduce 
new perspectives which incorporate more formal analysis of 
the firm and innovation. 
Additionally, recent research on biotechnology 
innovation has also stressed the importance of 
institutional factors, public policy and culture in shaping 
markets and therefore demand for innovation (Green, 1991 
Walsh, 1991b, Tait and Levidow, 1992, Tait et al, 1990). 
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These factors are indeed important in biotechnology 
innovation as will be seen in the following chapters. 
Theoretical perspectives are clearly in need of 
further development. Adequate theoretical frameworks for 
innovation should incorporate broad perspectives on the 
interaction between technology and production and 
consumption patterns, but also recognize the centrality of 
the firm as the principal innovating institution in 
advanced capitalist societies. In an article which 
reflects a number of key features of this approach, 
Amendola and Bruno (1990) write that innovation must be 
seen as a. process of change in both the firm and its 
environment. Additionally, the specificity and particular 
characteristics of technology must also be recognized. 
While this thesis does not attempt to construct such a 
theoretical edifice, the information generated by the study 
could contribute to such an effort. 
1.4. FRAMEWORK FOR THE THESIS. 
The research involved in this study, carried out over 
two years between 1989-1991, exposed a complex and uneven 
terrain of biotechnology innovation. Biotechnology seemed 
to 'fit' with more general trends in the global economy; it 
was science and technology intensive, its-unique technical 
properties gave new possibilities for specialization, 
flexibility and control. Small new biotechnology firms 
appeared to embody a number of Post Fordist ideals; they 
promised to be very innovative, close to academe, cross- 
sectoral, specialized, flexible and focusing on niche 
marketing by introducing high value/low volume new 
products. However, the thesis argues that these firms 
often failed to translate research projects into innovation 
at the development stage because there was not the 'know- 
how' or facilities within firms needed to generate 
products, nor were there institutional supports which could 
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have helped them prosper (Webster, 1990, Tait et al, 1990, 
Oakey et al, 1990) . 
MNCs, examined in chapter 4, were pursuing a wide 
range of different strategies. At one extreme, one of the 
companies examined had restructured itself largely on the 
basis of biotechnology and was fully committed. At the 
other extreme, one company had largely divested itself of 
mainstream agricultural biotechnology. Another company was 
pursuing a very cautious strategy and was convinced that 
agricultural inputs would be dominated by the continued use 
of chemicals for the foreseeable future. Regulations, and 
the relatively low value nature of agricultural markets, 
patent legislation, organizational and cultural aspects of 
firms and political perceptions, both internal and external 
to the firm all influenced the rate and direction of 
innovation in both DBFs and MNCs. 
Thus, while it seemed to many that biotechnology 
would offer rapid solutions to growth problems within the 
agricultural and food sectors and in more general terms 
would contribute to industrial growth in the Western world, 
the actual rate of innovation has been slower than 
anticipated. The path of innovation seemed blocked and the 
prognosis about future developments vacillated during the 
eighties; on the one hand there remained a fascination 
with the techniques and on the other many in the business 
community became daunted by enormous technical and non- 
technical challenge involved in innovation. Whilst there 
have been some significant process and product innovations 
during the eighties, there have also been significant 
problems. 
Various theoretical perspectives, as suggested in the 
previous section, can contribute to an understanding of 
biotechnology innovation. First, I argue that in order to 
understand the dynamics the innovation process it is 
necessary to move away from the linear model as an 
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interpretative or predictive guide. Dosi, (1988) in a 
review of the innovation process has put forward five 
'stylized facts' or propositions about innovation: 
1. Innovation involves a fundamental element of 
uncertainty. 
2. Contemporary technological innovation is 
increasingly reliant on advances in scientific 
knowledge. 
3. The increasing complexity of research and 
innovative activities militates in favor of 
formal organizations (firms' R&D labs, government 
labs, universities) as opposed to individual 
inventors. 
4. Significant numbers of innovations are 
originated through 'learning by doing' and 
'learning by using'. 
5. Technical change is a cumulative activity. 
The first three points do not necessarily stand in 
contradiction with the linear model of innovation (Massey 
et al, 1992: 79). The fourth and fifth, however, do not fit 
as well. 
Dosi's five 'facts' can provide insights into the 
specifics of biotechnology innovation in both large and 
small firms. Their relation to the findings will become 
apparent in the following chapters and connections will be 
explicitly made in chapter 7. A very brief summary of 
connections to be made in following chapters is as follows: 
Points 1 and 2 clearly apply to biotechnology innovation 
which is characterized both by high levels of uncertainty 
and a sustained attempt by firms to get closer to the 
science base which they perceive will give them competitive 
advantage. Point 3, contributes to our understanding of 
why many DBFs have found successful innovation such an 
elusive goal. Teece's observations about how possession of 
complementary assets such as marketing and distribution 
facilities, contribute to large firms gaining the most from 
innovations, whether or not they have actually developed 
them, are also important in this respect (Teece, 1986). 
However, as chapter 4 demonstrates, the increasing 
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complexity of innovation also posed serious challenges for 
MNCs. Rothwell summarizes some of the main-elements of the 
complexity which characterize the 1980s and early 1990s. 
"During the... period (early 1980s-1990) the 
situation appears... complex with a broader 
combination of central themes: de- 
diversification; technological accumulation; 
inter-firm collaboration; and global strategies" 
(Rothwell, 1991: 15). 
Point 4, stresses the importance of 'tacit' 
knowledge in innovation. This concept sheds light on both 
large and small firms in the study in a number of important 
ways. For example, DBFs had problems in developing and 
marketing products because of lack of experience and large 
firms found that they could not respond as quickly as 
smaller counterparts who had knowledge embodied in 
individual members of teams and scientific culture and a 
'feel' for biotechnology. It will be argued that 
acceptance of the idea of 'tacit' knowledge and 'learning 
by doing' has both management and public policy 
implications, which have been recognized in other contexts, 
for example, Japan and South Korea3. Dosi's fifth fact is 
also an important insight; the contention here is that 
because technical change is cumulative, "What the firm can 
hope to do technologically in the future is heavily 
constrained by what it has been capable of doing in the 
past. " (Dosi, 1988: 225) Thus it takes time for firms to 
learn not only about scientific properties but also about 
technical issues associated with development and the social 
frameworks associated with different technologies; how to 
deal with patents and regulations for example. 
3 See Alice Amsden, (1990) 'Third World 
Industrialization: 'Global Fordism' or a New Model? ' for an 
analysis of S. Korea's rise as an industrial power. Amsden 
argues the country has pursued a strategy of 'learning by 
doing' and this is an important component of its rapid 
industrialization. 
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Points 4 and 5 give rise to a number of complicated 
questions about university/industry relations and inter- 
industry collaboration, analyzed in chapter 5. If the 
analysis is accepted it implies that firms must manage 
their collaborative efforts carefully and that successful 
technology transfer cannot simply constitute buying 
. 
discrete pieces of information. However, precisely because 
innovation is cumulative and is a process of learning by 
doing, large established firms will depend to some extent 
on links with the outside so that they may break with the 
past. While large firms had numerous advantages over 
smaller counterparts, chapter 4 demonstrates that firms can 
be constrained by past activity and must identify ways to 
change and to 'unlearn'. 
The findings of the thesis have complicated 
implications for Post-Fordist theory as it relates to 
innovation. While the issues are apparent in various 
places in the thesis, they are directly discussed in much 
greater detail in chapters 3 and 7. While the study 
concurred with a number of points raised by Post-Fordist 
theorists, predictions that small firms would play a 
leading role in final product innovation are questioned. 
Many managers interviewed agreed that production was 
becoming increasingly science and technology driven and 
that the pace of change was increasing rapidly. Post 
Fordist thinkers predict that this would lead to increasing 
collaboration between large firms and specialized 
producers. While new forms of collaboration were being 
sought after by many of the firms examined in the study, 
four out five of the large companies either had very few 
collaborative ventures with DBFs or did not pursue these 
types of collaboration at all (although as has been 
suggested, they may have benefited from increased 
collaboration). 
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In more theoretical terms, there are curious 
ambiguities in some of the Post Fordist writing. First, 
along with those who have shed light on the failings of the 
linear model, Post Fordist theory suggests that 
"... innovation requires the integration of all skills 
(marketing, design, production and R&D) at all stages of 
the process" (Massey et al, 1992: 71). The two theories 
share common ground in suggesting that R&D functions and 
further downstream elements of the production process need 
to be much more tightly linked than often occurs in more 
traditional Taylorist firms. However, this sits somewhat 
uneasily with some of the flexible specialization claim 
that small, flexible producers are the innovators of the 
future and that high levels of vertical integration are an 
outmoded Fordist phenomenon. These small firms are often 
unable to get significant final products to market and are 
in many cases far removed in terms of geographical and 
cultural space from final product developers. 
These points relate to factors influencing the 
generation of innovation at the level-of firms, which it 
has been argued constitute key innovating institutions. 
However, other factors which directly affect demand and 
markets, and which contribute to the shaping of markets, 
must also be taken into account. Firms do not operate in a 
vacuum. Thus, I will argue that in order to see the whole 
picture of biotechnology innovation, consideration must be 
given to market and price structures in the agricultural 
and food sectors. Technology and innovation are related to 
wider social, political and economic processes. This is 
discussed in chapter 5 which focuses on institutions and 
markets. Chapter 6 examines non-market factors such as 
regulation, patent legislation, public opinion. These non- 
market forces are social and political constructs which 
shape demand and consumption patterns. These factors 
cannot be tacked on the end as 'additional factors' in 
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studies of innovation, they are integral to the process. 
Firms have responded to these influences in a number of 
ways including changing their production strategies and 
becoming actively involved, as political actors, in shaping 
markets. For example, a number of large MNCs involved in 
biotechnology innovation set up an organization called the 
Senior Advisory Group on Biotechnology (SAGB), among other 
things in order to lobby for a European regulatory regime 
which would suit their needs. Other firms have been 
engaged directly or indirectly in trying to win over the 
public and professional bodies to biotechnology. The 
implication here is that successful innovation is not only 
the result of having the right production environment, but 
is also related to appropriate external environments 
(regulations, patents, attitudes of policy makers, relevant 
professional bodies and consumers). Moreover, firms must 
be understood as political and social as well as economic 
actors. Amendola and Bruno's (1990) characterization of 
innovation as a process of change in both the firm and 
environment clearly applies here. 
This chapter outlined the issues considered in this 
thesis and the theoretical frame which guides the study. 
The following chapters attempt to shed light on the thesis 
objectives as defined at the beginning of the chapter. Key 
issues to be discussed include the following: An 
examination of social, political and economic factors 
influencing innovation; consideration of the institutional 
factors that affect the rate and direction of change; the 
critique of the linear model of innovation and related 
observations about Post Fordist theory. The theoretical 
issues raised in the final section of the chapter will be 
raised at appropriate points throughout the thesis and will 
be considered in more detail in chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 2. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
COMPANIES AND A DISCUSSION OF METHODOLOGY. 
This chapter discusses aspects of methodology and 
provides details of interviewing structure and the 
companies involved in the survey. Methodological and 
theoretical perspectives are not separate issues. 
Therefore, Section 2.1. discusses both methodology and 
theoretical underpinnings to the approach taken in this 
study. Section 2.2. explains more practical details of 
how interviews were carried out and techniques used during 
the interviews. Section 2.3. provides details of the 
companies visited. 
2.1. THEORY BEHIND THE PRACTICE. 
The study was designed in order to further 
understanding about what factors influence managers' 
strategic decision making about biotechnology innovation. 
As I aimed to find out as much as possible about the way 
managers perceived biotechnology innovation currently, in- 
depth interviewing was the most appropriate technique. 
Although the unit of analysis was a firm operating within a 
specific sector, and the focus on company strategy, it was 
not possible to interview an organization in order to find 
out its views. Organizations are made up of individuals 
and therefore the entry point to the study was the 
individual. Organizations and individuals within them are 
not the same thing, nor can organizations be reduced to the 
people who constitute them. Harmony between managers' 
views cannot, of course, be taken for granted and 
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organizational goals and formal strategy may be interpreted 
in varying ways in practice. Nor can firms be considered 
in isolation. R&D decision making and strategy in a 
company is a product of this interaction between manager, 
firm and external environment. 
The following systems diagrams (Systems Diagrams 2.1. 
and 2.2. ) portray elements in the relationship between 
manager, firm and key elements commonly seen as affecting 
innovation in the external environment. 
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The logic behind the diagrams is the level of 
control exercised by the firm (the system) over factors 
which affect its operation. The manager operates within 
the context of the firm and is therefore represented within 
the boundaries of the system. While the firm has ultimate 
control over any individual manager, the relationship is of 
course a two way process; the manager can, and in most 
cases is expected to, influence decisions in the firm. 
Culture and organization are more problematic. First, 
there is perhaps a problem in using the notion of 'control' 
in relation to difficult and elusive concepts such as 
culture. It maybe more accurate in some circumstances to 
view the culture as having control over the company. 
Nevertheless, the concept lies firmly within the boundaries 
of the firm and can be seen as ultimately something which 
the firm can, given the desire, at very least alter and 
change. The second problem is that the interaction between 
culture and organization and managers will differ; the size 
and nature of the firm and his/her place in it will affect 
the relationship between these factors and the manager. A 
top manager in a small firm (diagram 2) will have more 
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influence over culture and organization than say, an R&D 
manager in a large firm. However, the firm, (rather than 
the manager within the firm) being smaller and more 
vulnerable has less control over culture and other factors. 
(diagram 2). Diagram 1, representing the situation in a 
large firm, has culture within the boundaries of the 
system, indicating the greater control which large firms 
have over factors influencing their operations. The 
external environment, within which the firm operates, 
affects the system, but the system, the firm, does not have 
control over it. Firms may try and influence such factors 
as patent legislation and regulatory regime, but will have 
virtually no control over these factors as an individual 
firm. The firm will have more some control over finance 
and collaboration with other firms and universities, 
although not complete control, thus these concepts appear 
on the boundary of the diagram. New technology appears 
both on the inside and outside of the system boundary in- 
both diagrams. This is because new technology generated 
within the firm can be controlled, whereas new technology 
generated by other actors cannot. 
Within the realm of systems analysis, Ackoff makes a 
distinction between 'problems' and 'messes'. 
"Managers are not confronted with problems that 
are independent of each other, but with dynamic 
situations that consist of complex systems of 
changing problems that interact with each other. 
I call such situations messes. Problems are 
abstractions extracted from messes by analysis; 
they are to messes as atoms are to tables and 
chairs. "4 (Ackoff, quoted in Rosenhead, 1989: 10) 
Thus, as a researcher, I constructed a problem, or, 
more accurately, a set of questions, but had to try and 
understand the messy situation in the firm. The method of 
4 Ackoff is writing in critical mode; he is 
outlining a number of the problems associated with 
traditional approaches used in Operational Research (OR). 
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loosely structured in-depth interviewing reflected a desire 
to tackle the mess from the managers' holistic perspective 
while at the same time getting relevant information about 
the problem (R&D and Strategic decisions at the level of 
the firm). 
Giddens, (1976) in his work on the limits of 
interpretive sociology argues that it has failed to 
conceptualize institutional analysis adequately and that 
this has caused a number of problems in relating 'meaning' 
to 'action' and in distinguishing between intended action 
and unintended outcomes. (Giddens, 1976: 158) He says, 
"The failure of the Anglo-American philosophy of 
action to develop a concern with institutional 
analysis is reflected in an over concentration 
upon purposive conduct. Thus many authors have 
been inclined to assimilate 'action' with 
'intended action', and 'meaningful act' with 
'intended outcome'; and they have not been much 
interested in the theoretical analysis of the 
origins of the purposes that actors endeavor to 
realize, which are assumed as given, or the 
intended consequences that courses of purposive 
action serve to bring about" (Giddens, 1976: 156). 
Giddens strikes at the heart of a long-standing 
sociological debate about relationships between intention 
and outcome and subjective truth and action and objective 
reality. The question of the relationship between 
subjective meaning and objective reality is a key 
problematic of sociological method and theory and it is not 
the aim of this thesis to summarize or explicate the 
debate. However, there is no avoiding the question of 
whether talking to managers and trying to establish how 
they construct 'meaning' and strategy (or how they choose 
to describe their world to inquisitive researchers) would 
get us nearer to learning about the action and practice of 
innovation. A number of points are relevant here. 
This study was not limited to understanding 
innovation on the basis of manager's perceptions. Attempts 
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have been made to consider the firm as a whole and also the 
environment in which the firm operates. However, the main 
'field work' tool consisted of in-depth interviewing. The 
limits of this methodology and the way in which findings 
are used in the study requires some discussion. I am not 
claiming that managers' perceptions necessarily reflect the 
reality of the firm, nor that strategy as envisaged by 
individual managers is necessarily equated with what the 
firm actually does. Nor am I suggesting that intended 
action can be equated unthinkingly with outcome. Indeed, 
unintended consequences have played an important role in 
some aspects of biotechnology innovation and these will be 
made explicit in the thesis. Moreover, this study is based 
on a case study approach where sample size imposes limits 
on the generality of claims which can be made. A number of 
concepts are relevant to the methodology used. First, with 
regard to the relationship between subjective understanding 
and objective reality I subscribe to the view that modern 
history does not move according to some unalterable 'logic 
of capitalism', or 'invisible hand of the market'. Nor do 
I believe that a voluntaristic approach which ignores 
structural constraints is accurate. The 'logic' of 
capitalism is the combination of system requisites (the 
profit motive), institutional structures and subjective 
interpretation and action. There is no determining 
relationship involved. It is the interaction between these 
different levels of reality, and the way in which they 
break down into each other, which is important. 5 Thus, 
while the data generated from field work relate to 
5 In some sense, this constitutes the core of the 
critique of neo-classical economics, which only gives 
credence to the operations of the market. Obviously, this 
position also differs from technological or economical 
determinisim, both of which can be found in various strands 
of Marxist writings, but which many would argue is not a 
necessary component of Marxist theory. See Nathan 
Rosenburg, (1982) for a discussion of marxist approaches to 
technology. 
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individual perception, the study attempts to incorporate 
some consideration of this interaction and reflects on 
implications for theories of innovation. 
Second, the above point suggests a connection between 
interpretation (managers' understandings and action) and 
the pattern of innovation. A key point which should be 
mentioned here is the manager's place in the organization. 
Here, I have concentrated on developing a picture of 
biotechnology innovation from the perspective of managers 
of firms. Their 'meaning' is related to the 'action' of 
innovation, but within limits; their interpretation of 
events and their prescriptions, are filtered through the 
organization of the firm (Morgan, 1986). The methods used 
by Pettigrew (1985) in his seminal study of ICI were 
similar to those used here, apart from the development of 
detailed accounts of the internal workings of the firm. 
However, particularly where I conducted a number of 
interviews within a firm, an overview has been produced in 
addition to individual assessments. Specifically, I aimed 
to understand the firm from different managers' 
perspectives, to understand organizational structures, the 
company's culture and organizational ethos and I also made 
distinctions, where it seemed appropriate6 between 
managers' perceptions and prescriptions, the official 
'line' taken by the firm and the action of the firm. Often 
managers themselves would make these distinctions explicit 
in the course of the interview. Interviews were backed up 
by reviews of company literature which reflects the 
organizational perspective, rather than the individual's 
6 Obviously, the kind of impact that individuals had 
on their firm and vica versa depended a great deal on the 
context. For instance in a number of the smaller 
companies, individual managers, particularly if they were 
founders of the company had 'stamped' their companies in 
quite profund ways. Compare this with a lower level 
manager in a large MNC. The degree of influence which 
individuals have depends on the level of bureaucratization 
and their position in the organization Morgan (1986). 
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interpretation. Additionally, several interviews were 
conducted with other academics working on projects related 
to biotechnology, consultants and a leading journalist 
concerned with biotechnology. A literature search acted 
also as a check on the data. 
In summary, the research used in-depth interviewing 
techniques to examine firms' strategies and strategic 
thinking and from those observations, combined with 
documentary research and additional interviews, drew 
conclusions about factors influencing the rate and 
direction of innovation. 
The concept of strategy is important to the thesis. 
Moreover, the terms strategy and strategic decision making, 
as they will be defined here, bring together a number of 
theoretical points. The following assumptions, (adapted 
from Webster and Swain, 1991) portray one view of strategic 
thinking and action: 
A calculation of rational action by individuals 
or collectivities, recognizing, however, that 
what may be rational for the individual is not 
necessarily so for the collective; 
Choice: i. e. there are alternative courses of 
action which are considered but dismissed as 
inappropriate. However, concepts of 'bounded 
rationality' and 'selection environments' 
(Morgan, 1986) denoting limits imposed by external 
environments and structures in the--latter case 
and of knowledge, experience and value systems in 
the former are also recognized. 
Conscious agency and a sustained pattern of 
behaviour to achieve ends which can be conceived 
of in terms of Weber's purposive-rational and 
value rational forms; 
Agency in the context of interaction (in this 
case, within the firm and with the external 
environment) 
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Recognition that some have a greater capacity 
than others to choose a form of action (a 
strategy) which maximizes their interests (i. e. 
that some have more power and resources than 
others). 
One of the problems with the concept of strategy is 
that it is always in firms' interest to portray strategic 
decisions as having been successful, thus managers may 
change accounts of strategy retrospectively if it failed. 
Although a surprising number of managers' admitted to their 
own and their company's errors of judgement, our approach 
was one of caution. Another related problem with using 
this concept of strategy is that not all behaviour or 
thought is rational. Strategy often at least partially 
results less from rationality and more from cultural 
attributes of the firm, combined with the neccesity of 
responding to changing economic conditions. Forces 
external to the firm which provoke change are considered in 
the thesis and in chapters 3 and 4 the concept of culture 
is introduced with respect to firms examined. In combining 
these different perspectives, I hope to avoid the problem 
identified by David Knights and Glenn Morgan (1990) whereby 
"... strategic analysis invariably slides either into 
voluntarism where there is an elevation of subjective 
intention or... falls back on structural determinations in 
which strategy is seen as a product of market forces. " The 
thesis suggests that strategy, meaning longer term 
planning, is the outcome of rational, conscious thinking 
and non-rational thought and behaviour. Moreover, as 
already noted in the discussion relating to the systems 
diagrams it is a balance between factors internal and 
external to the firm. 
Culture is an elusive and complicated concept and 
has been debated widely by academics (Thompson et al, 1990; 
Harvey, 1989). The concept is summarized in relation to 
companies by Nancy Foy in the following way. 
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"A company culture is the collection of its 
almost instinctive beliefs, allergies, heroes, 
villains, accomplishments, caveats and 
commandments Some of these like the neuroses of 
individuals, are so deeply rooted that their 
origins are lost in the mists of past events, 
while others have vivid, visible causes. " (The 
Guardian, 2 September, 1981) 
This description identifies possible roots of 
cultural attributes. While it touches on the intangible 
nature of the concept and the non-rational nature of much 
firm behaviour, it does not provide sufficient definition 
and its transposition of psychological constructs, applied 
normally to individuals, to organizations could be called 
into question. For the purposes of this study, it'was 
necessary to 'operationalize' the concept by identifying 
specific, distinguishable characteristics. One of the 
companies I visited had studied the connections between 
corporate culture, values and strategy. They hoped to be 
able to decipher competitors' future actions according to 
value and cultural orientation. In one study, they 
attempted to identify corporate'value systems. They did 
this by reading through competitor's published statements 
and annual reports identifying and counting key words and 
from this deducing broader cultural orientations. While 
this research project takes a different approach, the 
categories developed by company managers are useful ways of 
distinguishing between different companies' 
characteristics. The following list includes several of 
the categories which they used in order to differentiate 
between corporate values and one other (the last to appear 
on the list) which I have added and which relates to the 
specific concerns of this study: 
- Security of profits 
- Costs orientation 
- Growth orientation 
- Product excellence 
- Consumer orientation 
- Scientific and technological excellence 
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These attributes could be either 'cultural' or 
'strategic' in the rational sense and the categories 
contribute to understanding differences between companies' 
orientations in a useful way. They will be used as 
descriptive tools in addition to other cultural 
characteristics, which encompass some of the more ambiguous 
elements incorporated in Foy's understanding of the term 
and which became apparent in interviews. 
2.2. PRACTICE AND TECHNIQUES. 
I conducted in depth, semi-structured interviews with 
middle and senior level managers in each firms. In a 
number of cases I was also given access to lower level 
managers and R&D scientists. This proved valuable; lower 
level managers are not so accustomed to being interviewed 
or talking about their work to outsiders and perhaps 
because of this they were keen to discuss their job and 
their perspective of the firm's strategies and decision 
making processes. Their accounts often painted a very 
different picture from that of high level personnel. For 
instance, it was not until I spoke with a relatively junior 
financial manager in one company that I learnt that a 
deadline had been agreed between funders and top management 
to give the company six months in which to generate a 
profit. If no profits were forthcoming, parts of the 
company would be sold off. In another instance a lower 
level research manager painted a picture of an 
organizational structure within the firm that was rife with 
problems, whereas more senior managers had described a much 
more harmonious atmosphere. 
Interviews usually lasted between one and half hours 
and two hours and were tape recorded unless the interviewee 
objected. There were, perhaps surprisingly, very few 
objections to being recorded. I went into each interview 
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with a clear idea of areas which needed covering, but tried 
as much as possible to establish a relaxed, informal 
discursive mode rather than a question and answer session. 
The aim of the interviews was to get managers' accounts of 
factors affecting decision making about strategy and R&D 
within the firm. The interviewing situation is a complex 
one; it is impossible to interview with the purpose of 
extracting defined information and at the same time to let 
interviewees lead the discussion so that they are more 
accurately giving their own opinions and perceptions. 
Nevertheless, recognizing these boundaries and my own role 
in the interviews, I believe the loosely structured 
interviews gave a truer reflection of manager's priorities 
and concerns, rather than simply a reflection of my own 
perception of the situation. I also listened very hard, 
not only to the content of what the interviewee said, but 
also to the tone of voice and watched as much I could. 
Often when I realized that I had touched on a sensitive 
area I would make a mental note to come back to the 
subject, sometimes through a different line of inquiry 
later in the interview. Sometimes approaching the same 
subject from a different angle elicited slightly different 
reactions. Sometimes it was the same reaction but by 
leaving difficult issues to the end of the interview I 
could keep interviews relaxed for as long as possible. 
Interviews were later transcribed and content analyzed. 
During the interviews, and later for the purposes of 
analyzing and presenting the data, I used a cognitive 
mapping technique called COPE. COPE is a qualitative 
technique which has been used extensively in consultancy 
situations. It was developed as part of a more 
comprehensive approach called Strategic Options Development 
and Analysis (SODA) to be employed by OR consultants 
(Eden, 1989). It is based on Kelly's Personal Construct 
Theory and is designed to aid decision makers in problem 
solving. Eden, the originator of COPE says, 
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"The particular body of psychological theory is 
cognitive theory. It argues that human beings 
are continually striving to 'make sense' of their 
world in order to 'manage and control' that 
world. In this way it implicitly sees the 
individual as a problem finder/solver, using 
concepts rather than emotion to guide action. 
Therefore, it suits the particular purpose of 
working with individuals who are constrained by a 
need to explain their actions within their 
organizational world (Eden, 1989: 25). 
Cognitive mapping, then, is a modeling technique 
which intends to portray ideas, beliefs, and cultural 
values and attitudes and their relationship to one another 
in a form which is amenable to study and analysis. It 
relates to the perspective taken in this study on strategic 
thought and action, in that it is based on the principle 
that while not all thought or behaviour is rational, people 
try to 'make sense' and construct rationality. 
The technique was developed in consultancy situations 
and here interviewer and interviewee consult the map 
together at various points during the interview. This 
gives the interviewee the chance to see what he or she has 
said and the connections which are being made and in order 
that people can explain their ideas more fully. Used in 
this way COPE is thought to be a useful facilitative device 
(Eden, 1989) and goes beyond being a methodological tool. 
The interaction between interviewer and interviewee is 
analogous to the interaction between a counselor and 
client. The counselor tries to act as a mirror so that the 
client may look at their own world view with more distance 
and in this way reconstruct their beliefs, actions and 
feelings. COPE is a facilitative device which allows for 
this kind of reflective consideration. 
I was not using the technique in a consultancy 
situation, therefore the aim was not to use the technique 
as a learning device for the manager, but in a more limited 
manner. I used COPE as a very useful way of collecting 
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data and as an analytical tool which would help to order 
data and therefore to better understand situations. Thus, 
interviewees did not consult maps during the interview, 
although maps were sent back to managers after interviews 
in order that they may comment on them. 
The technique proved useful in the interviewing 
situation in that it painted a picture of the interview and 
pointed to areas which had not been talked about 
sufficiently or to connections which the manager might be 
implying. Thus, it helped identify gaps in interviews and 
served as a 'prompt' to ask follow up questions. It is 
also an extremely useful way of compiling and presenting 
data. 
The following conventions were used in constructing 
the maps: 
-ideas (concepts) are usually placed in a 
hierarchical format with high priority goals 
appearing at the top of the map. 
-ideas are expressed as far as possible in the. 
language used by the interviewee; 
-where appropriate from the context of the 
interview, the opposite, negative pole of a 
concept (as envisaged by the interviewee) is 
indicated after the insertion of a dotted line; 
-the arrows link lower level options to desired 
outcomes, or, in a similar sense, consequences to 
causes; 
-a negative sign attached to an arrow indicates 
that the lower level concept links to the 
negative pole of the higher level concept; 
-there is no significance in the numbers attached 
to each concept; they merely represent the order 
in which the concepts were entered into the 
computer. However, they are a convenient means 
of identifying concepts. 
The following map (Cope map 2.1. ) is based on an 
imaginary interview with a graduate student about to embark 
on a Ph. D. Initially, in the course of conversation the 
overall goal is defined by the interviewed in the following 
way, 'Write a good Ph. D. thesis' (concept 1). The 
interviewee then identifies a number of factors which will 
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enable her to realize this goal. 'Create time and 
resources' (concept 2) has a direct link with the ability 
to write the thesis. The interviewee, in response to 
questions identifies 'financial resources' (concept 3) as a 
particularly important resource and goes on to say that she 
has a government grant but finds this inadequate (concept 
4) Because the government grant is thought to be 
insufficient and is expressed in negative terms, a negative 
arrow links concept 3 and 4. The interviewer then tries to 
establish what other options the woman has for earning or 
gaining more money. She says that she is considering 
taking on work as a part-time tutor in a local polytechnic 
(concept 5, connected to concept 3). Although this will 
cut down on the time available for the Ph. D. thesis, it 
seemed to her better than poorly paid waitressing work 
which was the other option she mentioned. Waitressing is 
incorporated as a 'rather than' (denoted by the symbol .. ). 
in concept 5. Because the interviewee, however, considered 
that tutoring will cut down on time which could be used to 
work on the thesis, a negative arrow links concept 5 to 
concept 2. 
The interviewer then looks at the map which has been 
constructed and asks the woman why she wants to write a 
Ph. D. The interviewee responds that she wants a Ph. D. in 
order to work as lecturer and researcher. Thus the top 
goal changes to 'Get a job as lecturer/researcher' (concept 
6). The women then remembers another reason why she 
preferred to take a job as a tutor; she felt that teaching 
experience would enhance her opportunities of finding work 
as a lecturer later as she would have had some teaching 
experience. The interviewer adds the map, 'get teaching 
experience', (concept 7) and draws an arrow from concept 5 
to concept 7 and from concept 7 to concept 6. 
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6. Get a job as a lecturer/ 
researcher. 
ZZ 
. 1. Write a good 
PhD thesis. 
2. Create time and Get teaching 
resources. experience. 
3. Acquire financial 
resources. 5. Work at poly... 
take waitressing job. 
4. Rely on government 
grant. 
2.3 INTERVIEW SCHEDULES AND BASIC DETAILS ABOUT 
COMPANIES INVOLVED IN THE STUDY. 
This section provides details of how companies were 
selected for the study and basic details about the 
companies themselves. 
I decided to limit the study to these two sectors for 
several reasons. Given the time and financial constraints 
some boundaries had to imposed; food and agriculture 
overlap and, of course, have common characteristics. These 
two sectors are subject to a more interesting and varied 
range of constraints on their activities than the 
pharmaceutical sector. My personal interest and experience 
was also more oriented towards the food and agricultural 
sectors, rather than looking at the pharmaceutical sector 
or applications of biotechnology feeding into other 
industrial sectors. 
I used the Biotechnology Industry Association's 
Directory of British Biotechnology, 1988-1989 to select 
small biotechnology based firms working in the areas of 
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food and agriculture. I contacted managers in firms 
fitting this description in the directory (approximately 
20) by phone or letter. A number of the firms, after 
initial contact had been made clearly did not fit the 
specification; some were obviously operating very much on 
the periphery of the types of biotechnology in which I was 
interested and were therefore rejected. A number were 
fully owned subsidiaries of multinational corporations and 
were also not included. I wanted to select companies that 
had retained a level of independence. For many DBFs, 
however, independence is not a clear cut issue. Very few 
companies do not depend on MNC investment in some way and 
thus, very few are not directed by MNCs to some extent. 
This was an important issue for DBFs and will be discussed 
in chapter 3. Although none of those selected was wholly 
owned by a multinational, one DBF had given up a 
controlling interest to a multinational after a period of 
independent status. 
I carried out preliminary interviews in 14 small 
companies, out of which I selected six for more detailed 
analysis. Criteria used to select small firms for more 
in-depth study included the type of technology and sector 
orientation of the company to cover companies working with 
diverse elements of biotechnology in different parts of the 
food and agricultural sectors. However, a number of 
companies which had originally intended to work on 
agricultural applications had changed their focus to some 
extent after finding that opportunities were very limited 
in this area. As this was an important aspect of our 
research I included a number of these companies. In two 
cases, I was keen to do follow up work, but was denied 
further access by companies. In one case this was 
primarily due to time constraints on managers and an 
unwillingness to reveal details of their activities. In 
the other case, financial difficulties made managers 
unwilling to discuss current issues facing the company. 
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Later in the study, I included a Belgian company 
which is widely acknowledged as one of the leading new 
agricultural biotechnology companies in Europe. It seemed 
important, in light of the rather difficult situation of 
many British companies, to examine a seeming "success" 
story. This was valuable in terms of learning about 
strategic options for DBFs in the sector. Additionally, I 
included a US company which had significant links with one 
of the MNCs I was working with. The MNC had spent a long 
time investigating links with small companies before 
deciding on this particular DBF. From what I had learnt, 
the DBF appeared strategically important to the MNC and 
therefore I included the company in order to learn more 
about the MNC involved and their perception of a "well 
managed" DBF. 
The following list provides details of the companies 
and gives the number of interviews which we had in each 
DBF. 
DBF 1. (3 interviews) I interviewed the chairman, 
managing director and commercial director. DBF 1 mass 
produces cattle embryos and is developing transgenic 
animals for the pharmaceutical industry. 
DBF 2. (3 interviews) I interviewed the chairman, 
the R&D manager and a project manager. DBF 2 is divided 
into three divisions which reflect the company's interests 
in plant breeding, using biological agents for use in crop 
production and technology transfer. DBF 2 had rights to 
certain areas of AFRC research; it had an arrangement with 
the AFRC which was similar to Celltech's one-time agreement 
with the MRC. This agreement no longer applies. 
DBF 3. (2 interviews) I interviewed two senior 
managers in the agricultural division. DBF 3 has two 
divisions, one concerned with waste, treatment and clean up 
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and the other concerned with developing biotechnology for 
agricultural and horticultural applications. 
DBF 4. (4 interviews) I interviewed the chief 
executive, the technical director, the financial director 
and a product manager. DBF 4 works in the areas of 
cryopreservation and algal fermentation. 
DBF 5. (5 interviews) I interviewed the Technical 
Director, the Executive Director, the Commercial Director, 
the Manager of the Fermentation and Genetics Department and 
a Research Scientist. DBF 5 started life with the 
intention of doing 50% of its work in the area of 
pharmaceuticals and 50% of its work in the agricultural and 
food sectors, but has shifted its focus increasingly toward 
the pharmaceutical sector. 
DBF 6. (1 interview) I interviewed the 
Communications Director andwas given printed material 
about the company's history and product range. DBF 6 is a 
Belgian company, based in Ghent. The company works in the 
area of plant biotechnology and has recently started a 
subsidiary which will use similar techniques in the area of 
pharmaceuticals. 
DBF 7. (5 interviews) I interviewed the CEO, the 
financial manager, the technical director, the production 
manager and a product manager. DBF 7 is involved in 
horticulture and uses tissue culture techniques. 
DBF 8. (1 interview) I interviewed the CEO. This 
company works with enzymes and develops applications mainly 
for the food industry. During 1990, it was acquired by a 
MNC who later sold the company. I would have liked to 
carry out other interviews in this company but was denied 
further access because of confidentiality and time 
considerations. 
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DB (1 interview) I interviewed the CEO. DBF 9 
is one of the largest DBFs in Britain and enjoyed exclusive 
rights to develop MRC research. I decided not to do 
follow up interviews in DBF 9 as the company is exclusively 
producing for the pharmaceutical sector and has been the 
subject of other research projects which generated material 
which I could include in this project. 
DBF 10. (1 interview) I interviewed the CEO. While 
this company had been involved in research into advanced 
biotechnological techniques, management decided that 
opportunities for profitable application in plant breeding 
were very limited and were very wary of spending large 
amounts of money on projects which would not prove 
commercially successful. The company had decided to 
concentrate on conventional breeding techniques. I was keen 
to do follow up work in this company. Unfortunately the 
company ran into severe financial problems which led to a 
certain amount of turmoil and changes in management and the. 
company decided not to allow us further access. 
DBF 11. (1 interview) I interviewed the managing 
director. This company works mainly with enzymes and 
products include Accelase (an enzyme cheese ripening 
system) and Savorase (an enzyme flavor producing system). 
The company was taken over by an Australian multinational 
and therefore I decided not to do more in-depth work. 
DBF 12. (1 interview) I interviewed the executive 
director. I decided not to follow up on this company as it 
had always been almost exclusively devoted to work in the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
DBF 13. (2 interviews) I interviewed the Director 
of Operations & R&D and the Director of Business 
Development. This company works in the area of cell 
culture, industrial enzymology, biopolymers and plant 
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molecular biology. The company was, taken over by a MNC 
while we were carrying out the research. 
DBF 14. (1 interview) I interviewed the vice- 
president. DBF 14 is a US company developing biopesticides 
which will replace chemical based pesticides. In the case 
of large companies I used a range of published data and 
Prof. Tait's previous research to identify three British 
based MNCs with significant interests in agriculture and 
food related biotechnology. I later decided to interview 
in two other companies, 1 French and 1 US both of which 
have headquarters and research activity in Britain. I made 
this decision on the basis of information gathered during 
the study which led me to believe that these companies were 
important 'players' in biotechnology innovation and would 
complement the study. 
The following MNCs were selected (detailed 
descriptions of the companies are given in Chapter 4): 
MNC 1 (5 interviews) is a North American based MNC, 
which has invested heavily in biotechnology. More than any 
other MNC examined this company had restructured its 
business on the basis of the new technology. It is 
involved in agricultural, plant and animal biotechnology. 
I interviewed the Head of Scientific Affairs based in 
Brussels, the Science Policy Manager based in St. Louis, 
USA and also from St. Louis, the Director of Biotechnology 
R&D, and the Public Relations Manager. Also I interviewed 
an R&D manager based in the UK. 
MNc 2, (6 interviews) is a leading agro-chemical firm 
which had invested heavily in biotechnology and opened a 
new seeds division largely on the basis of new 
opportunities offered by the technology and in the hope 
that it would yield new higher value products. It is 
involved in a wide area of food, plant and agricultural 
biotechnology. I interviewed the Public Relations Officer 
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from the Seeds Division, the Seeds Division's R&D manager, 
the Research Director of the Seeds Division, the Human 
Resources and Regulatory Affairs Manager from Biological 
Products, a Senior Manager from Biological Products, and a 
Research and Planning Manager from Biological Products. 
MNC 3 (4 interviews) has significant agro-chemical 
interests, although its core business is oil. At the time 
I began the study MNC 3 owned a major plant breeding 
company and seemed set to enter the new era of 
biotechnology. Over the course of the two years, company 
strategy changed and the company cut back on its commitment 
to agriculture - related biotechnology, targeting its work 
much more narrowly. I interviewed two senior managers at 
the company headquarters, an R&D manager at the Seeds 
company which was at the time of interviewing owned by MNC 
3, but has now been sold. 
MNC 4 (8 interviews) has interest in using 
biotechnology in food production and processing and 
therefore acquired a formerly government owned of plant 
breeding institute. I interviewed a senior manager from 
the Agri business division, two economists from the 
research and economic assessment department, a senior 
manager from the central research laboratories, the 
research director from the company's seeds business and 
also a research manager and the business manager from the 
same division. 
MNC 5 (4 interviews) is a French based company and a 
major European player in agro-chemicals and has over the 
last few years made major acquisitions of seed companies in 
the hope of being able to include biotechnology in future 
R&D. I interviewed two R&D managers and a Biotechnology 
Research Director based at a research station in the UK and 
a Senior Manager from the Agrochemicals division'in Lyon. 
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2.4. CONCLUSION. 
This chapter has discussed a number of aspects of 
methodology and provided details of interviewing structure 
and the companies involved in the survey. Methodological 
and theoretical perspectives are not separate issues and 
hopefully this chapter has shown how aspects of methodology 
reflect theoretical underpinnings. 
This study is unashamedly interdisciplinary. The 
factors influencing decision making about biotechnology do 
not fit neatly into one discipline, indeed the conclusions 
of the thesis explicitly make the point that trying to 
understand the process of innovation requires a 
multidisciplinary perspective. A criticism of 
multidisciplinary approaches is that they sacrifice depth 
for breadth or rigor for range. While this is obviously a 
danger, it is also possible to foster rigor at the expense 
of relevance. Disciplines can contribute to increasingly 
'bounded rationalities' which while internally consistent 
do not have much to with the complexity which characterizes 
our world. Gareth Morgan advocates trying to "... foster a 
kind of critical thinking that encourages us to understand 
and grasp the multiple meanings of situations and to 
confront and manage contradiction and paradox, rather than 
to pretend that they do not exist" (Morgan, 1986: 33). This 
study tries to foster that perspective. It takes, on the 
one hand, a broad look at biotechnology innovation in 
context and looks, on the other hand, at the process from 
the narrower perspective of firms and individuals in them. 
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CHAPTER 3. DEDICATED BIOTECHNOLOGY FIRMS. 
This chapter describes and analyzes some of the 
difficulties experienced by Dedicated Biotechnology Firms 
(DBFs). According to a variety of different perspectives, 
DBFs had appeared to be viable institutions for the 
transfer of science to the marketplace. Chapter 1 
discussed how theories of Post Fordism, Kondratieff waves 
and Schumpetarian entrepreneurs provided the basis for much 
of this enthusiasm about small biotechnology firms. The 
chapter, however, also detailed misgivings about the linear 
innovation model and suggested that a number of socio- 
economic factors were important in determining the rate and 
direction of innovation and the success of DBFs. The 
findings presented in this chapter suggest that DBFs 
experience a great deal of difficulty in bridging the gap 
between excellence in science and creative ideas on the one 
hand, and successful profitable innovation on the other. 
The reasons for this relate both to the specific nature of 
biotechnology, contextual factors and more generalizable 
institutional problems confronting small firms. The 
results of the research reported in this chapter should be 
considered in conjunction with analysis presented in 
chapters 5 and 6; Chapter 5 examines in more detail the 
institutional and market factors which impact on 
biotechnology innovation and how this broader environment 
affects DBFs and MNCs. Chapter 6 provides analysis of the 
situation regarding risk regulation and patent legislation 
which further complicate the process of innovation. 
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3.1. DBFs and the Struggle for Survival. 
During the eighties it became apparent that DBFs were 
in a very different position from their counterparts in the 
micro-electronics sector. In 1989, a prominent US venture 
capitalist commented, "This isn't Silicon Valley: there 
are major technical, regulatory, patent, and marketing 
risks. There is not a venture capitalist who has not lost 
money in biotech" (FT, 10 Oct, 1989). 
In the early eighties in the US, analysts predicted 
two-thirds of existing DBFs would disappear in due course - 
through bankruptcy, merger or acquisition (Cape, 1984). In 
the late eighties in the UK, Oakey et al comment, "even 
this prognosis may be over-optimistic" (Oakey et 
al, 1990: 24) 
When in 1990, Hoffman La Roche bought up the most 
successful new biotechnology firm, Genentech, The Economist 
concluded that 'The dream is dead'. Hobbelink notes: 
"The dream was about entrepreneurial success in 
biotechnology: university professors with sharp 
brains and commercial minds setting up small 
biotech companies that could grow into 
multimillion dollar empires. The parallel with 
the 'computer industry, where such companies as 
Apple, starting from scratch, are now-challenging 
IBM and others, was often drawn. The dream was 
also about a highly diverse biotechnology sector 
with hundreds of independent small biotechnology 
companies competing shoulder to shoulder with 
large transnational corporations, thus 
guaranteeing a highly dynamic interaction 
responding to the real needs of the marketplace 
(Hobbelink, 1991: 31). 
Small companies, it was assumed, could grow rapidly, 
competing with large companies on the basis of new 
technology. Additionally, the host of new opportunities 
would allow for new entrants over a long period of time. 
70 
However, biotechnology innovation took longer than 
many expected, money became scarce and large firms played 
an increasingly important role in developing the 
technology. Moreover, niche markets proved difficult to 
identify and small firms underwent drastic reorganization 
and culture shocks in trying to get their products to 
market. 
Gerald Fairtlough, CEO at one of Britain's most 
successful DBFs, Celltech, during its early years, says 
that the company was built with three principles in mind: 
- to have enough financial resources to take 
a reasonably long term view; 
- to aim nevertheless for some early 
commercial success; 
- to achieve synergy between in-house 
scientific excellence and external scientific 
collaboration (Fairtlough, 1989: 157). 
Celltech managed to become a profitable, independent 
company. Created under exceptional circumstance, however, 
it proved an the exception to the rule7. The government 
gave support and financial backing and most importantly, 
the company acquired exclusive rights to Medical Research 
Council (MRC) discoveries in key related fields. While 
most DBF managers would agree that the three principles 
constitute sound theory they found it extremely difficult 
and in many cases, impossible, to follow the Fairtlough 
formula. 
This chapter focuses on DBFs and hopefully sheds some 
light on why small firms find biotechnology innovation such 
an up hill struggle. Section 2 discusses the nature of the 
problems confronting the firms. Section 3 looks in some 
detail at some strategies adopted by small biotechnology 
7 As Dodgson points out in his detailed study of 
Celltech, it is by no means guaranteed that the company 
will remain independent (Dodgson: 1990). 
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firms. Section 4 briefly considers the implications of the 
study for conceptualizing the role which DBFs play in 
biotechnology innovation. Theoretical perspectives are 
further discussed in Chapter 7. 
3.2. CONSTRAINTS TO GROWTH. 
3.2.1. FINANCE AND FUNDING. 
The lack of adequate finance to build up a product 
based business concerned all of the relevant managers I 
spoke with. The inability to finance activities with 
profits from the sale of products, is something which most 
high-tech firms experience initially, but is a particular 
problem in DBFs. One manager told us, "The ability to 
keep raising money is central to a business like ours. 
Research is invariably more expensive than you believe it 
will be and it takes longer. " Another manager commented 
that biotechnology companies have very high 'burn rates', 
meaning that significant amounts of money get spent on 
projects which fail either technically or commercially. 
Venture capitalists, who had targeted biotechnology 
at the beginning of the eighties, now shied away. "The 
business environment has changed significantly, venture 
capitalists are looking for established areas, " one 
manager said. Biotechnology became viewed as high risk 
activity. DBFs aimed to produce radically new products. 
This, while potentially very profitable, made it very 
difficult to judge accurately in quantifiable terms, market 
potential. The 'newness factor' the same manager said, 
both repelled and attracted investors. Managers said that 
whereas the label 'biotechnology companies' had brought in 
money during the early eighties, it was increasingly a 
liability. When looking for money, in order not to scare 
investors away, some managers began to identify their 
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companies with the sectors they were supplying rather than 
their technological base. 
In a number of cases, DBFs were able to get less 
capital intensive and less technically demanding products 
on the market rapidly. This, however, did not solve the 
funding problem. Even though these companies marketed 
lower value products successfully, they still had heavy R&D 
expenditures on further products. Very few could rely 
solely on profits to fund future developments8. Since the 
stock market crash of 1987, few DBFs have considered going 
public. 
Regulations and uncertainty about patents distinguish 
biotechnology from other high technology small firms and 
add to the difficulties of getting high income generating 
products on the market quickly. 
Managers in this survey often found that a difficult 
choice had to be made between diverting energy from the 
potentiality more lucrative area of product manufacture 
into contract R&D work offering short term survival funds, 
"but not providing sufficient profit margins" to promote 
further growth. 
Even when obtained, venture capital proved 
problematic in a number of cases. One senior manager, when 
asked how he would do things differently if he found 
himself in a similar situation a second time, responded 
immediately that he would try and find longer term funding 
instead of relying on venture capital. In his experience 
venture capitalists, given what he perceived as their short 
term horizons, did not help the company to create the more 
exciting and profitable products; their primary concern was 
that the company break even or make a profit in the shorter 
8 See Grieve Smith and Fleck, 1988 for further 
discussion of this point. 
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term. Additionally, UK venture capital companies pursue a 
'hands off' approach to the firms they finance, providing 
very little in the way of management and decision making 
support. Managers in firms with longer term backing 
identified this as a positive feature. 
The situation regarding venture capital funding of 
DBFs is very different in the US. First, more venture 
capital has been made available to DBFs (Orsenigo, 1989). 
Additionally, more recently, the Japanese have been making 
significant contributions to venture funding of US start- 
ups. The Japanese both collaborate directly with DBFs and 
provide capital to "US start-ups through US venture capital 
companies" (Roberts and Mizouchi, 1989: 49). Second, US 
venture capital companies tend to be much more 'hands on' 
than British counterparts, providing companies with much 
needed managerial advice (The Economist, October 5,1991). 
Inadequate financing was identified as a major 
constraint by another recent study. Oakey et al surveyed 
48 DBFs in Britain. 56% of DBF entrepreneurs in the study 
relied upon personal savings as the main means of funding 
the launch of their firm. 21% relied primarily on venture 
funding. In terms of continuing finance, 26% of firms 
relied primarily on self generated profits, (mainly from 
contract R&D rather than products), and 24% on venture 
capital (Oakey et al, 1990: 119). Interestingly, product- 
based firms were particularly dependent on venture funding. 
Oakey notes, "... in other recent work on high-technology 
small firms, ploughed-back profits were a far more 
prevalent main means of capital generation, with a 73% 
level of occurrence" (Oakey et al, 1990: 121). In turn the 
lack of finance inhibits product development. 21% of 
respondents in Oakey's survey stated that shortages of 
capital had directly inhibited them from introducing new 
innovations (Oakey et al, 1990: 125). This is a larger 
percentage than firms in other high-technology industries. 
74 
Oakey et al's study also provides interesting 
information about equity investment in DBFs (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1. PERCENTAGE OF EQUITY SOLD TO EXTERNAL 
BODIES. 
% of Equity Sold. Total ..... of Total 
0 17 (39.5) 
1-50 9 (20.9) 
51-100 10 (23.3) 
Acquired 7 (16.3) 
Total 43 (100.0) 
(Taken from Oakey et al 1990: 143) 
When the researchers called firms back a, year later, 
they found that 28% of firms rather than 16% had been 
acquired. An interesting feature of the table is the high 
proportion of firms which had sold over 50% of equity and 
yet still maintained some control by not selling 
controlling stakes in the company to any one party. Oakey 
et al consider this to be part of broader and planned 
strategy aimed at bringing in investment but retaining 
control. This accords with our findings. Most of the 
managers we interviewed were keen to maintain a level of 
independence and keeping a diverse base of investors was 
seen as one way of doing this. 
Oakey et al (1990: 145-8) also note that it was 
product-oriented firms who were more inclined to sell 
equity stakes and more likely to be fully acquired . On 
the basis of data which included information about 
acquisition deals, and acquisition offers or inquiries to 
smaller firms, they say, "... the initial external support 
and, in a number of cases, full acquisition, are likely to 
be prompted by the long-term potential contained in the 
product technology of new firms". While this data is not 
conclusive, it could be seen as signifying a no win 
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situation for DBFs; the further they move down stream and 
the more product oriented they become, the more likely they 
are to be acquired. On the one hand acquiring firms are 
more interested in product oriented firms and on the other 
hand, given the expense involved in product development, 
product oriented firms are the more likely to need external 
funding and may therefore view the option of being acquired 
in a friendlier light. 
Finally, a number of the managers in this survey 
complained that UK government and EC support and 
initiatives were too difficult to obtain. The amount of 
managerial time that required to apply for funds deterred 
managers from pursuing this route. 
3.2.2. THE SEARCH FOR NICHE MARKETS. 
DBFs have enormous difficulty in identifying or 
creating niche markets. Oakey et al make the same 
observation. They relate the lack of accessible market 
niches to the slow development of a core technology. This 
is in. contrast to the semiconductor industry where, 
"... the basic technology was invented at the 
birth of the industry, providing a basic core 
technology which small firms could acquire at a 
reasonable price and from which subsequent 
invention, innovation and diversifications could 
evolve" (Oakey et al, 1990: 152)"9 
My research confirms difficulties in market 
identification. However, these difficulties did not stem 
primarily from the absence of a core technology. Managers 
in our study indicated that difficulties associated with 
niche marketing had to do with non-technical factors, such 
9 While Oakey et al do not specify what they mean by 
a basic or 'core' technology, they think it possible that a 
common technological base may emerge in the near furture 
which would unblock paths to innovation (Oakey et 
al, 1990: 152) . 
76 
as managerial problems, lack of funding and finance, 
regulation, market and price structures. In a number of 
cases, small companies also had problems scaling up 
technologies, but this had more to do with specific product 
and design requisites rather than with lack of a core 
technology. For example, in two different cases, 
innovations which had worked well at the laboratory stage 
became problematic when they had to be incorporated in 
final product form and scaled up for manufacture. Here, 
the problem was not so much the lack of 'core technology' 
but lack of adequate knowledge and experience in final 
product design and manufacturing. Moreover, firms were 
often involved in more than one sector, which suggests that 
the lack of 'core' technology was not the problem. 
Technology often did provide a base from which to 
diversify. Nine of the firms visited were currently 
involved, or had previously been involved, in more than 
one sector. The others had taken strategic decisions, 
largely based on non-technical factors, to limit their 
efforts to one sector. 
In general, managers tended to see that the lack of 
niche markets prevented further development of the 
technology rather than the other way round. Tait et al 
(1990) identified regulation as one of the principle blocks 
to niche marketing in agricultural and food sectors. 
Regulatory barriers give large firms an important advantage 
over smaller counterparts. However, while regulations 
acted as a barrier to entry for firms in our survey, they 
were not the only constraint or even the main one. In the 
areas of food and agriculture, regulation acts in 
conjunction with other barriers such as market and price 
structures, lack of finance and managerial expertise to 
prevent the firms from identifying or creating niche 
markets. 
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Agriculture related production is a relatively low 
value area, increasingly dominated by fewer and larger 
firms. DBFs find it difficult to create space in which to 
introduce new products. While both large and small firms 
find it difficult to identify areas which could give a 
higher enough return to recoup high R&D costs, large firms 
can compete on the basis of market share and economies of 
scale. They can also lobby for changes in the 
institutional environment which would make high value 
agriculture a possibility. This is discussed further in 
chapters 5 and 6. 
There are additional reasons for DBF's difficulty in 
getting more radical innovations to market in the areas of 
plant biotechnology. In order to carry innovations through 
to the market stage, companies working with plant 
biotechnology needed to work with plant breeders. In order 
for new technology to work successfully, a high degree of 
skill is required in more traditional methods of plant 
breeding. Apart from the cost and complexity involved in 
acquiring a plant breeding operation, owning a plant 
breeding company meant DBFs were likely to be viewed as 
competitors by MNCs. The number of take overs of seed 
companies by MNCs in recent history means that there are 
fewer independent seed companies with which smaller 
companies can collaborate. 
Given the difficulties of developing and selling 
higher value products, and the resistance to change amongst 
large companies, the majority of DBFs tend to lose sight 
of many of the more creative and alternative ideas which 
they had initially. For instance, one small company 
devoted a great deal of time and effort to working on 
insect resistance but had difficulty finding partners to 
develop the product; MNCs were not interested in products 
which undermined their chemically based agricultural 
products. The price structure of agricultural markets, the 
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fact that farmers would have to take initial risks and 
change habits and worries about patent protection 
compounded the problem. A manager from the firm explained 
the problems in the following way: 
"... if you put insect resistance in crops, you 
could use less pesticides... it turned out that no 
one was really interested in the early findings, 
'like insect resistance. OK, you created insect 
resistant plants, but the pesticide industry 
isn't very keen on that - they might lose 
business. On the other hand, its only a benefit 
for the farmer not the seed industry. The seed 
industry has to persuade the farmer - might even 
have to give them free to the farmer in order to 
maintain market share. What happens in breeding, 
is that you come up with nice varieties, but you 
don't charge the farmer for your efforts. You 
come up with all this resistance and not be able 
to charge the farmer. If you could persuade the 
farmer that he or she would have to use less 
inputs, then you could charge more, but this is 
quite difficult... While there is an obvious 
benefit to the farmer, the seed company finds it 
more difficult to make money on this... And how do 
you protect all these things you put in plants? " 
Additionally, a number of DBFs in our survey moved 
away from the agricultural sector because of the lack of 
accessible higher value low volume markets. The 
predominance of DBF activity in the healthcare sector has 
been noted elsewhere (Walsh, 1988: 20). Additionally, 
venture capitalists began to favor companies operating in 
the area of healthcare (FT, 11 July 1991). While DBFs 
turned to the healthcare sector in response to these 
problems, there were also formidable constraints to 
developing niche products in this sector. In many cases, 
companies performed research services for large companies 
or produced non-regulated items, such as diagnostics, but 
could not gain access to higher value markets. Of the 14 
companies we interviewed, 10 were involved either in 
product creation or contract R&D in the area of human 
health. All the companies except one which were active in 
the area of human health ended up producing the lower value 
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and highly competitive diagnostics, licensing out to 
multinationals or selling intermediates. Of these 10, 
only one had realistic chances of getting pharmaceuticals 
through to the final stage in the short term. The 
exception was Celltech which as previously noted is a 
'special case'. Cope map 3.1. is based on a company in the 
survey and portrays the components of the decision to go 
into healthcare. The overall aim is to bring higher value 
products to market and this leads companies into the area 
of healthcare. In this way they avoid negative aspects 
associated with agricultural related biotechnology. But 
heavy regulatory costs associated with drug development 
mean that companies often end up supplying intermediates to 
large companies or carrying out contract R&D for those 
companies. 
1 Create high value 
8 Create medium 
value in uts. 2 work according to 
large firm agenda. 
1 3 Go into healthcare. 7 Supply inter- 
mediates to 
6 Avoid regulatory large companies. 
problems. 
4 Create niche markets. . 
5 Avoid low value 
agriculture. 
Problems associated with lack of market niches in 
agricultural and food sectors are related to the production 
conditions in these sectors which are rooted in specific 
sets of social, institutional and economic factors. High 
value/low volume opportunities are few and large firms 
dominate the agricultural input sector. 
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3.2.3. REGULATION. 
Firms found it difficult to deal with existing 
regulations in the area of pharmaceuticals and food 
products and managers. worried that the specific regulatory 
regime governing biotechnology would prove prohibitive. 
The cost and complexity of regulations-pose additional 
constraints in getting products to market. Additionally, 
while MNCs have experience in dealing with regulatory 
requirements, DBFs have to become instant experts. Often 
unable to devote scarce managerial staff time exclusively 
to regulatory problems, their difficulties multiply. 
The EC finalized its regulatory code for 
biotechnology in 1991 but this has not put an end to the 
controversy surrounding the creation and implementation of 
biotechnology regulations. Many, although not all, 
managers in both large and small firms felt that the EC had 
regulated the technology, rather than the final product. 
This they considered 'discriminatory'. 
Difficulties stemming from regulations contradict 
other policy efforts within Europe designed to promote 
small companies. However, more research is needed in order 
to try and assess the extent to, which regulation, relative 
to other factors, creates problems for small firms. 
It is tempting to identify regulations as the main 
constraint to small biotechnology firms. On the basis of 
information gathered during this project, however, it would 
appear that no one variable is the cause-of small firms' 
problems; the situation is more akin to a complex web. 
Regulation constitutes only one part of the picture. 
Chapter 6 deals with the question of regulations in more 
depth and also explains how uncertain patent legislation 
has impacted on innovation in large and small firms. 
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3.2.4. COLLABORATIVE VENTURES AND CONTRACT R&D. 
Collaborative ventures between firms have been an 
important feature of biotechnology innovation. In 
particular there has been a high degree of collaboration 
between large and small firms in the US (Hobbelink, 1991). 
The trend toward 'alliances' among firms is not limited to 
biotechnology, it is a feature of the development and 
commercialization of a number of high technology products 
and processes (Roberts and Mizouchi, 1989). 
DBFs showed both conformity and diversity in their 
approach to collaborative ventures. All the firms relied 
to some extent on external contacts with universities or 
research institutes for developing inputs and on other 
firms for developing and marketing final products. - 
As companies became more 'professional', and the 
focus narrowed, managers made drastic cuts in research 
budgets. Longer term research was cut down (drastically in 
some sections as the next section explains) and put out to 
universities or research institutes. Universities also 
worked on specific problems identified by scientists and 
managers which could not be dealt with in-house. These 
collaborations were considered in some cases to be 
successful and in others, not satisfactory in the main. 
There were some complaints that both universities and 
research institutes wasted time and money. 
Licensing and joint venture agreements were often 
seen as the only ways, given the lack of experience and 
contact with distribution networks, in which they could get 
products to market stage. In terms of collaborations with 
large companies, a number of different perspectives and 
strategies emerged. Managers had diverse opinions about 
the pros and cons of licensing agreements, joint ventures 
and contract R&D. 
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Most companies pursued a strategy of both licensing 
and joint venturing, but the amount of licensing done 
varied considerably. A number of managers expressed a 
dislike of licensing agreements. They felt that by 
licensing the technology, they had lost control over 
further development and future markets. Some managers felt 
that a company should only license technology in areas that 
were not core to the firm and in which the firm had no 
development interest. Others saw the decision more in terms 
of short and long term aims. Some companies tried to 
combine licensing agreements with broader elements of 
strategy. One company, wanting to diversify its 
activities, was keen to attract large company R&D money on 
the basis that it would give exclusive licensing agreements 
once the project had been completed. Another company had 
made a strategic decision not to license technology. "We 
made a decision not to sell our technology, not to license. 
You have much more strength when you joint venture. " This 
decision was part of a larger strategy which involved 
targeting technology development carefully. The same 
company also limited its joint ventures to international 
markets, developing and marketing its own products within 
North America where it was based. 
Many managers felt that joint ventures constituted an 
acceptable way to take research further down stream. 
However, some managers noted the disadvantages of working 
with larger partners. One manager said that having had a 
bad experience where he felt the larger company "took the 
technology and gave little in return", he would prefer to 
steer the company away from this type of collaboration in 
the future. However, one manager said that it was 
particularly important to joint venture, rather than 
license when skills which could be useful to the company in 
the future could be built up. Another used joint ventures 
to gain access to global markets, while making sure that 
83 
they kept control of the home market, by doing local 
distribution and marketing themselves. 
Undertaking contract R&D is a significant feature of 
many DBF strategies (Orsenigo, 1989). Incentives to build 
up this feature of the production process come from two 
directions. For DBFs, contract research means short term 
cash. Sub-contracting out research and in some cases parts 
of the development process, has become attractive to some 
larger firms and is taken by some as evidence of broader 
shift to Post Fordist production techniques and horizontal 
forms of integration. However, contract R&D must be 
distinguished from more established and longer term 
collaboration. The latter form of collaboration was not 
widely evident in the survey of DBFs. Neither was it 
attractive to four out the five large companies interviewed 
in this study. 
For most DBFs contract research represents a mixed 
blessing. On the one hand, it provides a means of short 
term funding; on the other it diverts time and energy from 
product development. The amount of contract R&D undertaken 
by the company depended on its ability or lack of ability 
to move further up stream into product development and it 
varied significantly among the firms surveyed. At one end 
of the scale, contract R&D was insignificant in one firm in 
terms of time allocation or income generated, and at the 
other end the scale one firm functioned predominantly on 
the basis of this type of collaboration. Most companies 
tried to limit the amount of contract R&D by time and the 
extent to which it fitted with other products. One company 
imposed a limit of 30% of its time spent on contract R&D. 
It also tried only to accept contracts which were 
synergistic with product development. Another company only 
took on modified R&D contracts which incorporated other 
potential collaborations such as joint ventures or 
licensing agreements. 
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It is interesting that none of the DBFs felt that 
there was a lack of opportunities to do contract R&D; the 
problem for small firms was knowing how to limit the amount 
of time and effort put into this type of collaboration. 
This is due to the fact that biotechnology is new and large 
firms have felt a deficit of knowledge and skill in the 
area. Therefore, for large firms, DBFs represented a 
convenient. way of both getting specific work done and 
checking out the new terrain before making big commitments 
to building up internal resources. However, the high rate 
of acquisition demonstrates the precarious position of DBFs 
and the move towards vertical integration in larger firms. 
There is considerable debate about the importance of 
collaborative agreements in contemporary capitalism. For 
some the increase in collaborative agreements constitutes 
another indication of fundamental change in capitalism; 
rather than the traditional pattern of periods of creative 
destruction followed by consolidation and increased 
vertical integration by larger firms, collaborative 
ventures signified new rules of competition (Best, 1990). 
Pisano identifies some of the questions posed by 
collaborative ventures in the following way: 
"In the Schumpeterian model of "creative 
destruction", technological upheavals are 
characterized by protracted competition between 
new entrants and incumbents... The competitive 
dynamics of an industry undergoing a major 
technological change will be different, however, 
if new entrants and incumbents have and exploit 
mutually beneficial opportunities for 
collaboration. Rather than the new firms driving 
out the incumbents (or vice versa), the new and 
the old may co-exist in symbiotic supplier-buyer 
relationships" (Pisano, 1990: 2). 
In a very interesting paper on collaborative 
agreements, Walsh outlines a number of reasons for 
increased technological collaboration in the form of 
"inter-firm co-operative alliances". In an increasingly 
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competitive environment, these agreements can be thought of 
by managers as good ways of: 
1. sharing the costs and risks of R&D. 
2. gaining access to new areas of technology. 
3. gaining access to new markets. 
4. gaining access to skills. 
(Walsh, 1991b: 10) 
In the case of biotechnology, both DBFs and large 
firms needed each other for these reasons. DBFs needed 
MNCs for all the listed reasons, but particularly 1,3 and 
4. MNCs needed DBFs mostly for reasons 1,2 and 4. In an 
important and widely quoted paper Teece (1986) introduces 
the idea of "complementary assets. " In the case of 
agriculture and food related biotechnology, the 
complementary assets which large firms process and which 
DBFs need are marketing and distribution systems, plant 
breeding facilities, the credibility needed to get farmers 
to change practices, the muscle to lobby for regulations 
conducive to innovation and the financial resources to be 
able to cope with long product lead times. Teece argues 
that in certain cases "profits from innovation may accrue 
to the owners of certain complementary assets rather than 
to the developers of intellectual property. " This is 
particularly the case in areas where patents do not 
adequately protect innovation because products can easily 
be copied and 'invented round' (Teece 1986)... The data from 
this study would suggest that DBF managers fear that MNCs 
will indeed be the ones to benefit most and that benefits 
of risk taking will be unevenly distributed in favor of the 
large firm. 
Given the rate of acquisition of DBFs, the 
difficulties experienced by DBF managers and the increasing 
tendency by both DBFs and MNCs to try to increase levels of 
vertical integration, it also is legitimate to question the 
significance of collaborative agreements. High levels of 
vertical integration by large firms are often depicted as 
j 
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representing a hierarchy rather than a pure market 
situation. The question then becomes whether collaborative 
agreements will act as an alternative to increased vertical 
integration and the subsequent building of hierarchies. 
Biotechnology is a new technology in which DBFs, being 
closer to the science base, often have an advantage in 
terms of knowledge about technology and skills. The amount 
of contract R&D and number of collaborative ventures 
between DBFs and MNCs indicates how important DBFs are to 
MNCs as a way of getting to know about the new technology 
and new areas. Given global trends toward increased sub- 
contracting (Best, 1990) and the range of skills and 
expertise which science-based DBFs offer, contract R&D may 
be a more enduring feature of biotechnology-based 
production. 
However, it would be misleading to see contract R&D 
or collaborative ventures representing new forms of 
industrial structure in agricultural and food related 
biotechnology production in Britain. While some DBFs 
manage to negotiate better terms of collaboration than 
others (limited rights rather than exclusive, higher 
percentage of royalties or profits, etc. ) they will find it 
increasingly hard to become successful product oriented 
companies via the collaboration route. First, this 
research has shown that many managers find contract R&D 
detracts from product development rather than aiding it. 
They also find collaborative ventures difficult and express 
worries about-losing control of their 'seed corn' which 
could be used later to build their products. A number of 
managers felt at a disadvantage when trying to work with 
larger more powerful partners. This situation appears to 
be the product of a specific set of conditions. A recent 
study of collaborations between large Japanese firms and 
DBFs (mainly based in the US) portrayed a much more equal 
situation. US DBFs, with much higher levels of funding 
(itself increasingly a product of Japanese strategy as 
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mentioned) are in a much better position to negotiate on 
the basis of technological superiority. Roberts and 
Mizouchi say "Often neither firm appears to dominate" 
(Roberts and Mizouchi, 1989: 47). The Japanese are likely to 
pursue a two-pronged approach to biotechnology innovation, 
internalizing R&D and acquiring companies in some 
instances, but maintaining strategic alliances and 
collaborative ventures (Roberts and Mizouchi, 1989). Thus 
they may well benefit in two ways. First, by collaborating 
with US DBFs, who have more resources, they are exposing 
themselves to leading edge technologies. They will benefit 
from collaborating with firms who have had resources to 
maintain an innovative and sharp small firm culture. In 
the cases where they choose to acquire, they will buy 
relatively mature operations which have had time and 
resources to accomplish high levels of innovation. Thus, 
the arrangement benefited both parties. 
In Britain, the situation differs significantly. The 
uneven nature of collaborations, and the underfunding of 
DBFs mean that they become less productive, resorting to, 
'market led' options before they have been able to develop 
innovative technologies. The high rate of acquisition, 
particularly of product oriented DBFs, indicates that once 
MNCs have identified the direction in which they want to 
move, they will increase in-house R&D capacity. The 
findings of this study also indicate a preference amongst 
large British firms for acquisition rather than 
collaboration. These findings beg the question: what 
contribution can DBFs make to biotechnology innovation? 
Oakey's opinion is as follows: 
"Put simply, a healthy and innovative small-firm 
sector is advantageous to large firms... There is 
a danger, as the industry grows that large firms 
will, through acquisition, stifle the emergence 
of a vital population of fast-growing small 
firms, from which they could purchase a diverse 
range of goods and services" (Oakey et 
al, 1990: 160) . 
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The contribution of DBFs to innovation is discussed 
further in chapters 4,5 and 7. Suffice to say here that 
Oakey et al's analysis of the trend toward rapid vertical 
integration in large firms in Britain appears accurate. As 
this happens life will become more, not less, difficult for 
remaining DBFs. There will likely be a further narrowing 
of market structure and the indications are that small 
firms may find it increasingly difficult to find space in 
which to grow. Moreover, as large firms gain more 
experience, they acquire powerful 'tacit knowledge' of 
technical aspects of development and of markets, regulatory 
and patent procedures which will give them additional 
advantages. 
3.2.5. INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS, CONTRADICTIONS AND CHANGES IN 
CULTURE. 
Lack of business experience amongst the 'start-up' 
scientists often made management of firms more problematic. 
In all the cases studied, additional managerial expertise 
was needed, to deal with internal organizational problems, 
regulations, patents and collaborations with larger 
companies. In all of the firms significant changes in top 
management ensued after deficits in commercial knowledge 
became apparent. Often, investors insisted upon change. 
However, these changes created new problems. 
The advantages which DBFs have over MNCs include the 
relative lack of bureaucracy and the high density of 
extremely well qualified employees. Ideally, DBFs 
constantly generate new ideas, are flexible and able to 
respond to new opportunities and learn quickly. Dodgson 
identifies small firm strength in their ability "... to 
diffuse learning throughout their organization quickly. " 
Smaller firms in his view have fewer "organizational 
rigidities" (Dodgson, 1991: 118). In many cases, changes in 
management led to an almost exclusive preoccupation with 
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being 'market led'. This, combined with more formal 
bureaucratic controls, threatened this area of strength. 
One of the main dilemmas experienced by DBFs involved the 
inability to combine immediate production and maintain an 
innovative, experimental technological base. DBFs 
increasingly portrayed themselves as market driven 
companies with no interest in researching areas which had 
no immediate commercial relevance, with management changes 
reflecting this new priority. One manager described the 
process as one of "implanting a commercial gene into the 
company". In a number of cases, new top managers brought 
in to make companies more 'market led' had no previous 
experience either in the biotechnology or agriculture 
related business. One of these managers described his 
mission in the following way: 
"If you had come into the company a year ago, you 
would have found scientists. They weren't 
businessmen. Now you have people like me in - 
I'm a businessman with a bent for marketing. 
Virtually what I've done is write a marketing 
plan for the company. What we plan is not to be 
the first in technology, but to make money. 
Unashamedly because if we don't make money we 
won't survive. The company has changed totally 
during the last year. We are now market led. 
I've killed off projects which were very 
interesting scientifically but weren't able to 
generate cash. " 
The new concern with marketing and finding profitable 
outlets threw companies into "an identity crisis" in the 
words of one manager and provoked extreme changes in 
company culture. This kind of change puts DBFs in a very 
difficult, contradictory and dangerous situation. DBFs' 
capacity to innovate in technically difficult areas using 
high levels of expertise is key to their long term 
survival. Being the 'first in technology' and being able 
to diffuse technology quickly is the best basis on which 
DBFs can compete with large firms in the longer term. 
Short term dictates, however, often undermined this 
capacity; firms had to narrow the research base and put 
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resources into lower value products or contract R&D. Top 
scientists who had been attracted by the informal and 
exciting environment often left, disillusioned with the 
prospects for creative work. In some cases new managers 
positively welcomed this and were keen not to employ 
scientists who wanted to be too creative. 
Given the background of many DBF founders perhaps it 
is not surprising that they needed extra business and 
managerial advice. A survey of UK DBFs established that 
58% were founded by people with technical expertise, but no 
business experience (Walsh, 1988: 10). Additionally, the 
'hands off' attitudes of many British venture capital firms 
meant that DBFs were rarely offered managerial advice from 
this quarter (Oakey et al, 1990: 158). In many cases, 
however, the process of reorganization threatened the very 
essence of the company; the company culture which gave DBFs 
a chance to compete with MNCs had to be abandoned in favor 
of cost cutting and short term security. Dodgson's study 
of Ceiltech provides important insights into the centrality 
of. company culture to successful development. He says of 
the company, 
"The technology base in Celltech is the 
creation and the tool of its workforce. In the 
company the maxim that the strength of an 
organization lies in its people is particularly 
apparent. Very considerable managerial efforts 
have gone into fostering a well organized, 
committed and creative workforce" (Dodgson, 
1990: 86). 
In another passage, he says, 
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"Science and technology provides the basis of 
Celltech's past, present and future 
competitiveness... the competitive position of 
DBFs like Celltech has depended first, on 
building up exceptional R&D skills based 
initially on academic links and second, on 
developing an integrated business capacity with 
distinctive advantages over large pharmaceutical 
firms based on their novel technological skills 
and organizational flexibility" 
(Dodgson, 1990: 52). 
As in many other DBFs, one of the major problems 
afflicting Celltech was the likelihood that technological 
breakthroughs would not translate into successful products 
for at least another decade. The problem, however, will 
be multiplied if 'short termism' is pursued as a solution. 
Another difficulty relating to conflicting roles 
which have to be played by the company emerged during the 
interviews. DBFs try to operate as 'biotechnology' 
companies, developing technology based products often with 
a number of sectors in mind and yet have to sell services 
and products into those established sectors. Managers to 
some extent found they fell victim to their own rhetoric. 
Biotechnology products have to feed into sectors such as 
agriculture or food, but managers, used to thinking of 
their company as a biotechnology company were often 
unprepared to deal with the specificities and complexities 
of different sectors. While DBFs acted on a cross-sectoral 
basis, developing pervasive technology, their customers, 
mainly in large companies, remained deeply entrenched 
within existing sectors. This led to numerous 
misunderstandings and made it difficult for DBFs to explain 
their mission. One manager from an ag-biotech company made 
the following comments. 
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"I think we have built companies for five years 
on the basis of technology and it has created a 
lot of problems, a lot of hassle... People ask, 
'What do they want to do with it? ' And they don't 
understand the problems. Like we say, we want to 
create added value - what the hell is added 
value? People have never understood what we were 
doing - for years people thought we were a 
tobacco company. " 
This added another pressure, along with the need to 
secure financing, for companies to identify themselves with 
established sectors, rather than thinking of themselves as 
biotechnology companies. 
3.3. DBF STRATEGY. 
Having examined some of the problems faced by small 
firms, I will now describe some of the strategies adopted 
by them. The first part of this section uses a cognitive 
map to portray different strategic options and their 
consequences. This is a convenient way of summarizing what 
has been said so far and connecting it to a fuller picture. 
It was possible to create a composite map (Cope Map 3.2. ) 
of DBF strategies because the external constraints on their 
activities were so strong and so universal that they almost 
completely limited their freedom of movement, thus limiting 
the degree of diversity in DBFs. 
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The top level goal of the companies was to establish 
a successful, profitable business, (concept 1). Feeding 
into this goal is a number of strategic options, several or 
all of which were part of the decision making strategies of 
the companies studied. The top, left-hand side of the map 
refers mainly to the companies' relations with external 
organizations while the bottom, right hand side of the map 
shows aspects of the internal organization and planning of 
the company. 
The map shows that the external world was dominated 
by multinational companies, regulatory authorities and 
financial backers. Regulatory, marketing and distribution 
costs (concept 15) presented major hurdles for all the 
companies. Selling intermediates to large companies 
(concept 16) was one way of avoiding this. The latter also 
meant that the company avoided the risks of competing with 
MNCs (concept 20), who were also important customers. 
In order to tackle regulatory, marketing and 
distribution costs DBF participated in joint ventures 
(concept 17), did genetic engineering in the laboratory 
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(concept 18) and then passed on the later stages of product 
development to MNCs to cope with, via contract R&D. 
Licensing technology was another means of avoiding 
regulatory, marketing and distribution costs (concept 21). 
However, the latter strategy often provided a less 
than ideal solution; managers felt they lost control over 
the direction of the company (concept 7) and were unable to 
reap higher profit margins from final product development 
(concept 23). Joint ventures (concept 17) were also 
problematic for some companies; lacking the necessary 
muscle to negotiate "fair" agreements some small firms felt 
that large firms were getting access to sophisticated 
technology while which they appropriated to use in their 
own products at a later date. 
The need to generate cash in the short term (concept 
5) dominated much decision making. This was incompatible 
with the desire to maintain control over the direction of 
the company (concept 7) (negative sign on the arrow). The 
need for short term cash led firms to license technology 
(concept 21) and take on contract R&D (concept 6) which 
diverted energies from product based growth (concept 23). 
In terms of internal management, creative anarchy, 
while exciting and productive in terms of generating new 
ideas, cost too much. They felt the need to begin to 
behave like 'proper' companies (concept 2) which means 
introducing formal bureaucratic controls (concept 13) which 
is not conducive (negative sign on the arrow) with 
maintaining creativity (concept 14). Behaving like a 
'proper' company also involves developing marketing and 
financial expertise to the company (concept 11), becoming 
more product oriented (as opposed to being a 'biotech 
boutique') (concept 3) and hence identifying high value 
niche markets (concept 10), which were often seen as 
existing mainly in the medical and to a lesser extent in 
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the food sector (concept 19) rather than the agriculture 
area. 
Using conceptual tools developed by Daly (1985) and 
Harrigan (1983), Orsenigo outlines four basic strategies 
which DBFs adopted to overcome some of the obstacles in 
their path. 1) Companies developed marketable products as 
soon as possible, gaining a lead in the market place 
through early specialization in a specific niche; 2) 
Companies built up core technological capabilities in a 
wide range of areas, "exploiting the technological 
synergies and complementarities made possible by genetic 
engineering and pursuing on these grounds diversification" 
(Orsenigo, 129: 89). This strategy, Orsenigo notes 
invariably meant longer lead times and emphasized more 
"radical" innovations. 3) In terms of vertical integration, 
DBFs could try to establish early production and/or 
marketing facilities or 4) could rely on external 
partners, "subcontracting the manufacturing of their 
products and/or licensing the commercialization rights for 
different geographical areas to other companies or using 
existing distribution channels" (Orsenigo, 1989: 129). 
Orsenigo acknowledges that companies may adopt a 
combination of these strategies and indeed, in our study, 
we found that companies invariably tried to weave together 
different strategies in an attempt to keep their heads 
above water and were, in some instances, performing a 
rather precarious balancing act. To use the term strategy 
at all may be considered misleading in some of these cases. 
As discussed in chapter 2, strategic plans result both from 
rational, conscious choice and less rationalistic 
processes. The notion of strategy, however, does imply a 
future plan. In some DBFs there was very little strategic 
thinking in evidence; DBFs developed survival tactics, 
rather than planned strategies. They were reactive to 
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events, rather than proactive. In other cases, however, 
there clearly were planned changes in strategy. 
One company, following a complete restructuring of 
operations and a change of top management, had abandoned 
many of the ideas and practices of being a DBF altogether. 
Using advanced tissue culture techniques, this company, had 
become as one manager put it a "contract supplier" of 
flowers and horticultural crops rather than a biotechnology 
firm. Development work consisted of identifying precisely 
the best technique for particular flowers and crops; there 
was no other research being carried out. The company had 
abandoned plans for diversifying into other areas on the 
basis of new technology. It became highly market led, 
working within a clearly defined existing business area. 
Its management culture became much more 'Taylorist', with a 
stricter separation between conception of strategy and 
execution of tasks. Improvement of existing techniques in 
order to cut costs while maintaining quality was the 
primary development concern. The company pursued strategy 
1 in Orsenigo's classification and the nature of management 
problems changed over time from those associated with DBF 
toward more traditional mass manufacturing concerns. 
Another company pursued a combination of Orsenigo's 
strategies 1 and 2. It aimed to create a 'cash cow' 
product which would fund more technically difficult and 
longer term projects. A number of technical problems 
slowed down development of the initial product. The 
company undertook a refinancing operation and found a 
number of new investors. The investors insisted that a top 
manager with significant commercial experience be appointed 
and wanted to diversify into other areas. The company is 
now at the stage where it can begin commercializing 
its 
initial product. It developed an agricultural product 
which had mass market potential and was able to take it 
through to the marketing stage independently. One manager 
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put this down to the absence of a MNC working in the area. 
Due to the limited opportunities in the area agriculture, 
however, it is moving, via a number of collaborative 
agreements into the area of health care. A senior level 
manager commented that a main worry now is how to balance 
demands from all investing partners in a way that will not 
damage the company in the longer run. There were several 
issues involved: the company had to avoid competing with 
its customers; it had to make sure that it was not becoming 
too dependent on one investor or customer and had to find a 
way to allow the venture capital companies to exit from the 
company. One possibility involved setting up a holding 
company and running a number of subsidiaries from the 
centre. One other company mentioned this idea. One 
manager considered it potentially advantageous in terms of 
company culture; companies could remain small and dynamic 
and yet pursue growth strategies. The components included 
in these strategic ideas are portrayed in Cope map 3.3. 
1 Remain small and dyn mic... 
2 Retain flexibility... become 
bureaucratic 
3 Create several 
subsidiaries.. 
4 Pursue growth strategies. 
Two DBFs included in the survey were based outside of 
Britain. I included them because they showed signs of 
having negotiated various hurdles successfully. The first 
of these companies employed a mixture of strategies i and 
3, and 4 and 1 in Orsenigo's classification; they 
specialized early and identified a bio-pesticide niche 
market which they pursued relentlessly. They concentrated 
on higher value speciality crops such as fruits and 
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vegetables, combining new techniques with existing 
technology. The company identified the area as one in 
which large companies would not initiate work.. In the 
words of one manager: "When big companies develop products 
they develop for big markets. High value, low volume 
applications get ignored. " Nevertheless the company has 
formed successful collaborations with large companies. 
Given the manager's view that the company initially 
innovated in areas of little interest to MNCs, this may 
well be considered as testimony to their achievements; the 
area has become too important for large companies to 
ignore. 
The company identified international partners willing 
to foster the new technology. Significantly, one MNC 
partner is less committed to the conventional mix of plant 
breeding under the chemical umbrella than other large firms 
involved in agricultural inputs and thus perhaps was more 
open to new ideas. Another, committed to being at the 
forefront of biotechnology innovation, invested on the 
basis of the company's expertise. 
The company limited collaboration both on the basis 
of quantity and quality; it develops and markets its own 
products in North America and only pursues collaborations 
in order to get access to international markets. 
Additionally, strategic considerations lead to a decision 
not to license technology; "We made a decision to sell our 
technology, not to license. You have much more strength 
when you joint venture. " 
The company formed in 1987 and was expected to 
break 
even during 1990 for the first time. Its top management 
came from MNCs and had considerable experience in relevant 
commercial areas. The company is based in the US and, as 
the senior manager I spoke with acknowledged, 
had much 
greater access to venture capital than most British 
companies. Thus external conditions have made 
life easier 
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for its managers and allowed them greater freedom to plan 
its course of action. One cannot compare companies' 
strategies without looking at the context in which they are 
operating, nevertheless the company's success is not only 
due to external financial conditions; it made important 
strategic decisions which gave it certain advantages. 
The other company based outside of the UK is Belgium 
based. Up until recently, it has been active predominantly 
in the area of plant biotechnology. The company was 
started up in 1983 by a scientist with very close links to 
the University of Ghent. It was based on work which had 
been done at the university on genetic engineering. It was 
started with government and private money rather than 
venture capital. This gave it more time to build its 
scientific base. For the first two years, the company was 
almost entirely technology driven. In 1986, it underwent a 
complete change in management; a Harvard MBA took over as 
CEO and people with experience in MNCs took other top 
positions. Over a period, the company began to narrow down 
its activities and became more product oriented. During 
this period, it did lose its top scientists. But current 
management feel that the level of expertise in the company 
is quite high and that more fundamental work can be done in 
universities. While the culture of the company changed 
significantly, care was taken to allow scientists to keep 
publishing and pursuing activities as individuals rather 
than just company scientists. 
The company's real success lay again in identifying a 
higher value technology which to develop. While it 
continues to work in such areas as protein improvement and 
insect resistance, it concentrated its efforts on creating 
hybrid plants. By creating sterile male hybrids, the 
company removed two major areas of uncertainty; the 
products will not need patent protection because they 
cannot self replicate and for the same reason will avoid 
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problems with risk regulation. Other areas of research 
were linked into this development. The management now 
identifies itself as being in the seeds business. In 1990, 
it brought in a top manager with 25 years experience in the 
world's largest seed company. 
The company realized early on that because they were 
operating in a lower value area, they had to use their 
specialist knowledge and skills to create a product which 
would offer new opportunities to other companies as well as 
themselves. The creation of hybrid plants is such an 
innovation; it gives this company and others a way of 
protecting varieties and therefore, adding value to them. 
The company has also been involved in the 
pharmaceutical area. For instance it has engineered plants 
to become production systems for high value pharmaceutical 
peptides. Additionally,, on the basis of technology built 
up in the plant breeding area, a sister company has been 
formed which will innovate in the area of pharmaceutical 
products. The company, having built up its financial base 
and having already created saleable products, is hoping 
that it will have the resources to create final product 
drugs. 
By expanding its investor base, the company secured 
20 companies as shareholders. It gave priority to 
communications and PR and also to bringing legal and patent 
expertise in house. The company had 40 field trials in 
progress in 1990 and was doing work in both industrialized 
and industrializing countries. While they did not expect 
to earn a lot from work in developing countries, they saw 
it as good publicity and building markets for the future. 
The company does not have any fixed rules about 
collaboration; it chooses the form of collaborations 
according to the crop and area of the world. Rather than 
acquire a large seeds company, however, 
it has generally 
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formed collaborative agreements and joint ventures with 
other companies to bring products to market. 
At a more abstract level the differences between DBF 
typeas can be understood in terms of the conceptual 
categories introduced in chapter 1. Neo-Fordist firms, for 
example the first company mentioned in the strategy section 
of this chapter, become contract suppliers rather than 
leading edge technology firms. This leaves them vulnerable 
to other firms developing more efficient techniques or 
undercutting them in terms of costs. In the case of firms 
in the flexible specialization category, representing a 
number of companies considered in this chapter, 
difficulties stem from trying to balance demands of short 
term contracts with longer term product development. As 
with the second company mentioned in the strategy section, 
they are often involved in diverse areas and developing a 
coordinated strategy is highly problematic in these 
companies. 
The third and fourth companies mentioned in the 
strategy section could be characterised as Post-Fordist 
producers. These firms have resolved a number of the 
problems confronting flexible specialization type firms 
through increased focus and productive collaborations with 
larger partners. It is perhaps significant that neither of 
these firsm are British and that even in global terms, the 
number of these firms in the area of agriculture and food 
related biotechnology appears to be small. The constraints 
have been detailed in this chapter, One particular problem 
is that Post Fordist strategy depends heavily on successful 
collaborations with larger firms. Yet, as the following 
chapter demonstrates, the majority of large firms in this 
study favored in-house development rather than extensive 
longer term collaborations with smaller firms. 
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Neo-Fordist Flexible 
Specialization 
Post-Fordist 
Contract supplier Biotechnology Focused approach 
relationships with boutiques. to technology and larger firms. product 
Concentration on development. 
Compete more on specialist high 
cost than with technology Strategically 
leading edge techniques. thought out col- 
technology. laboration with 
Managed largely by partners. 
Managed by biotechnology 
generalists, experts. Managed by ex-MNC 
perhaps with managers with 
emphasis on Difficulties in experience in 
marketing. going beyond relevant areas. 
development of 
Lower R&D intermediate Engaged in 
expenditure, but products. selective joint 
firms lose their ventures, 
place at the Problems in trying licensing 
leading edge of to balance short agreements, to 
the technology and term contracts market products. 
lose their with longer term 
competitive edge. strategic work. Limited number of 
firms able to 
pursue this 
I strateqv. 
3.4. CONCLUSION. 
This chapter has raised a number of points. I have 
discussed the internal and external factors which influence 
decision making in-DBFs, their implications and the 
connections between them. The study identified powerful 
external constraints on successful development and showed 
how external and internal constraints combine to push many 
DBF away from more ambitious innovations, particularly in 
the area of agriculture and food. Despite this, a few 
firms formulate strategies which do allow them to innovate 
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in higher value areas and maintain a level of independence. 
Key to these strategies is experienced management, the 
identification of 'core' technologies, selective targeting 
of product areas, carefully thought out collaborations with 
larger partners and avoidance of the more extreme versions 
of 'market led' strategies which lead to a running down of 
the company's assets. Time will tell whether or not these 
success stories will continue to prosper in the longer 
term. The fact still remains that the outlook for the 
majority of firms in this study, as independent entities, 
did not look bright. 
The findings of this research are not conclusive; the 
study focused predominantly on companies in Britain and 
companies that were included from other countries were 
chosen because of their success. Thus, more international 
comparative work is needed in order to determine how much 
weight should be attributed to variables affecting these 
firms. 
Further work should include the following set of 
questions: To what extent is the critique of the linear 
model outlined in chapter 1, relevant to the troubles 
afflicting DBFs? Or, on the other hand, are the problems 
being experienced not inherent to small high technology 
firms but rather due to national circumstance and 
industrial structures? Orsenigo, in his study stresses 
the importance of considering context when evaluating the 
role of DBFs; saying, 
".. The underdevelopment of [venture capital] and 
the smaller role played by Schumpetarian ventures 
in the patterns of innovation in science based 
technologies reflect other structural 
institutional and cultural features of the 
countries in. questions" (Orsenigo, 1989: 151). 
While a host of questions remain about the underlying 
causes of difficulties for DBFs, the findings of this 
chapter, combined with the study of innovation in large 
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firms, suggest some conclusions. First, although as 
chapter 1 explained, there seemed good reason to believe 
that DBFs might prove compatible with broader trends in the 
economy, the level of contribution they have made to 
innovation has been stunted by a range of interacting 
factors. In terms of the Post-Fordist framework, while 
industrially advanced economies are indeed characterized by 
an intensification of scientific exploitation and 
technological innovation, DBFs cannot, in the main, cope 
with the role they were thought to have had in transforming 
new science into marketable biotechnology. This is due to 
more circumstantial factors such as the lack of finance, 
difficulties in collaboration with larger firms, sector - 
specific problems associated with the agricultural and food 
industries and market structures. However, there are also 
more inherent difficulties relating to lack of resources 
and knowledge to ensure that firms can cope with technical 
and non-technical features of development, regulation and 
marketing. In particular, the spatial arrangement which 
separates DBFs from downstream processing, technical and 
commercial knowledge, hinders successful innovation. This 
is problematic because, as argued in chapter 1 and shown in 
chapter 4, the pattern of much innovation is not linear; it 
is an iterative process between different parts of the- 
production process and is the result of learning by doing. 
On the other hand, while DBFs are likely to be unable to 
compete with larger counterparts on equal terms, larger 
firms, and the economy as a whole, may find it beneficial, 
as Oakey suggests, to have a healthy DBF sector. DBFs have 
advantages in terms of concentrated scientific excellence. 
Also, they are not hindered by previous experience and 
investment. For both these reasons they are likely to be 
quicker on their feet and more flexible than their 
larger 
counterparts. 
In an interesting piece on 'market creation', 
Green 
(1991) identifies a number of 'institutional' and 
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regulatory problems which have created obstacles to the 
successful marketing of biotechnology based diagnostics. 
While Green deals with the area of healthcare, the study 
provides a useful framework for incorporating both detailed 
sectoral considerations and sociological and political 
concerns into innovation studies. 
Monoclonal Antibodies (MAbs) opened up new 
possibilities for the identification of various ailments 
and conditions in humans. Diagnostics were attractive to 
DBFs because they offered a relatively short and cheap way 
to the market, partly because they did not involve time 
consuming and expensive regulations. MAbs could be used 
for quick and cheap diagnosis of a range of infectious 
diseases and promised, in addition to adding to cost 
reduction and efficiency in hospital laboratories, to open 
up a new market area offering an alternative to laboratory 
diagnostic services (Green, 1991: 65). 
The main markets were identified as being in US, 
where healthcare. is costly and largely in the private 
sector. Unlike the UK, the cost of diagnostic testing is 
reimbursed by health insurance companies. Thus, one new 
market which was identified was the market for physician's 
office testing (POT) which by-passed hospital laboratories, 
offering physicians new sources of income. The second 
market was potentially even larger; if tests could be made 
simple enough, it was possible that they could be sold 
direct to consumers. This idea became known as over the 
counter (OTC) testing (Green, 1991: 68). 
Green follows the fortunes of DBFs aiming to develop 
these markets and finds that most failed. They failed for 
various reasons; important complementary technologies 
which would have made self testing for sexually transmitted 
diseases easier, were not available; new regulations 
emerged after considerable controversy which required large 
firms resources; products which have sold well (such as 
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pregnancy tests) "incorporate principles appropriate to its 
manufacture, its final use by the 'consumer' and, something 
often forgotten, its retailing characteristics" (Green 
1991: 70). In the case of OTC tests products had to be 
professionally approved and "accompanied by good advice 
back-up including good labeling ('if in doubt see your 
doctor') and telephone advice points. " Many doctors, Green 
notes, were not initially supportive of OTC pregnancy 
tests, arguing rather that all pregnant women need 
professional advice. Physicians' reluctance to relinquish 
control over pregnant women clashed to some extent with a 
culturally powerful feminist demand for more autonomous 
knowledge about the female body and more control over it. 
While OTC pregnancy tests have proved successful, it is 
large firms with the necessary resources to deal with 
marketing and distribution requirements and institutional 
requirements such as engaging in PR with doctors and 
fighting regulatory battles, who have been successful in 
developing end products. In the area of STD diagnostics, 
doctors have been extremely reluctant to encourage more 
autonomy and self diagnosis believing that patients need 
doctors' advice and counseling in dealing with their 
ailments. (Green, 1991: 70-73) 
Green's analysis brings the social nature of market 
creation to the fore. He clearly identifies the need for 
institutional and social change to accompany technological 
change if new markets are to be created: 
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"The creation of new markets for MAb-based 
diagnostics has not fulfilled the expectations of 
early 1980s biotechnology enthusiasts. DBFs 
found it relatively easy to sell their MAbs, 
either built into their own kits or, more often, 
as components of kits made and sold by 
established immunodiagnostics firms to medical 
laboratories. MAbs were, in effect, just 
incremental (if important) innovations within 
immunodiagnostic markets. However, more radical 
applications of MAbs to STDs... proved more 
difficult. The market spaces for such tests 
required an engineering of institutional 
arrangements as well as appropriate technological 
developments. The study of the development of 
the pregnancy-test market, into which MAbs 
slotted in the mid-1980s, shows what 
institutional engineering was necessary. 
Innovating firms had to negotiate with regulatory 
agencies... and, on a continuing basis, had to 
convince and placate professional medical 
practitioners hostile to OTC testing. " (Green, 
1991: 73) 
Chapters 5 and 6 give further consideration to these 
sorts of factors in terms of agriculture - related 
biotechnology. 
This chapter has raised important questions about the 
role of small firms in biotechnology innovation. They are 
confronted with multiple problems including, regulations, 
difficult collaborations, the nature of markets, market 
structure, patents, lack of management expertise, finance 
and funding. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that 
DBFs, in conjunction with large firms, may yet have a role 
to play in biotechnology innovation. Clearly, however, the 
findings presented in this chapter dispel two myths: 
first, that global trends are moving in favor of the small, 
innovative, firm in all sectors; second, that DBFs fit 
automatically into a linear model of innovation whereby 
small, innovative, firms which are close to the science 
base, will necessarily succeed in bridging the gap between 
invention and innovation. 
1nA 
CHAPTER 4. LARGE COMPANIES AND 
BIOTECHNOLOGY: DIVERSITY AND DOUBT. 
This chapter examines biotechnology strategy in five 
large MNCs. It describes how companies incorporate new 
technology into existing operations and structures and how 
they envision biotechnology contributing to existing 
business activity. The five companies' strategies are 
discussed in terms of five variables: R&D and market 
identification; Organizational structure; Collaborations; 
Regulations and Public Relations and Culture. The 
companies displayed significantly different strategies and 
a variety of approaches. COPE maps summarize each of the 
large firms' strategy and portray the extent of the 
difference clearly. 
This chapter argues that large MNCs have more room 
for manoeuvre than DBFs. Nevertheless, some firms were 
much more prepared to take risks than others. The extent 
to which firms committed themselves to biotechnology 
depended largely on their previous activity and place in 
market and industry structures. Strategies also depended 
on related issues of different economic and political 
assessments and cultural attributes. Additionally, 
strategies depended on their perception of public opinion 
and regulation. Regulations, public opinion, and patent 
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legislation will be discussed in relation to firms' 
strategy. This chapter draws heavily on the empirical 
evidence gathered during the two years of field work; 
broader discussion of these issues and the political and 
social struggle which surround the introduction of new risk 
regulation and patent legislation appears in Chapter 6. 
This chapter portrays the cumulative nature of 
innovation and discusses the concept of learning by doing 
in terms of firms' strategies. Strategy was complicated by 
the difficulties of adopting new technologies and knowledge 
and of breaking with the past. This chapter also examines 
the various ways in which firms sought to do this and 
analyses different collaborative strategies. Again, while 
the field work provides the focus for this chapter, chapter 
5 discusses in broader terms issues of collaboration and 
organization of production, together with analysis of 
changes in market structure. 
4.1. MNC 1. OVERVIEW. 
MNC 1 is a large integrated chemical company, with a 
turnover of over $7 billion. The company restructured its 
entire business on the basis of new technology; it aims to 
build a biotechnology-based business with extensive R&D and 
production in plant and animal agriculture, pharmaceutical 
and food biotechnology based business. This investigation 
of the company focused on its agricultural activities and 
the analysi's which follows relates to this part of the 
company. 
Previously, in the area of agro-chemicals, MNC 1 had 
been characterized largely as only a two product company, 
albeit tremendously successful products. In 1984, the sale 
of the two products provided for more than 60% of profits. 
In 1987, the patent on one product ran out and 'Copy cat' 
competitors threatened the supremacy of the second. The 
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company also produced a wide range of chemical based 
commodities, but had few higher value, specialized 
products, in its portfolio. 
Beset by low profit margins, falling profits and 
increasing hostility toward the chemical industry, the 
company took drastic action during the 1970s and 80s 
(Nill, 1988). It increased its stake in the pharmaceutical 
business and bought into the seeds business; biotechnology 
played a major role in influencing MNC l's growth and 
acquisition strategies. A manager analyzed the decisions 
taken at the time in the following way: 
"[MNC 1] determined that its major corporate 
strengths lay in the ability to apply chemical 
technology to the life sciences, as evidence by 
its strong positions in plant herbicides, growth 
regulators, plant breeding and certain 
pharmaceuticals" (Nill, 1988: 29). 
A senior manager, interviewed in this study said that 
the company needed to find a new technology in order to 
maintain its profitability. It identified biotechnology as 
a major new technology which could potentially generate 
high profit margins. The adoption of biotechnology also 
related to the 1970s oil shocks and the company's 
reconsideration about its dependence on petroleum based 
products. 
"Businesses that are driven by petroleum 
feedstocks were too risky to be in, or at least, 
if you were in them you needed to be in feet 
first and control the market, which we didn't do. 
We had a range of businesses, from speciality to 
pharmaceutical to commodities and we were at the 
time, also looking to get out of the commodity 
business. " 
The company undertook an extensive review largely 
based on Hax and Majluf's transformation theory, which 
tries to identify companies' strengths in terms of 
conditions in the external environments. The approach 
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focuses heavily on developing corporate thrusts. 
(Nill, 1988) By mid-eighties, MNC 1 claimed it had 
"... virtually completed its transformation of 
[its] chemicals, fibres, and plastics businesses 
from heavy dominance by commodity petrochemicals 
to a higher performance, less cyclical mix" 
(hill, 1988: 32) . 
4.1.1. R&D AND MARKET STRATEGY. 
In 1984, the company completed a $150 million 
biotechnology laboratory in the US. The complex houses R&D 
which feeds mainly into animal and plant biotechnology- 
based products. At the US lab, 1200 people work in the 
area of plant biotechnology alone. 280 have Ph. Ds. 
Managers regard the company as a leading-edge innovator. 
This position will serve the company well in global terms, 
they believe. A senior manager predicted that growth in 
Europe would be 'technology driven' rather than 'market 
led' during the nineties, with new technologies provoking 
change in process, products and industrial sectors. 
MNC 1 made decisions about which technologies to 
develop first based on two criteria: first, the company 
wanted to build on existing strengths; second, it wanted 
to introduce technologies which would play a key role in 
relevant sectors in the future. This second component of 
strategy has been dubbed 'technological economic 
surveillance'. While the company pursued each strand of 
strategy separately (continuing with chemical based 
developments and, on the other hand, diversifying into new 
product areas) it also tried to combine the two objectives. 
The decision to produce recombinant Bovine Somatotrophin 
(rBST), a growth hormone which can increase milk yield by 
up to 20%, is an example of the outcome of these two 
strands of strategic thought. MNC 1's interest in 
Somatotrophins and animal productivity enhancers dates back 
to the 1970s. A lot of work was done 
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"... splitting up naturally occurring BST into 
fragments, looking at the activity and working 
out the activity versus the structure and it was 
found that you needed virtually the whole 
molecule to retain activity. " 
Because BST is a large protein, traditional methods 
of chemical synthesis are not possible and so the project 
was shelved until the advent of genetic engineering opened 
up new possibilities. The first patent on recombinant BST 
(rBST) was taken out by Genentech and MNC 1 moved quickly 
to acquire the rights to the new product". MNC 1 also 
began in-house R&D on recombinant Porcine Somatotrophin 
(rPST) which will reduce the fat content of pork. 
MNC l's extensive work on genetically engineering 
herbicide resistance into plants is another instance of 
trying to combine the two elements of strategy; the company 
is trying both to build on accumulated expertise and break 
into new areas. Other R&D projects include insect and 
virus resistance. 
The company pursues a global strategy, aiming to 
create markets in developing countries; Third World 
countries want to increase production and while the company 
would not produce solely for developing countries, it 
considers demand from this source. Indeed, in some cases, 
products have been easier to sell in developing countries 
and Eastern European than in industrialized counterparts 
because of 'friendlier' regulatory codes. Currently rBST 
has been approved in Czechoslovakia, South Africa, Namibia, 
Brazil, Mexico and the states of the ex-Soviet Union. One 
manager said that products might be given free to peasant 
farmers in the Third World in order to create tomorrow's 
markets. However, MNC 1 would make Third world exporters 
pay for the technology. 
10 At the time the company began work on rBST, milk 
quotas had not yet been introduced in Europe. 
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The company is not only working on 'appropriationist' 
strategies, (Goodman et al, 1987) but has also developed a 
sugar substitute which is produced from a genetically 
engineered bacterium producing phenylalamine, a raw 
material. 
4.1.2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. 
MNC 1, while organized as a set of-separate 
companies, places a great deal of emphasis on corporate 
culture and co-operation between businesses. Basic R&D 
which feeds into all sectors is carried out at the US 
research centre and biotechnology is seen very much as 
uniting sectors and creating new opportunities. One 
manager considers it one of MNC l's attributes that it has 
created a structure and culture which allow for the 
dissemination of biotechnology research between different 
parts of the company. 
"... [MNC 1] had the foresight to realize that 
basic biotech research would yield breakthroughs 
applicable to both human and animal health care 
. and 
to agricultural products as well. While most 
biotech companies have concentrated solely on one 
area... [MNC 1] has structured an organization 
that can capitalize on all the breakthroughs that 
emerge from their basic biotechnological 
research. This enables the company to reap 
'maximum benefit from its invested R&D 
expenditures" (Nill, 1988: 34) . 
In addition to its willingness to adapt 
organizational structure in response to new technologies, 
the company has set up new collaborative structures. 
4.1.3. COLLABORATIONS. 
Collaborative ventures play an important part in MNC 
1's strategy for biotechnology innovation. In the early 
days of its restructuring, it set up a venture capital 
company. Later, it established a European counterpart in 
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order to extend its reach. This fitted in with the 
company's technological environment approach. MNC 1, 
"aggressively invested in a portfolio of small 
entrepreneurial companies focused on 
agribusiness, biotechnology, and life sciences, 
electronic chemicals, process control and 
instrumentation" (Chemical Week, 14 Dec, 1983, 
quoted in Nill, 1988: 29) . 
MNC l's Director of Investor Relations emphasized 
that exposure to new technology, also pursued in 
collaboration with university, had higher priority than 
financial return (Nill, 1988: 29). 
MNC 1 also pursues more specific joint ventures and 
licensing agreements with DBFs and other MNCs. Some 
collaborative ventures are seen to be vital in accessing 
new markets and lead to acquisitions and mergers. 
MNC 1 maintains high levels of investment in 
universities. The company 'donated' $23.5 million to 
Washington University for biotech research and provides 
research grants to other universities for more specific 
work (Hobbelink, 1991: 39). Based primarily in the US, the 
company operates in a context where industry investment in 
universities has a long tradition. 
4.1.4. REGULATIONS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS. 
Regulatory problems have plagued MNC 1's efforts to 
market agriculture - related biotechnology products and 
were always raised by managers early in interviews as one 
of the companies main concerns. Regulatory wrangles over 
rBST, both in the US and in Europe have slowed 
commercialization of the product down considerably. MNC 1 
claims no negative side effects result from use of rBST but 
controversy over its impact on human health and animal 
welfare continues. Small farmers did not welcome the 
product and saw it contributing to economies of scale and 
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favoring large farmers. MNC 1 says this is untrue and that 
in any case, socio economic impact should not included in 
regulatory assessments. A senior manager also disputes the 
widely accepted view that milk is in surplus in the EC. 
One manager said, 
"BST has not really had any regulatory problems, 
its had what I would call 'political problems'. 
And its nothing to do with biotechnology at all. 
It comes up against these perceived problems of 
over-production of milk and all the rest of it - 
whether the small farmer will be disadvantaged - 
which all tends to be tied in with the subsidy 
he's getting - the CAP [Common Agricultural 
Policy]. There's a large amount of 
misinformation around. There are no surpluses 
right now. " 
On the one hand he said he did not envisage the same 
level of controversy taking place over herbicide 
resistance, on the other hand he depicted the argument over 
regulations as a-political battle, in which 'rich greens' 
were gaining ground. His perception of the 'greens' was 
interesting. 
"I have to say that green interests are a rich 
man's'privilege, a rich man's ideology, if you 
like. And that's pretty true of most of the 
greens in the [European] parliament... Count this 
and Baron that from Germany. " 
MNC 1 managers saw the-problem largely in terms of 
'them' and 'us', although exact perceptions of 'them' 
varied. Three of the managers I spoke with argued that 
consideration of socio-economic impact in licensing 
technologies constituted a form of central planning. One 
commented, "Its like they had in Eastern Europe and you 
know what happened there". 
MNC 1 plays a key role in trying to promote the 
technology amongst policy makers in the US and tries to 
persuade UK and EC policy makers to support the technology. 
Its former President claimed that biotechnology constituted 
"a world economic revolution" and urged US and UK 
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politicians to give biotechnology political support arguing 
that knowledge is the "raw material" of the future, for 
industrialized countries". One of his specific-requests to 
US politicians was for 'commitment' to the technology, in 
particular, he wanted a Presidential blessingll. 
MNC 1 is at the forefront of lobbying against 
'process' based regulations, arguing that genetic 
engineering poses no special, risks and that only products 
of biotechnology should assessed. It lobbies for patent 
protection of genetically manipulated plants, saying that 
the rate of innovation will be slowed down if patents are 
not given. 
The controversy generated by biotechnology, and 
particularly rBST, has forced the company to reconsider the 
way in which it promotes biotechnology. Voicing the new 
line, one manager said he could see no reason to try and 
win people over to biotechnology; most people did not know 
what it was and it was probably better left that way. PR 
about biotechnology should be targeted much more closely to 
key policy makers. Public campaigns prove to be counter 
productive. 
4.1.5. CULTURE. 
MNC 1 ranks high on growth orientation, scientific 
and technological achievement. Success in biotechnology 
innovation has been such a high priority that security of 
profits and costs orientation have been secondary goals. 
Its concern with developing the technology has also 
been 
greater than its desire to create 'excellent products' in 
the sense of popular products with 
immediate potential to 
generate significant profit. 
11 His request was granted with the 
formation of the 
Vice Presidential Council on Competitiveness, which has 
lobbied for business friendly regulations and provided 
funds for biotechnology development. 
117 
Indeed, the biotechnology thrust means that MNC 1 
managers appear to have reified biotechnology to embody all 
that is good. MNC 1 underwent profound changes during the 
late seventies and early eighties and the organization's 
credibility hinges in many respects on the success of 
biotechnology-based innovation. The heavy identification 
with the technology has led the company into politically 
difficult terrain. Failures of, or problems with, 
particular innovations such as rBST, are viewed as 
resulting from the activities of political opponents, such 
as the 'Greens' or the 'Reds' who oppose the company 
itself, rather than as product related technical or 
marketing problems. While this may be accurate in some 
cases, constructing public relations around these arguments 
leads the company to take an adversarial, defensive stance 
when trying to promote its products. Other companies 
working with biotechnology voiced disquiet about the way in 
which MNC 1 handled public relations, believing that it was 
creating opposition rather than diffusing it. One manager 
from a another company commented that MNC l's handling of 
BST was 
"... a very good case, in my view, of one 
company... thinking that they could go it alone 
with the general public, with the ministries, 
with everybody because the strength of their 
technical case was so terrific that nobody could 
challenge them... they were very naive to think 
they could just go on TV and just talk it out 
with a few people... having to establish real 
consumer need for biotechnology is an important 
element of the discussion. " 
MNC 1 showed relatively little awareness of consumer 
power. It is willing to defend products against a 
skeptical public. In this sense, it cannot be 
characterized as a consumer oriented company. 
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4.1.6. COPE SUMMARY. 
1 make effective use of 
y new biotechnology. 
2 restructure on 
3 be at forefront of basin of iotech. 
new technology. 10 press for 
satisfactory 
13 collaborate regulatory environment. S. risk 
extensively. uncertain 
regulatory, patent 
9 create large internal and public 
R&D capacity. opinion contexts. 11 promote technology. 4. push forward 6 diversify 
with new products business Into 
... be second runner. areas with 
p biotech h potential. 
12 lobby for 
political and 9 develop new technologies 
economic support, ahead of market demand. 
1S avoid making 
biotech a controversial 
issue. 
The COPE map portrays the priority given to 
technology by MNC 1 (concepts 2 and 3). It is both 
building a large internal capacity (concept 9) and 
collaborating extensively with external partners (concept 
13). The company has decided to restructure on the basis 
of biotechnology (concept 2) even though the strategy poses 
various risks (concept 5). Its decision to push forward 
with new products (concept 4) means that it is developing 
new technologies ahead of the market, which also poses 
risks. The company promotes the technology (concepts 11 
and 12) and presses for a satisfactory regulatory 
environment (concept 10). At the same time, managers have 
begun to realize that this strategy is unhelpful in that it 
makes biotechnology a controversial issue (negative arrow 
from concept 15 to concept 11). 
4.1.7. CONCLUSION. 
The following key points became apparent in this 
summary of MNC i's approach to biotechnology innovation. 
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First, MNC 1 has staked much of its reputation and, indeed, 
resources on biotechnology and has tried to gain both 
political and economic support for its perceived mission as 
a forerunner of a technological revolution. Its commitment 
partly, at least, stems from its previous rather precarious 
hold on agricultural input markets; the company had 
relatively little to lose and a potentially a lot to gain 
by radically diversifying and building up a new core 
technology. The company identified biotechnology as one of 
the technologies which would be essential to industrial 
economies in the next century. The strategy has been to 
reorganize and diversify around the technology (technology 
driven rather than market led). It has spent large amounts 
of money buying up expertise and creating R&D facilities. 
Second, while much of the company's innovation is 
cumulative in the sense that it builds on previous work, it 
has made serious efforts to break old patterns. Its wide 
network of rather loosely structured and longer term 
collaborations with universities and DBFs stands in 
contrast to other large companies studied. This type of 
collaboration perhaps better allows for the diffusion of 
more tacit knowledge. Additionally, its approach to DBFs, 
providing them with venture capital to build businesses 
allows for small teams to stay in place in those 
environments. In some respects, MNC 1 acts more like the 
Japanese companies mentioned in chapter 3. 
Third, while MNC 1 has created fertile ground for 
innovation, it has had a multitude of problems in the areas 
of regulations and public opinion. The high profile given 
to biotechnology and MNC l's rather ideological stance has 
to some extent backfired creating controversy over why and 
how certain aspects of biotechnology should be used. While 
the company has taken radical steps to change its structure 
and organization at the R&D and production end of 
operations, it has had serious problems with successfully 
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integrating marketing and public relations efforts with 
products. The constraints on innovation are clearly at 
this end of the production and marketing process. 
4.2. MNC 2. OVERVIEW. 
MNC 2 is a very large international full range 
chemical company, divided into highly autonomous 
businesses. Total group turnover amounted to more than 
£11.7 billion in 1988. Profits amounted to nearly £1.5 
billion. I interviewed managers in the Seeds and BioBiz12 
businesses. MNC 2 has very significant interests in agro- 
chemicals; it is the third largest producer in the world. 
A major player in pharmaceuticals, more recently, as a 
direct response to opportunities made possible by new 
biotechnology, it invested heavily in Seeds. Over the past 
decade a strategic shift directed R&D more towards "'bio' 
fields of pharmaceuticals and, to a lesser extent, 
agrochemicals and seeds" (FT, June 20,1991). In addition to 
Seeds, MNC 2 created two other new business with the 
specific remit of exploiting biotechnology: Diagnostics and 
BioBiz.. The overall MNC 2 R&D budget in 1990 was estimated 
to be at nearly £700 million. Bioscience accounts for 50% 
of R&D spending, and half of that is spent on agrochemical 
and pharmaceuticals, although, naturally a much smaller 
percentage is spent on third generation biotechnology. A 
senior manager summed up his vision for the company in the 
year 2000 in the following way, 
"First of all it will be a leading integrated 
chemical company. It will have by then a much 
larger pharmaceutical business than today with a 
solid presence in biotechnology, a continuing 
strong agrochemicals business and a successful, 
profitable and substantial seeds business" 
(FT, June 20,1991). 
12 This is not the company's real name. 
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4.2.1. R&D AND MARKET STRATEGY. 
During the eighties, MNC 2 acquired a significant 
seeds business. To quote the Director of Seeds R&D, 
"[MNC 2] has made a major investment in that 
business. We've gone from a position of being 
nowhere in 1985 to now being the world's fifth 
largest seed company with a turnover of $250 
million a year. Our investment in. this business 
is because we believe that biotechnology is going 
radically to change the way that new plant 
varieties are produced in the future. " 
The seeds business uses a system of research 
targeting to guide much of its in-house work. The idea is 
to subject each research idea to a number of checks and to 
build up a body of knowledge about different markets. It 
is applied to short, medium and longer term objectives13. 
Each research project is evaluated quantitatively according 
to commercial value and technical feasibility. However, 
biotechnology, which represents potentially radical new 
developments, both in economic and technical terms, makes 
accurate quantification problematic. Thus, decision making 
tends to depend on "informed guesses. " A primary objective 
of long term research is the acquisition of generic 
technology or understanding which can then be translated 
into more specific targets. In some cases, it resembles 
"an act of faith"; although it is impossible to identify 
exactly how the technology will be used, there is a faith 
that it will prove useful. The importance of these 
'qualitative' judgements highlights the critical role of 
the tacit knowledge of experienced managers. 
MNC. 2 Seeds allocates about 10% of its R&D money to 
'Skunk' work; scientists have time and resources to work on 
13 Although long term projects must be less target 
specific, managers aim riskier projects at targets with the highest potential value added. 
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their own 'pet' projects, without submitting ideas to any 
form of 'targeting'. About one skunk project a year 
becomes a commercialized product. One interviewee said 
that an environment where "you screw the resources so much 
down to the floorboards that everybody's delivering on time 
the dedicated target and doesn't have any flexibility" is 
not conducive to innovation. As a 'science-based' company, 
MNC 2 believes in the value of excellent science and 
creativity. 
Biotechnology contributes in three principal ways to 
improving agricultural products: (i) improving the 
accuracy and selectivity involved in plant breeding and 
improving the 'genetic potential'; (ii) in "better 
husbandry" - work on fertilizers, pesticides etc. With 
regards to the first objective, primarily a process 
innovation, a lot of work concerns "characterizing and 
recognizing, in a very routine and useful way differences 
in the genetic make up of a plant. " Together with other 
techniques, this, "makes the life of a plant breeder 
simpler - we can accelerate generation time... " Moreover, 
the process of plant breeding becomes much more selective. 
These techniques will not have an obvious impact in the 
market place, "... all that is happening is we're doing what 
the plant breeders always have done, but we're doing it 
much more effectively by giving him the tools of the trade. 
Probably half of our work is like that. " A larger company 
with accumulated experience in traditional plant breeding 
and the seeds business will have enormous advantages over 
smaller companies in this sort of work. This 
is 
particularly the case if work in this area 
is to be 
combined with the second area of innovation mentioned; 
(iii) the introduction of new varieties (products) with 
genetically manipulated attributes. "The plant 
breeder 
cannot for example, introduce resistance to a particular 
disease if there is nowhere in that crop any resistance. 
" 
123 
Managers stressed that simply inserting genes into 
plants is of no use, unless the plant itself is of good 
quality. 
"There's no point in having, say, a corn plant 
which is insect resistant, but otherwise useless. 
You've still got to yield a lot of high quality 
corn, its still got to stand up, its still got to 
resist a lot of diseases out there. In other 
words, its got to have all the other good 
agronomic attributes, plus this. " 
Traditional plant breeding still plays an important 
role and integration of traditional and new techniques is 
seen as key. Another manager described biotechnology as a 
'knowledge revolution' and identified one of its main 
functions as adding to the total sum of knowledge about 
plants and agricultural inputs. He pointed out that even 
in cases where chemical applications continue to 
predominate, biotechnology will have contributed to better 
applications because increased knowledge will mean better 
technology, whether it be chemical or biological. 
All managers made the point that biotechnology based 
products have'to compete with existing products. In the 
context of relatively low value agriculture products and 
cheap chemical applications, this poses quite a challenge. 
One manager said, 
"Everybody gets excited about a new biological 
control agent, like Bt or son of Bt or something 
like that, but you've got to look again from the 
farmer's point of view or the foresters point of 
view. What has it got to offer that's better 
than what we've got now, and a lot of them don't 
stand up. " 
Thus, ina number of important managerial ways work 
with new biotechnology is likely to benefit considerably 
from previous knowledge and experience of plant breeding 
and the seeds business giving larger companies benefits 
over smaller counterparts. 
124 
Seeds pursues higher value applications, although the 
relatively low value nature of the market, dominated by 
very large sales of a few crops, prevents the high 
value/low volume objective from being an exclusive 
strategy. Thus, large acreage crops such as wheat, barley, 
sugar beet and oilseeds have been identified as primary 
targets for research and development. Seeds and agro- 
chemicals share R&D costs. 
Other businesses also pursue higher value 
applications. At the beginning of the eighties one of MNC 
2's highest profile investments in biotechnology was in a 
single cell protein foodstuff for animals. The development 
undoubtedly marked a technical achievement, but as oil 
prices went up (making alternative foodstuff relatively 
cheaper) the product became less commercially attractive. 
The inherent problem with fermentation technologies which 
involves draining off considerable amounts of water, proved 
capital intensive and expensive. A manager comments, 
"The experiment taught us much about how to grow 
micro-organisms on a large scale (1.6 million 
litres) but it also highlighted the inefficiency 
inherent in the fermentation process. More than 
anything else this focused our biotechnological 
attentions on higher value added products at the 
speciality end of the chemical business. " 
4.2.2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. 
MNC 2 does not have centralized R&D facilities, but 
rather operates on a decentralized basis. The Bio-strategy 
group of managers, drawn from pharmaceuticals, crop 
protection and plant breeding tries to spread expertise 
throughout the company and coordinate efforts. MNC 2's 
decentralized R&D structure gives this group considerable 
importance. The group aims to ensure that the company 
benefits from what a senior manager calls 'corporateness', 
(FT, June 20,1991) ensuring that all the businesses can 
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make use of appropriate science when it arises14. The 
purpose of the decentralized structure is to give MNC 2 
increased flexibility in determining R&D research 
programmes and provide added focus. Whether a team of top 
managers creates 'corporateness' and ensures diffusion of 
knowledge is an interesting question. 
The tension between centralization and 
decentralization also poses problems for MNC 2 within 
businesses. One manager explained difficulties in 
combining new and old practices and dealing with 
geographical distance. The problem consisted of, 
"... managing the interface between old and new 
science... as a seeds company you have to do a lot 
of things locally. The routine - the classic 
process of plant breeding to produce new plant 
varieties and new hybrids - has to be done in the 
area where you are to produce plants that are 
locally adapted, and you can't do that anywhere 
except in the environment for which they are 
intended. Similarly, for a lot of-crops, if 
you're successful in that the bulk of seed that 
you produce to sell is large and so the 
production, the processing, the bagging and 
selling also needs to be done rather locally. So 
that means that seed companies - even if you are 
a large company has to be composed of a lot of 
more-or-less independent units. There's a strong 
push to make it decentralized... So you have the 
basic science, the plant breeding - rather local. 
Now, when you look at biotech, you tend to have 
different requirements... you need critical masses 
of scientists and they have quite high capital 
requirements for a lot of expensive machinery and 
specialized laboratories... And its difficult, 
probably unaffordable to set these up in every 
breeding station.. its a management dilemma. " 
In a sense, the problems result from a contradiction 
between localized and centralized knowledge and the 
14-The article in the Financial Times documents cases where the interchange of ideas between the pharmaceutical 
and'agrochemcial parts of the company have resulted in 
significant product innovations, indicating that links between the businesses are productive (FT, June 20,1991). 
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interaction between low-tech and high-tech activities. A 
related managerial issue concerns increasing the level of 
communication between different parts of the company. 
Basic R&D requires huge, and therefore centralized 
computing facilities. This creates a problem with 
disseminating results. One of the major constraints, cited 
by an R&D manager in MNC 2 was the difficulty of getting, 
"the IT [information technology] operating 
appropriately. You can't do this genetic mapping 
for example without being able to run large 
statistical programs and handle the 
results... getting that up to speed and then 
getting it accessible to the different scientists 
in different laboratories around the world is 
important. Getting different companies within 
MNC2 to communicate with each other is a 
priority. " 
A different set of constraints inspired MNC 2 to 
innovate organizationally; instead of creating links with 
DBFs, the company set up a 'mock'. small company. 
4.2.3. BIOBIZ. 
Biobiz constitutes an extremely interesting attempt 
by a large multinational to reap perceived small firm 
benefits. After the failure of the single cell protein 
project, MNC 2 explored options; it wanted to create a 
space precisely so that, while working within defined 
parameters, the company would not be overly constrained 
by 
its past activities when trying to innovate with a new 
technology. The initial remit was 
"... to come up with new approaches 
in 
biotechnology that can be meshed into [MNC 2's] 
other activities - which range from commodity 
materials like plastics and fibres to 
pharmaceuticals and crop-protection compounds" 
(FT, 12 July, 1989) . 
The founding Director developed a managerial ethos of 
a, 
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" ... free-wheeling style of a 
kind more likely to 
be found in a small start-up company than within 
a large industrial combine like the 12bn-a-year 
turnover of [MNC 2]... We are very different from 
most of the other parts of [MNC 2]. We have 
little in terms of sales and all our energies are 
taken up in moving quickly and spotting new 
markets" (FT, 12 July, 1989). 
In the early days, a priority involved picking up the 
pieces from the single cell protein project. Biobiz turned 
the technical achievement into a high value meat substitute 
aimed specifically at (according to marketing specialists) 
the younger, wealthier and female sector of the market. 
The founding Director said, 
"We are now careful not to overreach ourselves. 
Rather than concentrate on high volume projects 
with low profit margins, we are trying to look 
instead at making smaller quantities of materials 
with much higher value" (FT, 12 July, 1989). 
A biodegradable plastic, sold in Germany as packaging 
material for shampoo is another Biobiz innovation. 
Managers identified Germany as an appropriate market 
because of the strength of the Green movement and 
relatively high GNP which would support the high cost of 
the product. 
One of BioBiz's objectives was to set up 
collaborations with outside businesses, including in some 
cases DBFs, in order to gain technical and marketing 
expertise. Managers in this company then had a positive 
view of collaboration and saw it as integral to their 
success. The company created a number of either wholly 
owned new businesses or collaborative ventures formed on 
the basis of common technology or common markets. A 
manager Italked with described the evolution of the 
business in the following way, 
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"For 6 years, [Biobiz] operated like a small 
company. We were treated differently. A wall 
was built around us... We've developed very much 
in the way that biotech has developed world-wide 
- from wide spectrum to major products. This is 
the strength of a large organization - product 
management. A certain amount of innovation, but 
product management is our strength. " 
BioBiz considered a large number of projects (there 
were 140 on the books at one point) but is now 
concentrating on six. The collaborative ventures with 
outside parties shared the risks of projects and brought in 
a number of skills. Managers stressed that not all the 
skills were technical, some being related to marketing or 
dealing with regulations in areas new to MNC 2. Thus, 
while Biobiz was similar to a DBF in some respects, it had 
far more resources and experience than are normally 
available to small companies. Moreover, its remit was to 
focus on the development end of R&D, rather than the 
research end. The wall built around the company was an 
organizational wall which allowed it to move in new 
directions rather than a wall which would have established 
Biobiz as an alternative research site. The aim of 
collaborations initiated by the company was to develop and 
market products in new areas rather than generate new 
research ideas. 
4.2.4. COLLABORATIONS. 
MNC 2 collaborates extensively with universities and 
research institutes, and participates in research programs 
sponsored by both the UK government and the EC. The 
company "sets great store" in working with universities and 
sees collaboration as essential to its operations. The 
company gives about 230 CASE awards (awards part 
funded by 
industry and government) and has over 30 collaborative 
ventures with universities. The model for collaboration 
is 
"where both sides will benefit". MNC 2, like all other 
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British based large companies in this study, stressed that 
universities should retain excellence in basic science 
rather than focus on development work and acts according to 
this belief. A manger commented "there's very little that 
we do where we just give a grant to an academic to deliver 
something in a contract sense. " Rather, work will be on 
longer term collaborations of mutual interest. One of MNC 
2's first big biotechnology products was the result of such 
a collaboration. 
A manager from the Seeds business explained the 
company's reluctance to collaborate with DBFs. While MNC 2 
buys technology from small companies, it finds that joint 
development agreements often prove problematic, 
"they want massive upfront money on things that 
are still risky. Their perception of risk and 
ours at-the development end are very 
different... I understand why they do that as they 
are having some pressure from whatever their 
funding agencies are. " 
The manager acknowledged that DBFs were often quicker 
off the ground than MNCs, saying, 
"I think they were all faster off the ground in 
this technology than the big MNCs were. Time 
will tell whether or not the world changes as a 
result of the small company. You now begin to 
see a lot of the multinationals having their own 
programmes and buying up small companies and so 
on.... " 
MNC 2 is not attempting to create a 'new hierarchy' 
of the type mentioned in chapter 1, with DBFs pursuing 
various aspects of the R&D. However, the different 
elements of the company's strategy combine in such a way as 
to present the firm with new problems, some of which are 
similar to those confronting DBFs. MNC 2 is determined to 
be at'the 'leading edge' of-innovation and is unwilling to 
increase levels of vertical integration. One manager, 
commenting on a rival's decision to increase vertical 
integration, said, 
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"Fine, that's a particular business route they 
have chosen to follow. [MNC 2] has never chosen 
to follow that route. We've always chosen to 
keep ourselves as suppliers of fundamental 
discoveries if you like, I mean 90% of [MNC 2's] 
business is supplying things to other people to 
do things with. " 
With biotechnology, however, the company has found 
itself in the position of either needing to extend its 
vertical reach into many new areas or enter into 
agreements. MNC 2's work with tomatoes is a good example 
of this. A Seeds manager explains, 
"... What we have is probably a whole string of 
inventions... examples of lower volume/higher 
value type of approach... we already have a 
biodegradable plastic wrapping up shampoos in 
Germany... Probably the challenge then, is to set 
up the right sort of partnership... to bring this 
to the market. [In the case of tomatoes] we can 
collaborate with a plant breeder of tomatoes. Or 
maybe we set up a collaboration with a retail 
outfit or something in-between. Or maybe we go 
out and buy one... But if you go down the 
acquisition track people. say, 'My God, do I want 
to get into this business of buying and selling 
thousands of tons of tomatoes on the Dutch 
auctions, simply to promote my new construct -r 
its such a totally new, totally different sort of 
business... But that is actually the position of 
what you might call the small company with this 
genetic engineering... So bioscience, when you're 
looking at these small volume/high value-added 
components, it actually introduces some 
interesting challenges for effective 
collaborations and partnerships. " 
Thus, MNC 2 does not seek up stream collaborations 
with smaller companies. Down stream development and 
marketing agreements with other companies, however, will 
likely be sought. In the case of Biobiz, these agreements 
have already been established. 
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4.2.5. REGULATIONS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS. 
Regulations and public opinion concern MNC 2 greatly. 
The company plays an important role in SAGB and has taken a 
relatively high profile in lobbying for favored regulatory 
options. Costs associated with regulations, policy 
decisions and different patent legislation are quantified 
and calculated in the research targeting process. While 
managers interviewed did not identify concrete instances 
where regulation influenced decisions, they pointed to 
capital flight from the EC biotechnology sector and to 
businesses which moved their biotechnology interests out of 
the community as evidence that EC regulations have a 
negative impact. Additionally, they threatened to move 
their biotechnology concerns out of the EC if regulations 
prove too severe. - 
One manager made a link between a 'bad' regulatory 
regime and patent environment in Europe and the targeting 
of biotechnology work on crops which grow in S. E. Asia and 
the US. He admitted, however, that SE Asia has, in any 
case, been identified by MNC 2 as a major new market area 
and that even discounting the regulations and patents as 
factors, the huge US market attracts investment. Thus, 
questions remained about the extent to which regulations, 
rather than positive market opportunities, influenced 
relocation decisions. 
4.2.6. CULTURE. 
Science, technology and innovation are integral to 
the company's identity. It likes to be seen as a problem 
solving company, with world class technological solutions. 
It jumped into biotechnology innovation enthusiastically 
while the market potential of the technology remained 
unclear. Growth orientation and scientific and 
technological excellence are high priorities. Concern with 
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security of profit, on the other hand, is not such an 
overwhelming concern that it prevents longer term work and 
ambitious technological projects. 
MNC 2 retains flexibility in responding to problems 
presented by new technologies (the setting up of Biobiz for 
example) and innovates in cultural terms as well as in 
technological products and processes. 
4.2.7. COPE MAP. 
1 make effective use 
of new biotechnology. 
17 collaborate 
with unlverlaties 
2. maintain 
commitment to 
10 Identify targets 3 adopt biotech 
... DBFs biotech. 
carefully... technology push. as core technology 
Jý \ In new company 
strategy. 
14 develop biotech In 
6 use biotech old and new businesses 1S push for product 
to Improve process based regulations. 
and create novel 16 develop 
products. large acreage 
11 evaluate cost of cam, 
regulation in Europe. 4. pursue higher 
8 create better husbandry value-commodity 
and better inputs. applications. 
12 consider moving biotech 
developments to more amenable 
7 Improve accuracy environment 
and speed of plant breeding 
1S develop biotech In 
seeds and agchem areas. 
MNC 2 has adopted biotechnology as acore technology 
(concept 3) for the future, but is identifying targets 
carefully (concepts 10,4 and 16). It is using 
biotechnology in higher value applications and large 
acreage crops (concepts 4,16) and to create both new 
products and processes (concepts 6,8,7,15). The use of 
biotechnology in higher value applications ties in with a 
broader strategic thrust to move away from commodities 
(concept 3). Like MNC 1, it is attempting both to build on 
accumulated skills and knowledge, and use the technology 
to 
diversify into new areas of activity (concept 14). 
Unlike, 
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MNC 1, it does not collaborate with DBFs, but, rather 
pursues collaboration with universities (concept 17). It 
is active in pushing for product based regulations and 
threatens to move its biotechnology developments elsewhere 
if suitable regulations are not created within the EC 
(concepts 15,11,12). 
4.2.8. CONCLUSION. 
A number of key points come of out of this brief 
summary. First, MNC 2 prides itself as an innovative 
company which maintains a high degree of scientific and 
technical excellence. As a chemical company it had to make 
fundamental decisions during the seventies about its future 
activities and whether it should focus on mass producing 
bulk chemicals or rather focus on its innovative abilities. 
While the company certainly continues to mass produce 
various commodities, it opted for the later choice, in terms 
of strategic orientation. Additionally experience with 
single cell protein also encouraged the firm to target its 
innovation more carefully to higher value added 
applications. Second, in terms of biotechnology, the 
decision to be at the forefront has been costly; the 
company had to buy into the Seeds business at huge expense 
and suffered an expensive failure with single cell protein. 
Nevertheless, in a classic case of 'cumulative innovation' 
the failure led to development of another more commercially 
successful product. This example, together with the 
emphasis put on 'qualitative judgements, integration of 
'old' and 'new' technology and facilitating communication 
also point to the importance of 'learning by doing' and 
tacit knowledge in the process. Third, internal 
reorganization has been a consequence of biotechnology 
innovation and, in Seeds, as we saw, internal organization 
and managerial problems persist. The problem of 
incorporating new biotechnologies persists. Fourth, the 
company has made some enormous shifts in direction in order 
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to incorporate biotechnology across a wide spectrum of 
activities. Yet it has retained its preference for 
decentralized R&D and its existing model of collaboration. 
Thus, its emphasis is very much on building up in-house R&D 
capabilities. While Biobiz represents an attempt to 
diversify down-stream activity, it does not collaborate 
with DBFs. 
4.3. MNC 3. OVERVIEW. 
MNC 3 was formed near the turn of the century and is 
a leading integrated oil company with extensive interests 
in chemicals, coal and metals. In 1988, the group had 
£55.82 billion turnover-and £2.94 billion profit. It spent 
£428 million on R&D. During the 1970s, the company 
acquired 68-seed companies and-formed one large seed firm 
which spanned a number of continents. - The idea was to 
create a 'Green Revolution' synergy between high yielding 
varieties and agro-chemicals. However, MNC 3 represents a 
very different strategic approach to biotechnology. While 
this study was in progress the seed company was sold. The 
company did not develop the mix of chemical and biological 
based agricultural inputs characteristic of MNC's 1 and 2. 
It also sold its share of a joint venture set up with 
another MNC, which uses micro - organisms to produce 
industrial enzymes and fine chemicals. Additionally, the 
company sold its US agricultural research station and 
its 
US agro-chemicals business. After a period of searching, 
during which time the company reevaluated 
its position in 
markets and explored possibilities by acquiring and 
then 
selling DBFs, it defined its areas of interests much more 
narrowly. Now, the company focuses on developing a niche 
biopesticides market and a forestry mass market, 
in which 
it can play a leading role. 
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4.3.1. R&D AND MARKET STRATEGY. 
During the early eighties, MNC 3 undertook a 
strategic review to see where biotechnology fitted into its 
operations. Three areas were identified as of potential 
interest, healthcare, biocatalysis and agriculture. 
Healthcare was eliminated as the company has no experience 
in pharmaceuticals and was too far down "the learning 
curve" to be competitive. Work on biocatalysis and 
agriculture were considered and central research continued 
to work in several related areas. Central research "has a 
contractor-customer relationship with the business 
sector... it also has its own budget... for general 
research. " Initial biotechnology related work was done 
under the general research budget and businesses were then 
expected to pay for development. Problems became apparent 
when the Seeds business asked for further central funding 
to help with development. 
The seed company proposed that more money be made 
available for research both within the company and at the 
company's central research laboratory. MNC 3 did not 
comply, preferring to sell the company instead. The 
decision provoked changes at the central research station; 
most biotechnology research concerned with crop 
biotechnology was phased out. The agrochemicals division 
now funds central research work, together with central 
funds. While work is being carried out in a number of 
areas, emphasis is placed on microbiology, plant molecular 
biology, biological control and forestry. 
A senior research manager from central research 
pointed out various technical constraints related to lack 
of knowledge about ecology; 
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"... in terms of the high-tech biotech that's been 
done on fiddling around with genetics and things, 
its all come across the ecological problems that 
people didn't understand very well, so that there 
were super strains and they worked wonderfully in 
the laboratory but they were never very 
encouraging in the field. " 
Work on microbiology and plant molecular biology 
continues in central research and now focuses on soil 
structure and ecology. This could potentially contribute 
to the biopesticides and forestry work, although no 
specific targets were mentioned. 
Some of the biological control work, such as the 
search for effective fungal pathogens, is, at the level of 
research, being looked at in horticultural plants. Because 
horticultural plants are often grown in controlled 
greenhouse environments, some of the ecological problems, 
which have constituted stumbling blocks to several 
biological control agents, can be avoided. It is also a 
convenient option given that the company has sold its plant 
breeding operation and has decided not to pursue crop 
development. 
While MNC 3's involvement in agro-chemical and seeds 
markets has been significant, it accounts for a small 
proportion of overall company turnover. During the 
eighties, MNC 3 became less interested in committing large 
R&D expenditure to what was, for this oil giant, a low 
value business. Moreover, one senior manager indicated 
that the company had been slow off the mark in thinking 
about agricultural biotechnology and this created 
additional problems in terms of future development. He 
said that during the strategic review, with which he had 
been involved 
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"... it was interesting, quite worrying in fact, 
that people... felt it was going to be years and 
years... but in biotech, especially the ag 
side... its happened so fast. People were 
inclined to say since its so far away, why don't 
we just leave it, we can always go out and buy 
the know-how... Most of us in the planning 
department are inclined to say, no that's not 
very sensible'. The problem is if you go that 
way, you're quite likely to buy the wrong know- 
how. I mean if you're not in the game, you can't 
make sensible judgements. "' 
Again the importance of cumulative experience and 
learning by doing becomes apparent. Reasons for MNC 3's 
withdrawal from the seeds business include: 1) Its main oil 
markets are high value and high volume and tend to 
overshadow other areas of operations; 2) Lack of commitment 
to developing and expanding the seeds business; 3) It was 
late in getting involved in agricultural biotechnology. 
Concern about deforestation and alternative energy 
sources inspired MNC 3 to pursue forestry. MNC 3's 
operations in relevant parts of the world put them in a 
good position to dominate markets. Company culture, 
discussed below, also influenced this decision. Biological 
control was identified as an important area for several 
reasons: a) society's increasing hostility towards chemical 
inputs; b) development of resistance in insects to 
traditional chemicals; c) the inability of chemical 
solutions to solve certain disease problems in plants. d) 
the company's previous involvement in this area. In-house 
work on biologically based insect control agents is done in 
conjunction with DBF 6; MNC 3 cross screens DBF 6 strains 
against pests in its potential marketing area. 
In MNC 3, scientists and business people make R&D 
decisions together, but the communication often begins with 
the R&D manager trying to sell ideas to management. The 
manager I talked with described himself as a 'middle-man' 
in this process. While much of the work done at the 
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central research station is commissioned by specific 
businesses, central funded research is as one manager said 
"real technology push". This is because centrally funded 
research is not considered "corporate research" but is less 
strategically planned than that term would indicate; 
central research seemed to be viewed very much as a font of 
ideas. While significant areas of fundamental work, are 
'put out' to universities, much of the in-house research is 
not directly related to commercial needs or plans. 
Business and scientific objectives were viewed as distinct 
areas by the research manager interviewed and communication 
between people with different aims was not always easy. 
"I suppose at my level and the scientists that 
work for me, you try and, I think you have to, 
pick up the people who have a very strong 
commitment to certain areas of work. So, you 
have the scientific commitment here and the 
managerial commitment there... I guess a lot of my 
communication really is trying to sell my science 
to get somebody to give us the money. Its no 
different from being in a university. " 
The autonomy of central research was exemplified by 
the research manager's response to a question about MNC 3's 
change in strategy. He said that yes, he supposed the 
strategy changed, but apart from some reorganization and 
less work on crops, central research had not changed 
greatly. 
4.3.2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. 
This autonomy in central research permitted 
biotechnology work to continue even after the seeds company 
had been sold. If seeds-had been more integrated 
into the 
company, more of the biotechnology research capacity would 
have been sold with the company. On the other hand, 
it is 
not clear where the existing research will 
be channeled. 
Additionally, perhaps if central and seed research 
operations had been more fully integrated, a more powerful 
innovative base could have been created. 
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The level of decentralization means that MNC 3 is 
characterized by an extremely complex organizational 
structure. Two main companies, one an oil company, Dutch 
in origin, the other a 'Transport' company, founded in 
Britain constitute the corporation. MNC 3 companies are 
active in six main Business Sectors, covering Oil and Gas, 
Chemicals, Metals and Coal. The main business is now 
conducted by operating companies, "of which there are 
several hundred in over 100 countries. " Agricultural 
biotechnology falls within the agro-chemicals division of 
the chemicals business. Operating companies are expected 
to largely fund their own R&D. In the case of MNC 3's 
Seeds company this presented problems in undertaking 
expensive biotechnology R&D. Requests for R&D funds to be 
made available from central sources, as mentioned were 
turned down. While significant 'ground work' was done both 
in the seeds company and the central research facility, 
funds to link the two and build on this work were not 
provided. This seemed to be partly because of the 
company's tradition of 'arms length' dealings with 
operational companies and partly because the company did 
not see seeds and plant breeding as strategically important 
to corporate objectives. While the Green Revolution had 
inspired chemical companies to invest in seeds in the hope 
of higher profit margins, the seeds business remains 
relatively low value. 
4.3.3. COLLABORATIONS. 
MNC 3 collaborates extensively with universities. 
However, increasing amounts of fundamental work tended. to 
be undertaken in-house, 
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"because the universities are no longer the 
repository of fundamental information that they 
used to be, so quite frankly there are things 
that I have to do in-house now that a number of 
years ago we would never have dreamt of doing 
because they were academic... I'm basically quite 
appalled at some of the research that isn't 
around. " 
lp, 
MNC 3 became part of a government/industry funded 
project called PROSAMO to look primarily at the 
interactions between genetically manipulated organisms and 
ecosystems. MNCs 2 and 4 are also involved with the 
project. PROSAMO was undertaken mainly as a public 
relations exercise to reassure the public about the release 
of GMOs. 
"The whole objective of PROSAMO was to be very 
publicly visible because its entire raison d'etre 
is in fact to demystify areas of risk assessment 
and to act as an advocate of the technology and 
to demonstrate the presence or absence of risk, 
and to make that public. " 
MNC 3 conducted an extensive search for suitable DBFs 
with which to. work. They eventually decided on a US based 
company which works on bio-control and, in particular, with 
genetically manipulated Bt. The various reasons for the 
decision to stay with biopesticides have been discussed. 
Another consideration which may relate to the fact that the 
particular DBF was chosen is that the Vice President is an 
ex-MNC 3 manager. 
4.3.4. REGULATIONS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS. 
MNC 3 has not yet run directly into regulatory 
hurdles and admits that it "is much more reactive in this 
respect than [MNC 1 and MNC 2]. " The company will not 
individually promote biotechnology as a matter of policy, 
but it has joined industry organizations and played a 
leading role in setting up PROSAMO. 
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The company is not involved in SAGB. According to 
one manager this is because it has adverse reaction to 
getting "politically" involved with promoting technology. 
Another said that MNC 3 did not get involved in European 
initiatives and was therefore less interested in promoting 
biotechnology through this forum. Another said, it did not 
have a high enough stake in the technology to warrant that 
level of activity. 
4.3.5. CULTURE. 
MNC 3 worries about security of profits and whether 
future profits will generate significant profit margins. 
Given this, there is a somewhat contradictory attitude 
towards costs; levels of central R&D funded by companies 
are strictly limited to the amount that the individual 
company can spend and there is a strong belief that 
companies should be able to 'stand alone'. However, 
funding for basic 'untied' research is generous and the 
company showed awareness that short term objectives related 
to balancing books did not constitute adequate measures to 
insure longer term success. 
This contradiction may relate to the fact that the 
company's main business is oil. On the one hand this makes 
it a rich company, which can afford significant central 
research facilities. On the other hand, it judges 
companies' performance by the standards of the oil business 
which can well afford to fund its own research. 
Managers both in the former Seeds business and in MNC 
3 commented that the two companies had significantly 
different cultures and that they had never truly meshed. 
Certainly, the seeds company's objectives did not seem to 
relate in any way to other parts of MNC 3's operations. 
The manager I spoke with was adamant that he would not work 
on herbicide resistance, one of the common vehicles for 
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combining biotechnology with existing chemical inputs (he 
thought it would prove unpopular with the public and that 
it was not the best use of the technology). Rather, the 
seed company was interested in developing biotechnology 
derived disease and insect resistance and using the new 
technology to speed up the process of plant breeding. One 
report on MNC 3's biotechnology strategy alleged that the 
seeds company research manager did not even know the names 
of MNC 3's herbicides (Biotechnology Development Monitor, 
No. 7.1991). In this sense the Seeds company could be 
described as embodying the attributes of 'scientific and 
technological excellence', product excellence, consumer 
orientation, while MNC 3 was more concerned with security 
of profits. The Seeds manager interviewed thought that the 
distance between parent company and subsidiary had some 
advantages as well as disadvantages; the Seeds company had 
been allowed to get on with its business without too much 
interference. But, biotechnology presented the company 
with a number of alternatives which went against the grain 
in various ways. 
The MNC 3 research manager interviewed pointed out 
another level of culture clash provoked by the nature of 
biotechnology itself. To make the best use of the 
technology, he said, meant in many cases developing a 
portfolio of niche markets. This is because, as mentioned 
previously, biotechnology increases scope for 
specialization and flexibility. 
"... When you talk about the strength of a 
biocontrol agent being its specificity... you have 
to have a portfolio of niche products, and you 
have to understand how to market that, and it is 
a different technique. Certainly [MNC 3) does 
have a kind of traditional philosophy if you're 
not talking about a million, to us then its a 
niche market. " 
The company pursued a niche market in biocontrol 
agents, but this could be an exception to the rule based on 
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the fact that the company had a tradition in this area of 
activity. 
MNC 3, which often describes itself as an energy 
company, has found one area of plant biotechnology that 
fits with both its culture and organizational set up. 
Large scale forestry projects, begun in the early 1980s, 
gives the company both short term profits in the massive 
timber market and "If biomass becomes an attractive source 
of energy, [MNC 3] will have the necessary experience and 
infrastructure in place for a headstart in this field" 
(Biotechnology and Development Monitor, No. 7,1991). Thus, 
this area 'fits' in terms of large markets and with 
respects to its potential application to energy generation, 
an area in which MNC 3 is a world market leader. 
4.3.6. COPE MAP. 
I make effective use 
or new biotechnology. 
3 retain non-biotech 
based core business as 
central concern. 13 don't Invest n 
2limit Involvement 
ýI low profit margin 
to specific areas. 
/ areas. 14 develop 
4 adopt biotech In core 
biopestkides. 
business where appropriate. 
9 have Internal 
12 do not work research and collaborate 6 develop 
In the area or seeds. with universities. biotech 
applications In 
potential 
S Innovate In stralegk monopoly areas. 
11 risk losing ground niche markets. 
In agchems. 
10 do not commit 
to developing biotech 
for the sake of If. 
The COPE map shows the difference between MNC 3 and 
companies discussed previously in this chapter. The 
company will retain non-biotech based business as its core 
activity (concept 3), but will use biotechnology in its 
core business, where appropriate. However, it is active in 
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developing biopesticides (concept 14). It is narrowly 
limiting its involvement with the technology, focusing on 
niche markets and areas where it may have a monopoly 
position (concepts 2,6,10,5, ). It has withdrawn from 
the area of seeds (concept 12) and because of this may lose 
its foothold in the agro-chemicals business (concept 11). 
4.3.7. CONCLUSION. 
Several important points about MNC 3's strategy 
emerge from this discussion. First, strategy is partially 
determined by the fact that few markets are as profitable 
as oil markets; the company therefore has less incentive to 
diversify into other areas. Second, and perhaps a related 
point, the company had grave doubts about the profitability 
of the seeds business. Being involved in seeds meant a 
heavy commitment to developing business-in Europe and the 
US and the likely returns were judged too small to warrant 
the investment. The company felt that the profit margins 
in the seeds business did not allow it to foot the bill for 
expensive biotechnology R&D which would have been necessary 
to make it competitive in the long term. Third, in 
accordance with company overall policy, the R&D could only 
have been funded by transferring funds from another 
division of the company and this was considered 
inappropriate. The seeds company was never deemed a 
central concern and remained culturally very much on the 
outside of the main company. The very decentralized 
organization of the company meant that R&D done in central 
labs was never fully integrated with seeds research. 
Fourth, biotechnology strategy as it stands clearly builds 
on previous areas of interest and activity; innovation in 
this case is clearly cumulative in nature. 
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4.4. MNC 4. OVERVIEW. 
MNC 4 is one of the world's largest food companies 
and the world's largest buyer and seller of oils and fats. 
In 1988 the company had sales of £1.7 billion and a profit 
of £1.5 billion. MNC 4 both diversified and strengthened 
'core' business during the eighties. Non-core activity 
like transport, paper and packaging and petroleum based 
chemicals were disposed of. The following activities are 
now considered core business: 
-edible fats and dairy 
-food and beverages 
-detergents and toilet preparations 
-speciality chemicals 
-agribusiness 
-medical products. (Biotechnology and Development Monitor, 
No. 3: 1990) 
The medical products division was established during 
the eighties on the basis of new opportunities in 
diagnostics made possible by recent developments in 
biotechnology. It has already had considerable success 
with its pregnancy and ovulation diagnostic kits. 
While MNC 4 still considers itself a marketing and 
consumer organization, it was forced to increase its R&D 
capabilities in order to remain competitive. During the 
eighties, MNC 4 sold and acquired companies frantically. 
In 1989 alone, the company took over 55 companies for a 
total sum of about US $3 billion. (Biotechnology and 
Development Monitor, No, 3: 1990). Acquisitions increased 
the company's global reach and provided it with significant 
R&D capability. A desire to increase vertical integration 
and control the whole chain of production also lay behind a 
number of important acquisitions. 
MNC 4, however, takes a relatively restrained 
approach to biotechnology. It acknowledges that it is 
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extremely important to be involved in the area; it must 
protect food inputs from companies which could develop 
genetically modified improvements and patent them. Thus, 
MNC 4 outbid a number of prominent companies to purchase a 
formerly government owned Cambridge based plant breeding 
and seeds operation. However, on the basis of financial 
and economic assessments and taking into account concerns 
about regulations and negative public opinion, the company 
is looking for incremental improvements in products rather 
than 'big bang' improvements. The company is especially 
sensitive to public opinion. As a supplier of finished 
products to the consumer, MNC 4 caters to public opinion 
more than companies who have little experience in dealing 
directly with consumers. 
4.4.1. R&D AND MARKET STRATEGY. 
MNC 4 holds that currently, more profit can be made 
from biotechnology by improving production processes than 
by going for 'big bang' innovations. This conclusion is 
informed by numerous factors. An economic model developed 
by the economic research department contributed to the 
decision. 
MNC 4 does not promote itself as a 'high-tech' 
company, but rather as one which is continually offering 
improved performance. Although they have ensured that they 
have the resources and knowledge to compete should the 
technology become a major feature of production in the 
future, biotechnology has a much lower profile in this 
company. 
In total, the company spent £332 million in 1988, a 
relatively small R&D expenditure if compared to MNCs 
1 and 
2 but a higher percentage if compared with other 
'consumer 
products' companies. In the area of plant 
biotechnology, 
MNC 4 "usually feels comfortable with about 1-2-3% 
[of 
turnover]. " Again, this represents-a low level of 
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expenditure when compared'with other companies 
in the 
study. One manager commented that "The industry average 
for-plant biotech is about 7-8%. Indeed, (MNC 2] are 
running at about 16-17% on plant biotech, and I 
believe MNC 
1 are up to 30%" but thought that these companies may 
have 
overextended themselves and that such a high 
level of 
investment expenditure would not be recouped in the field 
of agriculture. 
Out of the interviews, three reasons emerged for the 
conservative approach to biotechnology. MNC 4 feels that 
it is a "marketing" and "consumer" organization. It does 
not define itself as "science-based", or see 
itself as a 
front runner in innovation. One manager went so far as to 
say that MNC 4 is actually aiming to be a 'second runner' 
in biotechnology. Second, MNC 4 companies are expected to 
make profits, limiting the amount that can be spent on R&D. 
Profit maintains the company's share price, which managers 
consider important and which acts as a check on R&D 
expenditure. One manager interpreted financial assessment 
of biotechnology in the following way, 
"if you say... that you're going to acquire 
companies that will develop biotechnology at a 
certain rate which is related to strategic long 
term initiatives then they seem quite happy. If 
you go out and spend a fortune on R&D and buying 
up companies and all the rest of it, I think they 
would start marking the share price down. I 
think [MNC 1] if you like is in that bracket, 
because they put so much into plant biotech, and 
now its, becoming obvious to the stock market that 
the seeds business is not a big money spinner. 
So, can they afford all this R&D? " 
Third, following on from the second point, MNC 4 
thinks that its 'realistic' outlook on the rewards which 
can be reaped from plant and agricultural biotechnology, 
based on managers' perceptions that seeds is a low value 
area is more-accurate than many of its competitors. This 
assessment emerged subsequent to MNC 4's purchase of a- 
major plant breeding institute, formerly owned by the 
148 
government, which I shall call Planton. One manager said 
that pre-purchase evaluation of the business has been 
overly optimistic. Partly this is because government 
accounting procedures are very different from business 
equivalents. However, the overly optimistic outlook was 
common to a large number of chemical and food companies 
which had bought up seeds companies. One manager predicted 
that many companies, realizing the limited opportunities, 
would begin to limit their investment in agricultural 
biotechnology. "I think industry analysts are only just 
beginning to realize that this shake out is occurring. " 
Increasingly, companies will come to see that the main 
reason to be involved in biotechnology is to defend 
existing interests. For MNC 4, defending their position in 
various markets is the main reason for investing in the 
seeds business and biotechnology; they are reluctant and 
cautious innovators. One manager thought that the area of 
food production and processing would become increasingly 
competitive as chemical companies looked for higher value 
outlets for products of biotechnology and pointed to MNC 
2's production of slower ripening tomatoes as an indication 
of a coming trend. Existing patent law, whereby companies 
can patent genes and end use will also intensify 
competition and makes it essential for MNC 4 to invest.. A 
major competitor works with 
"... a biotech boutique to develop oil seeds which 
are less saturated in their fat, then maybe they 
could produce a margarine which they could claim 
is 'natural', and maybe they can develop an 
oilseed that you can just squeeze it and out 
comes margarine at the other end... well anyway, 
less processing. So its cheaper and greener and 
you make quite a good marketing issue out of that 
- and they can patent it! And they don't have to 
give us the gene. And not only can they patent 
that - they can patent the margarine that's made 
out of it as well. " 
This thinking lay behind the purchase of Planton. A 
failed experiment with oil palms, initiated at central 
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research' facilities ledtMNC 4 to conclude'that it needed 
major input from experienced plant breeders before 
investing further in plant biotech. Managers' think-that 
limited R&D spending on plant biotechnology will put the 
company in a position to bargain with competitors and 
'swap' innövations, by licensing genes to each other. The 
concentration in plant breeding is on improving processing 
characteristics in plants, such as oilseeds and speeding up 
the process of plant breeding. Thus, the primary ' 
motivation behind MNC 4's biotechnology investment is to 
protect raw materials. 
MNC. 4 plans; to avoid risks of the type taken by MNC .1 
in terms of regulation and public opinion and are much more 
cautious in the products it is developing. In 1982, MNC 1 
proposed that-MNC>. 4 should join with them in developing 
BST. MNC 4 refused; managers thought that development 
costs would prove high and, although milk quotas had not yet 
been: introduced, milk'production. was already, in surplus. 
They,, ".. have not,, regretted the decision. The same decision 
would-be made again,. butnow"therewould be another reason 
not to pursue: the, . project ., 
"We thought it was technically too difficult, too 
,J expensive,.. and. it was not user-friendly. to the 
farmer... it was just not our. business - far too 
risky, but. we did not consider the 'green' issue 
at -that time,; and I1m. adding that on now.. . that 
would have'-been the no'. 1 ' factor 'i f we were 
offered it today 
MNC 4 , risfikeen 
to pursue development, of biotechnology, 
only where there exists perceived, 'need'. In most cases, 
MNC 4 , focus;, biotechnology 
innovation onýimproving the 
qualityof, products'and efficiency of the production 
process. , ;.,, The company sees-that-biotechnology can make 
contributions all the way along the production line, from 
improving raw materials to diagnostic kits which can detect 
signs for deterioration in packaged foods on the super cj4 
market 
shelves. 
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While this strategy was emphasized by all managers, 
it is also true that MNC 4 is developing applications for 
higher value,, lower volume markets and diversified into new 
business areas, on the basis of biotechnology. The 
establishment of a medical products division and 
development of pregnancy and ovulation kits is the prime 
example of this. Thus, the 'nothing new' line must be 
considered in light of MNC 4's PR approach, which is to 
down-play the impact of the technology. 
One of the company's economists also saw that 
biotechnology might contribute to the emergence of 'grey 
areas' between sectors. 
"... if you look at the way the market, its moving 
more and more towards the grey area... Anti-aging, 
that is moving to the medical, whether its 
cosmaceuticals or pharmacetics, that kind of 
thing, its coming at it from both angles. And 
biotech can contribute to that... It has got a 
role to play in understanding how the skin works. 
In understanding what it is that makes the skin 
react in a particular way. And if we can then 
'focus our research on producing enzymes, or 
whatever it is,, to trigger reactions in the body, 
then it will build. " 
In order to seriously undertake this work, however, 
decisions would have to be made about where to locate R&D 
and who should fund it. To do the work in personal 
products division would require a culture shift from being 
purely consumer products oriented to undertaking serious 
R&D. Increasing concern with healthy food creates other 
possibilities for a -'grey area' between 
food and 
pharmaceutical areas. This appeals to food companies, keen 
to develop high value added food items and perhaps to 
pharmaceutical companies who could use their expertise to 
diversify into other areas. 
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4.4.2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. 
MNC 4 central research labs are located in the UK 
(detergents, foodstuffs), USA (detergents and toiletries), 
Holland (edible oils and fats, detergents) and India 
(consumer and industrial products). MNC 4 divides its 
research between operating companies and central research 
laboratories. The amount differs according to the 
specificities of each company and each coordination. 
operating . companies. 
have, a high. level of autonomy... They 
are charged a 'tax' for central in-house activities, but 
are also free to contract R&D to outside companies or 
institutes. MNC, 4 central research labs also include 
services such as 'consumer science', research, in order to 
establish demand matters andconsumer preference. This 
type of research, -then, 
is located at-the-same site as R&D 
and is considered to-be-a'very'-important-component of 
research activitY-- 
'Each 
company establishes-its own research programme 
and itsh'capital; expenditure budget. However, all 
coordinations have a team of managers responsible for 
overseeing the'business`development of each company and 
unifying'R&D efforts. : Duiring`the'eighties, is part of the 
overall-strategic review, central-research"labs underwent 
mä jör örgänizäti_öna1, ychanges. 'The aims 'included, . 
reorgini'z'ing"research` groups` according Rto new technologies 
and de'velopments, =simplifying`structures, making them more 
accessible to'-'operating'companies and'rb'ringing the R&D 
facilities and operating "companies, closer together. 
When it , 
visited the central research. labs in the UK, 
staff were participating in a Total Quality Management 
exercise which, ° it was hoped, would make the organization 
less hierarchical improve communication amongst different 
research groups and contribute to successful innovation. 
The exercise constituted a significant investment of time 
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and money, with each member of staff participating in a 
five day training programme and a series of exercises and 
projects over a period of a year. 
4.4.3. COLLABORATIONS. 
MNC 4 has relatively few R&D collaborative ventures 
and none with DBFs. The preferred method of acquiring 
skills is to acquire companies. Both central research and 
operating companies have links with universities and fund 
research projects and postgraduate researchers. R&D is 
done with universities all over Europe and the US. 
Projects are usually carried out in joint teams, made up of 
people from the universities and in-house scientists. This 
is a way of ensuring that projects run according to the 
company's plan. Thus collaboration is very much 'hands-on' 
and steered by the company. 
4.4.4. REGULATIONS AND PUBLIC RELATIONS. 
While they lobby for regulations that would suit 
them, according to some managers the company has created a 
strategy that can adapt to adverse regulations and public 
opinion. Because they are primarily working on improving 
existing products, they are more amenable to the idea that 
biotechnology should be subject to socio-economic 
assessment and a 'need' criterion (discussed in chapter 6). 
Their products have already proved themselves 'needed', in 
the sense that there is sufficient demand to make-them 
profitable. One manager supported the creation of a 
European version of the US Office of Technology Assessment, 
although he expressed concern that this might serve to 
'politicize' technology. MNC 4 managers were all aware of- 
the political nature of regulations and the link between 
public opinion and regulatory regimes. 
As part of a strategic review of biotechnology at the 
UK central research laboratory, managers ranked new 
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biotechnology products in terms of public acceptability. 
The lists they drew up is included below: 
RANKING OF MAJOR APPLICATIONS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY ACCORDING TO 
THEIR LIKELY PUBLIC ACCEPTABILITY. 
MOST ACCEPTABLE. Treatment of disease 
Medical Diagnosis * 
Environmental Protection 
Fermentation Technology * 
Biotransformation (Enzymes)* 
New Ingredients for Detergents and 
Personal Products 
Improved crops/seeds * 
New Food Ingredients * 
Release of New Micro-Organisms 
Animal Growth Hormones 
Pesticide/Herbicide Resistant 
seeds: 
Transgenic animals 
LEAST ACCEPTABLE Human Eugenics. 
Note: * indicates areas of MNC 4 interest. 
The company, 'as noted, has been concerned about 
patent protection. Managers thought also that when patent 
legislation was finalized, providing that it allowed for 
the patenting of , , 
'living 
, 
things' , innovation would speed 
up. One, manager,, who had been involved in a National 
Economic, Development Office study of biotechnology, 
commented, 
"The viewywe-gave about. agribiotech to NEDO was 
that the, availability of products and markets is 
not going to"be`delayed by technical constraints 
which° has been 'the case,,, in, the past but more by 
legislative and environmental concerns. So, it's 
government legislation, '"patent-"legislation and 
consumer -reaction. ". °: So, -the-industry needs to get its act together in its PR and I think its 
beginning to do that'through the various bodies. " 
4.4.5. CULTURE.. 
MNC 4 has a strong culture which permeates throughout 
the company; there were high levels of consensus among 
managers'about"the direction of the company and the kind of 
biotechnology which was appropriate. 'Cultural' consensus 
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does not happen by chance or osmosis in. MNC 4; during the 
eighties, top management tried to increase the degree of 
central coordination. But, also as a way of dealing with 
still relatively high levels of diversity and autonomy 
amongst a wide range of companies producing different 
products, the company stressed company culture as unifying- 
force. This type of socializing and training programme, 
although expensive and time consuming, allows "the company 
to make this decentralized structure work, and yet still 
keep all the local operations marching in step. " 
In terms of the categories used to decipher other key 
differences between companies, MNC 4 is oriented toward 
security of profits, costs orientation, product excellence 
and consumer orientation. It is a growth oriented company, 
but growth with security is a priority. The company is 
not, in comparison with other MNCs in this study, primarily 
motivated by scientific and technological excellence. 
4.4.6. COPE MAP. 
1 make effective use 
of biotechnology. 
13 sell Improved 
performance-. image 
11 pursue incremental 
of hlgh tech. 
improvements-go for 
assen market 'big bang' Improvements. 10 limit risk. demand before 
undertaking innovation. 
4 Integrate biotech 
Into existing business areas. 
2 Increase value added 
with biotech in 9 take Into 
existing business areas. account what developments 
regulations, 6 com avots and public opinion re 
with favor. tbiotech 
traditional 
13 lobby for suitable methods. 
regulatory 
S focus on 
environment. 
improving process... 
create new products. 
155 
TheýCOPE map portrays MNC-4's cautious approach to 
biotechnology innovation and its focus on incremental 
improvements and improved performance and process (concepts 
15,11,2,10,5). Unlike MNC 1, -in particular, the 
company is keen to follow the market and develop 
biotechnology in areas where market demand has already been 
established (concept 7), thus there is a strong tendency to 
integrate biotechnology into, existing business. 
Comparisons'are made between biotechnology and traditional 
methods (concept 6). While the company lobbies for 
preferred regulations, it is more responsive than MNCs 1 
and 2 to the external environment, particularly public 
opinion and acknowledges that it may have to change 
strategy in response to external factors (concept 9). 
4.4.7. CONCLUSION. 
Key points arising from this discussion are as 
follows. First, MNC 4 is in a different mold to other 
MNC's considered. It is not a chemical company. As'a food 
and consumer products company it approaches biotechnology 
innovation differently, with less emphasis on being at the 
forefront of technology and more concern with direct 
product applications, }and consumer perception. The 
company's mission has not been to, _research 
continually with 
new technologies, but to incorporate innovations to cut 
costs andx`improve. existing foodstuffs. consumer goods and to 
focus on marketing anndv image`. -, 'Second, during the eighties, 
the company-undertook extensive restructuring., in order to 
remain competitive. `,, An important component of change was 
an attempt to., -, increase the level of R&D and bring central 
research activities and operating companies closer 
together. The challenge,: of`. "new biotechnology gave the 
company 'a particular impetus to increase R&D in plant 
breeding and increase vertical integration in order to 
secure inputs of raw materials. The company has spent 
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considerable effort forging strong links between different 
parts of the production process and building upon existing 
strengths. Even its venture into previously uncharted 
waters with medical diagnostics, builds on its capabilities 
of large scale distribution of products and marketing 
expertise. Innovation in this company is clearly seen as a 
cumulative activity and one that emerges from learning by 
doing. Third, it has chosen to use the strategy of 
acquisition rather than collaboration to access new 
technology and incorporate new knowledge. Fourth, like MNC 
3, MNC 4' is disappointed by limited profit margins in the 
Seeds business; unlike MNC 3, whose core business is oil, 
it perceives no option but to continue activities in this 
area. Fifth, MNC 4 sees that the constraints to 
biotechnology innovation derive from economic factors, risk 
regulation, patent legislation and public opinion rather 
than technical factors. 
4.5. MNC 5. OVERVIEW. 
I was unable to conduct as many interviews with 
decision makers in MNC 5 as I did with the other MNCs 
because relevant R&D is not carried out in Britain. 
Nevertheless, I acquired enough knowledge about the 
company, to warrant a section in this chapter. This firm. 
provides some interesting contrasts with other chemical 
companies in the study. 
MNC 5 is a state-owned French based chemicals 
company. It is the third largest pharmaceutical company in 
Europe and the fifteenth largest in the world. 
Agrochemicals contribute 25% of overall profit, and MNC 5 
is among the world's 4 leaders in this field. The company 
had a turnover in 1988 of FFr 65.3 billion and FFr 3.5 
billion profit. Despite, its leading market position, it 
takes a cautious approach to biotechnology innovation. 
Like many other agro-chemical companies, it invested 
157 
heavily in seeds companies, hoping to take a leading role 
in developing the technology. While the company reports 
and a published strategy document for the next ten years 
call for investment in seeds and plant breeding, management 
now seems clear that chemical based agricultural inputs 
will constitute the company's primary focus in the 
foreseeable future at least. 
By comparison with other agro-chemical companies, its 
commitment to biotechnology is limited. In one of the main 
research stations in Lyon, there are only twenty people 
working, primarily on the. development of herbicide 
resistance. : There are other small biotechnology research 
stations in Britain and the US. 
4.5.1. R&D AND MARKET STRATEGY. 
Over the next ten years, MNC 5 plans to pursue the 
following targets: 
"Crop protection from 90% down to 70% [of sales], 
Seed Technology from 5% to 20%, and Garden and 
Amenitya-Care=up. "from. 5% , to 10%., In absolute 
figures, each Division will continue expanding" 
(MNC' 5,1990: 3) . 
The. Seeds business will proceed via two growth 
routes.. 1), Seed, -treatment; 2) Genetic manipulation of 
seeds;.: ý-Additionally, _, 
MNC-, 5 has identified three crops, 
maize, sunflower and soy-bean on which it will concentrate, 
-its biotechnology efforts. 
The "mission", of the agricultural sector is spelt out 
as, follows: 
Optimizing-plant production, by` combining all 
approaches-(chemical,, -biological, genetic, 
physico-chemical).; The_key, word is innovation; 
making more and better' investments, using our privileged links withý, French researchers to enter the international scientific community, and 
making use of'all synergies provided by the 
Group"(MNC -5,1990: 4);, * 
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Funding for R&D in the agricultural sector will come 
from agro-chemicals; seeds is unable to generate enough 
profit to fund its own research. R&D spending currently 
runs at 7% of agricultural division turnover (Chemistry and 
Industry, 1991)., Spending is expected to, 
"increase steadily (over 10%) for new products, 
projects under development and seed treatment; it 
will be greatly increased (doubled) for plant 
breeding, molecular and cellular biology, and 
plant physiology" (MNC 5,1990: 6). 
Although'this programme sounds quite ambitious, all 
the managers interviewed were more cautionary about 
biotechnology's potential contributions. And all stressed 
that MNC 5 carefully limited its involvement. In terms of 
markets, it identified the US (corn and soy-bean) and 
France (sunflower). It also narrowed down technological 
developments; increasing the yield in major crops is 
considered important and biotechnology is used to identify 
useful genes and improve plant breeding methods. Herbicide 
resistance is a short term objectives. Pest and drought 
resistance are longer term objectives. 
All managers also emphasized that they saw chemicals 
playing the major role in crop protection for the 
foreseeable future. They argued that while pesticides have 
a bad reputation, they are effective, relatively cheap and, 
at this point, very safe. One manager said that compared 
with the unknowns surrounding biotechnology, pesticides 
could be viewed as the more environmentally sound option. 
Another said, "All pesticides tend to be looked at as 
bad, 
but this is analogous to the philosophy that says 
'all men, 
are rapists'. " The industry is "saddled. with a reputation 
that it doesn't deserve", based on early pesticides. 
Another manager made the point that biotechnology research, 
combined with increased understanding about plant 
physiology, will likely improve chemical applications. 
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Distinguishing between MNC 1's and MNC 5's approach, 
an interviewee said that MNC 5 is not a technology driven 
company, whereas MNC 1 "has moved from being a one product 
company to being ä biotech company. " From the perspective 
of a British based manager, not directly involved in 
biotechnology R&D, MNC 5's commitment to biotechnology 
appeared "shaky" and he thought that recently acquired 
seeds companies might be sold off. This would depend on 
the pay back from biotechnology products and on the 
financial situation of, the company as a whole. It would 
also depend on how the regulatory situation and public 
opinion evolved... jWhile biotechnology could make useful 
contributions, particularly in developing countries, 
technical problems and economic constraints did not make it 
an attractive option".. , 
In response to other companies grandiose claims that 
biotechnology , could "Feed the 
World", he said economic 
constraints mean that "TheIre is very little interest in 
making the deserts bloom. " 
In addition, the general manager of the agricultural 
business in a'"pub lished 'article indicated that while 
environmental concern was pressurizing companies to come up 
with , newproducts, 
''these were likely to involve more 
sophisticated chemistry-: The article did not- record him 
mentioning biotechnological alternatives. 
'--. Constant comparisons°are made between the efficacy of 
different. techn'ologies. , lBiotechnology and greater 
knowledge of. geneticshave. important contributions to make 
in' improvingýprocess, technology and research itself. 
Biotechnology -, 
is- encouraging>: a. move away-from the "random 
spray`-and pray"'philosophy. in crop protection. It is 
making the process of. plant-breeding and crop protection 
more specific. ' ", Managers worried, however, whether niche 
marketing, -would generate sufficient profits. 
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However, while the company maybe focusing its efforts 
carefully, total withdrawal from the area of biotechnology 
seems unlikely. The director of biotechnology R&D,, based.,,, 
in France, while noting the limitations of technology, made 
it clear; that the company would pursue a range of 
biotechnology developments in maize,, sunflowers and soy- 
bean.., He also said that higher value/lower volume targets 
were. ideal targets for biotechnology R&D. One of 
biotechnology's particularly attractive attributes is that, 
by increasing genetic and biochemical knowledge, it 
increases specificity. Thus, biological pesticides might 
be designed with far greater specificity than existing 
chemical solutions, to deal with specific plants, climates 
and pests. Or plänts'could, be engineered to resist 
specific insects and disease. However, while this would 
certainly be lower volume, the manager was worried that 
products would not have a high enough value to recuperate 
money spent on requisite R&D. 
About 10-20% of research funds is spent on work 
designed to give "windows on technology. " This component 
of research is much more technology driven. At a certain 
point, market criteria are applied and decisions about 
further development, are taken. 
Like an interviewee from MNC 3, this manager stressed 
the-need for better understanding of ecology and plant 
physiology. He stressed that while genetic manipulation 
had become relatively easy, this would not prove ,a panacea 
for all further development. "Genetically altered plants 
have to be tested in the -field as plants obtained through 
conventional breeding to check their agronomic behaviour. " 
Thus, the focus of research has to change from a narrow - 
genetics focus to an approach that aims at understanding 
the entire organism and its interaction with the 
environment. These issues constitute the main technical 
problems currently. He also emphasized that while in-vitro 
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techniques can speed up plant breeding a little, it 
remained a drawn out process. 
4.5.2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE. 
The MNC 5 group revolves around three technological 
axes: life sciences applied to humans, animals and plants; 
new materials and speciality-chemicals; and organic and 
inorganic intermediates. - The company is divided into four 
divisions: "chemicals, health, "agrochemicals, and fibres. 
The agrochemicals division hosts two other businesses; 
seeds and the garden and amenity business. 
The French, government nationalized the company in 
1982. Also, -, during, -1982,, the company reorganized its R&D 
andbusiness. function"s;, oneof the changes was that R&D is 
now done on-a- divisional, basis., The need was felt, to bring 
R&D closer, -to. other', stages, of 
the production, process. - 
The agricultural division has R&D facilities in three 
countries, Britain,; France, and_the US. 
4.5.3. COLLABORATIONS. 
MNC 5, do'es not have significant collaborations with 
DBFs. It does have extensive contact with universities and 
research institutes in France, -B"ritain, , 
the"US and Japan. 
Work is,; done. inauniversities for two, reasons. First, the 
company; prefers, do"to more fundamental work in universities 
and,, secondly, "so that there-will be a pool of trained 
people, to employ in the future. At the beginning of the 
eighties, there was -a-shortage of-, Skilled people in the 
area of-. biotechnology, "but now"that companies and 
universities had-stabilized their research programmes and 
filled, their, quotas of biotechnology people, skills 
shortage would not,, be ,. 
a xproblem in the future. 
ý- 
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4.5.4. REGULATION AND PUBLIC RELATIONS. 
The cost of regulations will make a difference to the 
amount of biotechnology R&D which is' undertaken; 'one of the 
incentives to undertake R&D''in the area is that regulatory 
costs for biotechnology-based products will be less than 
for chemical' counterparts. If this is not the case, there 
will be less incentive to undertake innovation. Although 
it is a member of SAGB, in terms of promotion of 
biotechnology, it takes a lower profile than some other 
companies in the study. Additionally, fewer claims, are 
made in the company's public literature about biotechnology 
being 'natural' or 'green' or its ability to solve world 
hunger. MNC 5 is not a company which has committed huge 
resources to developing biotechnology, therefore the 
situation for interviewees seemed relatively clear: if 
regulatory costs are prohibitive, the amount of 
biotechnology R&D will be reduced accordingly. 
Recently, however, the company encountered 
considerable opposition to one of its new insecticides in 
the US and there is a significant probability that the 
product will be banned. This may give biotechnology 
research within the company a new impetus. However, given 
managers' skepticism;, this should not be assumed. 
According to an interviewee based in France, there is 
no evidence of public opposition to biotechnology in France 
and very little concern about its impact. 
4.5.5. CULTURE. 
Limited time spent in the company did not leave me 
with sufficient'-information or 'sense" of the company to 
make broad comments about its culture. However, clearly 
MNC 5 is not aiming"for scientific and technological 
excellence so much as it is product oriented. -This seems- 
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to be a key distinguishing factor between this company and 
other agro-chemical companies which are developing 
agricultural related biotechnology. 
Managers said that being state owned made no 
difference to the way in: which. they made decisions about 
biotechnology. However, it maybe that the financial 
security afforded the company,, gives it less necessity to 
'hype' the technology; MNC 5 does not have the pressure toý 
maintain its share: price. 
4.5.6. COPE MAP. 
Make effective use of 
biotechnology. 
take a cautious - 
approach. 
keep internal 
RAD tow ideal 
with market 
limitations - 
go for large 
Improve plan' 
acreage applications process 
go for higher ,' .' 
value added applications 
maintain commitment 
to chemicals 
evaulate biotech 
carefully 
make constant 
compassion 
between biotech 
and chemical t breeding technology 
keep up with 
technology through 
university contacts 
Cone Mar) 45 
The COPE map shows the MNC 5's careful approach to 
biotechnology (concept 4,, 
, 
2) and its relatively low levels 
of R&D 'spending in this area (concept 8). It is targeting. 
high'välue applications and large acreage crops, but on a 
smaller . scale - that, yMNC` 
2 .: `- It -is also using. biotechnology 
to improve'- the : plant breeding -process. - 
(concept 7) MNC 5 
makes°constant, comparison-s between biotechnology and other 
technologies.., and is not. interested in replacing chemical 
technology, <, unless biotechnology, can prove itself 
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technically and economically superior (concepts 4,5,3). 
The company collaborates with universities in order to keep 
up with the latest developments (concept 6). 
4.5.7. CONCLUSION. 
Key findings are as follows. First, MNC 5 appears 
wary about biotechnology's contribution to its agricultural 
division, at least in the short term. MNC 5 is convinced 
that for the foreseeable future conventional plant breeding 
and chemical based crop protection technology will continue 
to dominate agricultural production. In most instances, 
biotechnology cannot compete with chemical applications in 
the area of crop protection and in the area of plant 
breeding, more needs to be understood about plant 
physiology and ecology before genetically engineered plants 
can be made to operate efficiently. Second, it does not 
seem that MNC 5 is overly concerned with building up 
technology for strategic longer term purposes. Its 
perception is that it's strong arsenal of chemical products 
will continue to be the primary breadwinners in the 
foreseeable future. This perception clearly differs from 
those of 1 and 2. Third, and perhaps relatedly, the 
company does not perceive itself as a 'science-based' or 
'technology driven' company. It sees itself as responding 
to market forces. Fourth, managers saw that the science of 
genetic engineering alone would not lead to new products; 
emphasis was placed on integrating the new science with 
more ecological knowledge and more tacit plant 
breeding 
knowledge. 
4.6. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS. 
These company studies portray a diversity 
in 
companies' approach to biotechnology innovation. 
This 
variation demonstrates the pitfalls of using 
'universal' 
models to account for patterns of innovation. 
The 
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following table portrays some of the key charactristics of 
each firm. 
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The chapter relates to points made in chapter 1 in a 
number of ways, some of which will be briefly discussed 
here. The final chapter elaborates on theoretical 
perspectives. 
Clearly, firms' R&D decisions, far from being based 
solely on economic criteria, are highly political and 
social decisions and are recognized as such. One of the 
fascinating aspects of biotechnology innovation is the way 
in which external political and social factors combine with 
firms' internal cultures and political evaluations. The 
'politics of innovation' partially explains the variation 
in the firms considered in this chapter. In the case of 
biotechnology, MNCs are dealing with many unknowns and a' 
volatile social, political and regulatory situation and 
negotiating this environment constitutes an important 
aspect of biotechnology innovation. 
Large companies had considerable advantages over 
their smaller counterparts in being able to produce 
innovation. Not only did financial strength increase their 
capacity to innovate in important ways, their economic and 
political muscle are used to promote the technology and to 
exert pressure for friendly regulatory environments. Large 
firms have the power to shape and create markets which 
small firms do not. Their resources also gave them 
opportunities to experiment in certain areas and to fail., 
They had the capacity to make biotechnology more efficient 
by combining it with other technologies, such as advanced 
microelectronics and chemistry. Most importantly, perhaps, 
they had enormous technical expertise, relating to 
production, marketing and distribution, for instance, which 
could be integrated with the new science. However, their 
size also posed problems. As some managers admitted, small 
firms, close to the scientific base, had been quicker off 
the ground and had advantages in terms of flexibility. 
Additionally, biotechnology creates opportunities for 
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further specialization in agricultural inputs and foods. 
On the one hand, the idea of niche marketing in lower 
volume/higher value areas appealed to managers, but they 
were unsure whether a large firm could reap large enough 
rewards to make this activity worth their while in the area 
of agriculture and food. Also, managerial problems arose 
in relation to trying to extend the global reach of the 
company, while taking local conditions into account. 
Biotechnology innovation, has specific properties and 
involves a different-set of socio-economic conditions from 
microelectronics for example. It also involves high risk 
R&D with long lead times. The structure, of agricultural 
and food markets shapes R&D and strategic decision making 
in a. specific. way-. The social infrastructure of 
regulations; and, patents remains controversial and 
uncertain. Thus, Amendola and Bruno's characterization of 
innovation as a process of change in both the environment 
and firm'seems particularly-appropriate in this instance. 
They say; - . 
"t x 'I. - innovation 
is a process that should be 
considered asa change, of'the'environment of the 
innovating firm rather than something occurring 
within this environment 'and, more in particular, 
'as -a learning process , which i concerns both the 
firm¢and:. its, environment and that results in deep 
changes in both- of'them"' (Amendo'la and Bruno, 
1990: 419) : ~'. cyr_ 
The differences between the way in which firms 
innovate, can also. beexplained bylooking at which sector 
they. are inýand their place in that sector. MNC 4, a 
'consumer__goods'a,, company, with, a large presence in the food 
industry, had; a very different, approach to innovation than 
MNC 2,, a 'science-based', chemical company, or MNC 1, a 
"technology driven" company. Sectoral innovation 
- -' Ir v .. ý, _ 
requisites, differ considerably,., This bears out Pavitt's 
observations (1984) about the differences in patterns of 
innovation in different sectors. However, if we look more 
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closely at: the companies studied here, it becomes clear 
that the level and nature of innovation cannot be deduced 
from sectoral characteristics. 
One point is that the nature of sectors change as do 
boundaries between sectors. MNC 4, a company located in a 
low innovation level sector, undertook massive 
restructuring during the eighties with a principal aim of 
increasing levels of innovation. While it takes a more 
cautious approach than many of the chemical companies, it 
is moving in the direction of increasing levels of R&D and 
reorganizing internal structures on that basis. Increased 
competition in seeds and plant breeding and potential 
changes in patent legislation influenced these decisions. 
The prospect of new areas of activity, such as diagnostics 
and pharmacuetics, provided additional impetus to increase 
R&D funding. 
Within the chemical sector, companies displayed 
considerable variation. This can be partially accounted 
for by looking at a company's position within the sector 
and the importance of agro-chemicals and seeds in relation 
to its other activities. One of the intractable problems 
of agriculture or food related biotechnology innovation, is 
the scale of investment needed to make a difference and the 
commitment needed to cope with a technology. that poses a 
myriad of managerial difficulties. In order to recoup R&D 
costs, MNCs found it necessary to pursue R&D in both the 
large acreage crops and high value/lower volume markets. 
In order to -achieve the first objective, 
large companies 
must make sure that they have seed companies located in 
appropriate geographical locations. However, they also 
have to find ways to diffuse centralized R&D activities. 
In order to the accomplish the second, MNCs, unwilling to 
diversify too much, may have to enter into new 
collaborative relationships or increase levels of vertical 
integration. The economics and management issues 
involved 
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in these decisions are complex and time consuming. ' In the 
case of MNC 3, the costs and risks attached to such 
investments were not worth taking. Seeds were far from 
essential to its core business and loss of market share in 
the agro-chemical sector due to herbicide resistance or 
other biotechnology developments would not damage 'core' 
operations in any way. One way of looking at it is that 
MNC 3 did not invest heavily in agricultural biotechnology 
because it did not have to. In stark contrast, MNC 1, with 
its reliance on two agrochemical products for 60% of its 
profits, had little choice. 
MNC 1 had everything to gain by diversifying its 
technological base. It committed itself - fully` to ", 
biotechnology. In'many ways, -this company has constructed 
a very: productive organizational structure for 
biotechnology innovation. It combined very significant in- 
house facilities and highly qualified in-house scientific 
staff with a network of. collaborations, following a 'Post- 
Fordist' strategy of building relationships with 
specialized, small and flexible 'suppliers'. This company 
has come the closest to creating a new, or more accurately, 
parallel hierarchy of small firms which contribute to its 
R&D effort. -', 
This. 
, 
company, with kits heavy -, investment, - in science 
and 'technology should, # perhaps, have the 'best -prospects for 
successful, innovation. ' 'ýIt i's too "soon to say whether this 
prognösis, will'-be'proved entirely wrong. It is not too 
early °to°'see -_why, MNC "`1 could -fail. MNC 1's -current 
problems relate td its='lack-of political judgement and, 
with hindsight, --', dubious interpretations of economic 
trends. In a- sense= the company pursued a' 'technology 
driven" strategy -r-äther-, being , -informed by the market, or by 
the political and"s'ocial''situation. While"MNC 1 appears to 
have', 'adopted a creative, and,, in important respects, non- 
linear-'approach to technical and organizational factors, it 
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has failed to consider the social and political factors 
essential to successful innovation. 
With respect again to diversity of strategy, MNCs 2 
and 5 make an interesting comparison. In terms of the 
areas of activity and their place in sectors, the companies 
are very similar. Their biotechnology strategies, however, 
are quite different, with MNC 5 pursuing a much more 
cautious approach. Cultural factors and different 
orientations of firms are key to explaining these 
differences. 
This study clearly highlights, in a number of 
instances, the fact that innovation is a cumulative 
activity. In a, sense the whole thrust behind much of plant 
biotechnology relates to the need to protect previously. 
established markets. Instead of buying in diverse elements 
of technology, which would fit specifically into previously 
identified markets, however, both the chemical companies 
and the food company in this study have opted to acquire 
already established seeds companies with considerable 
experience on which to build. 
There are other, more specific examples of the 
importance of accumulated knowledge and experience of the 
development end of R&D. In, the case of the MNC 2, one of 
its first biotechnology products, the meat substitute, came 
from a previous venture which proved a commercial failure. 
The technical achievement, which mainly related to scaling 
up activity, not the science of fermentation, found a 
commercial outlet in-the form of a very different product 
from the one originally intended. MNC l's 
development of 
rBST related to previous work in the pre-genetic 
engineering era. This description of how decisions 
relating to this development came about also portray 
it as 
an instance of innovation coming from 'learning 
by doing'. 
MNC 3's continued work with biopesticides relates 
to 
previous involvement in the area. Its decision to 
build up 
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its forestry activities was based largely on its interests 
in energy and biomass. 
On the other hand, the cumulative nature of 
technological change does not,, by any means, explain all 
innovations or decisions relating to R&D strategy. MNC 4 
diversified into diagnostics, an area in which it had no 
previous experience and innovated successfully. In a 
negative sense, - MNC 3, decided not to pursue 
innovation in 
seeds, even-though it had considerable existing 
investment 
and expertise in the area. And the example of MNC 2's meat 
substitute product as an instance of cumulative 
knowledge 
leading to innovation is'not so simple; while the final 
innovation was in'some respects the product of previously' 
acquired technical knowledge, MNC 2, in addition to 
building on past work, set up' a small company within a 
company in order to limit'the extent to which past activity 
determines the'future. -Thus, the company tried both to 
take'advantage of its capacity to 'learn by doing' and to 
create new oppörtunities'by''learning to undo' structures 
which-inhibited innovation. MNC 1 does this through, 
constant monitoring and fostering of smaller companies. 
Anotherrinteresting aspect of the` diversity amongst 
companies was the 
variation in organizational structure. 
All the companies, with'theýexception of MNC 3 had recently 
undertaken some` reorganization of their'R&D functions., 
. There are 
no simple correlations between organizational 
structure and rate or-direction of . innovation. However, 
the evident tension between centralizing and decentralizing 
research-activity and 
between the desire to make research 
'market. led. ' and yet retain creative activity is related to 
a company's desire to 'accumulate knowledge; -on the one 
hand, and`'remain'open tonew areas of activity, on the 
other. ` The degree and'type'of contact between different 
secti'ons', of the'companyis-a central management dilem ma. 
Companies restructure in order to compete with new 
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technologies in increasingly competitive environments. 
Biotechnology, still close to the scientific base and 
spanning several sectors was one of the factors which 
caused companies to rethink the organization of R&D within 
the companies. Companies pursued different strategies in 
terms of connecting more basic research with different 
parts of the company and created a variety of balances 
between more fundamental work and further down stream 
development activity. In turn, the study provided several 
examples of the impact of organizational structure on 
firms' innovation patterns. The fact that this is a 
continually difficult aspect of management is another 
indication that the linear model of innovation is lacking; 
companies realize that the issue is not simply how much is 
spent on R&D, but that issues of centralization, 
decentralization, nature of collaborations, degree of in- 
house work, balance of targeted research and more 
fundamental work are very important. 
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CHAPTER 5. INSTITUTIONS. MARKETS AND 
INNOVATION. 
In previous chapters a tension between the potential 
of biotechnology to create new products and the ability of 
DBFs to get innovations to market became apparent. 
Organizational and cultural factors which impacted on large 
firms' capacity to innovate were also identified. 
Additionally, fieldwork demonstrated that both large and 
small firms are uncertain about opportunities in 
agricultural and food markets. Together with emerging 
regimes of risk regulation and patent legislation, changes 
in institutions and markets are important components of 
more systemic changes (changes in the regime of 
accumulation if the language of the FRS is adopted); 
biotechnology is both molded by and influences these 
broader changes. Chapters 3 and 4 examined innovation from 
the perspective of the firm; this chapter, together with 
chapter 6 explores the interaction between the firm and 
external environment from a wider angle which tries to 
include a wider range of actors. 
Sociologists and economists widely agree that both 
science-push and market-pull are necessary for successful 
innovation (Hacking, 1986, Coombs et al, 1987). Both 
contribute to the rate and direction of innovation. Both 
derive from a combination of public and private 
institutions and policies. In the case of agriculture and 
food related biotechnology, aspects of both science-push 
and market-pull have proved problematic. This chapter 
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looks at changes in the relationship between universities 
and industries, and inter-firm collaboration; and between 
the public and private institutions which drive the 
'science-push' aspects of biotechnology innovation. 
Although these changes would appear to contribute to 
scientific and technological exploitation of basic 
findings, -the 
inability of DBFs to tackle other 
institutional hurdles and organizational difficulties in 
large firms have limited the extent to which these changes 
encourage rapid and radical innovation. 
Biotechnology innovation is occurring at a time of 
more generalized.. industrial restructuring. Additionally, 
the technology itself offers new opportunities which will 
likely provoke further institutional change. The first 
section of; this chapter, considers the broader institutional 
system in which , 
biotechnology innovation is occurring and 
discusses the interaction, between. institutional change and 
innovation. 
The second part of the chapter looks at key aspects 
of agricultural and-food markets. These markets are 
politically sensitive and public policy has played an 
importantrole'in -shaping' them'. Market and industry 
structure also'influence the shaping of biotechnology and 
this -'section" examines' the dynamic ' interactions between 
markets, industry and the new technology. 
While the chapter is divided into two parts, it is 
useful to consider these features of innovation together; 
institutions and"'markets both form part of a system in 
which' innovation occurs and each component of the system 
affects the other. 
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5.1. INSTITUTIONS AND INNOVATION. 
5.1.1. UNIVERSITY/INDUSTRY AND INTER-FIRM COLLABORATION; 
NEW FORMS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. 
New biotechnology emerged at a time when broader 
economic trends favored closer relationships between 
industry and academia. Not only was competition becoming 
more dependent on increased scientific and technological 
input, giving companies an incentive to increase their R&D 
budgets but laissez faire economic policies and cut backs 
in state support also encouraged universities both to seek 
out industry funding and become increasingly 
entrepreneurial. Biotechnology, close to the science base, 
contributed to the changing relationship between 
universities and industry in a number of ways. First, it 
encouraged increased industry investment in universities. 
University scientists have not, generally, been attracted 
by large firm environments and MNCs have had very limited 
success in attracting top scientists and bringing them 'in- 
house' (Orsenigo, 1989). Moreover, scientists working in 
biotechnology, which broke down disciplinary boundaries,. 
tend to work in-teams, making it more difficult for large 
firms to buy up skills and knowledge by making them company 
employees. Thus, large companies contracted out work to 
universities and set up longer term collaborations. 
Second, university academics, attracted by prospects of 
commercial success became more adept at selling their R&D 
skills, forming 'hybrid' institutions to bridge the gap 
between academic institutions and industry and a number 
became-fully fledged entrepreneurs, forming DBFs. While 
academics often. resist large firm environments, smaller 
firms, in which they held equity stakes, had more control 
and were more flexible, proved more attractive. 
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Increased collaboration between university and 
industry took place in the context of public policy 
initiatives to : further, commercialize science. - The 
contribution of science-to economic growth hasa läng 
history (Webster and Etzkowitz, 1991: 5). In the post world 
war two era, as production and competition became more 
intensive, depending increasingly on advances in science 
and technology, - western governments became more preoccupied 
with creating 'links'between universities and industry. The 
common view which directed these policies in Britain was 
that Britain`wäs good at science but bad at commercial 
development. During the post war years, government funding 
for basic science rose and so did its efforts to encourage 
technical change. 
"With'rthe`, rapid. growth. -in 
funding of science and 
technology`after. the'Second World War, and the 
growth`ýof-all economic and industrial policy, 
, 
". largelyas, a result of the enthusiasm for 
Keynesian demand management, government 
'- 'Iinvolvementa-in. technical change expanded 
considerably", (Coombs et a1,19ß7: 223). 
The (Science"pushl "attempts to induce innovation by 
funding basic-science reached the heightýof its popularity 
under Wilson who promised to deliver a Britain "forged in 
the' white`heat'"öf"this technological' revolution" (quoted in 
Coombs'et`ai, -'1987: 224), However; -the results in terms of 
, 
increased-competitiveness were limited. 'Studies done 
during the "seventies, " established that simply pouring money 
intö'R&D`"would not`guärantee innovation. Efforts were then 
made'to pl'än"ýinnovation, more effectively, identifying 
'demänd'pill''on a sectoral'basis. These efforts were 
institutionäliied`inbodies'such as the National Economic 
Development Off ice'-(NEDO)''. - Conservative governments, 
particularly the`hatcher government, have taken a much 
more laissez-fäire--äpproäch, believing that private 
industry should play the central role in developing new 
technologies. Nevertheless, policy was still aimed at 
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increasing collaboration between scientists and 
industrialists. Privatization of research, both in the 
sense of selling public research institutions and 
increasing private contributions to R&D, was a key policy 
tool used by the UK government during the eighties. 
Webster and Etzkowitz note that, "Relative contributions to 
GERD (Gross Expenditure on Research and Development] by 
government and industry have shifted since the 1970s such 
that private enterprise is now the major source of research 
funding" (Webster and Etzkowitz, 1991: 6). Industry 
investment in universities has increased in Britain during 
the 1980s as government cut back funding in relative terms 
and encouraged universities to collaborate with industry. 
Business was not only encouraged to form closer links with 
universities, universities themselves became much more 
entrepreneurial, spawning off high technology firms and 
managing their R&D in a much more commercially astute way. 
In the UK, from 1981 to 1987, industry's contribution 
to UK public sector research science (PSRS) rose from £51 
million to £119 million (1985 prices) (Webster and 
Etzkowitz, 1990: 6). Webster and Etzkowitz point out that 
while the amounts are small, the trend is significant. The 
NEDC emphasizes that while UK industry contributions have 
risen, they have done so at a much slower pace than in 
other European countries (NEDC, 1991: 76). One of the major 
concerns of authors of the NEDC report is the shrinking 
skills base in Britain. Basic science has to be maintained 
in order to be able to compete in biotechnology. 
Additionally, transfer of technology to business 
environments has to be made more effective (NEDC, 1991). 
Initial concern about commercialization of 1 
biotechnology in the UK followed the failure of-any British 
company to exploit the Medical Research Council's (MRC) 
discovery of monoclonal Antibodies (MAbs). In addition to 
spontaneous collaborative agreements between industry and ' 
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university, both interested in using research to increase 
profitability, government bodies directly encouraged and 
established various business ventures. Celltech, a DBF, 
was established shortly afterwards with the remit of 
exploiting MRC research. The company had, until recently, 
first refusal on all MRC discoveries. The Agriculture and 
Food Research Council (AFRC). had a similar agreement with 
the, Agricultural Genetics Company. Both Celltech and AGC 
also had financial support from the government. Another 
DBF, Animal Biotechnology. Cambridge benefited from less 
formal agreements with now privatized parts of the AFRC. 
Other moves taken by the public. sector to facilitate 
technology transfer.. include--setting up various LINK schemes 
which promote. collaboration. between University and industry 
and encouraging schemes such as PROSAMO where a number of 
industrial, and-academic-teams, work on biotechnology risk 
assessment. -A Biotechnology Directorate was established in 
the Science and"Engineering'Council and a-Biotechnology 
Unit was'-created in`°the'Department of Trade and Industry. 
Science parks°and-interdisciplinary research centres (IRCs) 
were"älsoicreated with the aim of furthering collaboration. 
Additionally, ` the government had ä more decisive solution 
to`the problem of=transfer and' collaboration between public 
and private ' bodies; itýsold'off a number of"government 
research, -institutes, one of which 'was bought by MNC 4. 
t. x 
Universities established various institutions and 
mechanisms throughrwhich. scientificdiscoveries could be 
commercialized. ;, Apart. from. spin-off companies, "... an 
=important ,, developmentw. 
has, been the steady though stochastic 
growth of hybrid transinstitutional structures that combine 
academic andindustrial R&D-, activities" (Webster and 
Etzkowitz; 1991: 15). x; F.. 
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5.1.2. DBFs AND THE LIMITS OF THE LINEAR MODEL. 
Biotechnology is an extremely science intensive 
activity and there is no doubt that the level of scientific 
skills and the establishment of new transfer mechanisms 
played a key role in promoting innovation. Orsenigo 
contends that levels of appropriate basic science skills 
and superior transfer of technology in the US gave that 
country a significant advantage (Orsenigo, 1989: 73). 
However, it is likely that the latter issue has proved more 
important than the former. Greater experience in 
collaboration between industry and academia and greater 
openness to entrepreneurial activity in US universities, 
not to mention greater access to qualitatively superior 
venture funding probably contributed even more to the 
relative success of biotechnology innovation than the 
quality of'the science base; UK DBFs also in many 
instances had excellence of science on their side and yet, { 
as this study has shown, were still confronted with 
formidable problems. This thesis shows clearly that the 
new mechanisms for transferring technology established in 
Britain have proved problematic. UK DBFs encountered 
numerous problems in trying to commercialize research and 
their experience demonstrates the limits of the linear 
model of innovation, which places prime importance on the 
supply and transfer of science, rather than at the 
production end of innovation. DBFs were confronted with 
technical, production and managerial constraints in product 
development. A number of managers acknowledged that while 
they possessed superior scientific expertise and their 
companies had creative and innovative environments, 
technical and managerial development constraints were 
extremely worrying. The linear model idea that, with the 
right scientific and managerial skills, science can be 
'made' into technology and transferred into commercially 
successful products has to be called into question, even 
in kä 
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such a strongly science based technology. This is not to 
say that DBFs cannot succeed; there are some instances 
where companies have had some success as demonstrated in 
chapter 3. However, the findings of this study suggest 
that success is not simply the product of the quality or 
quantity of science made available, but depends on 
financial, managerial and technical development skills 
relating to scale up and production. Successful innovation 
is the product of interaction between stages of production; 
the nature, shape'and commercial value of technology 
changes as a result of this interaction. Thus, while the 
changing role of universities gave impetus to the creation' 
of DBFs and facilitated technology transfer via these 
companies, the increasing availability of scientific 
discoveries for commercialization does not lead directly to 
problem free innovation. 
5.1.3. LARGE FIRMS AND NEW FORMS OF COLLABORATION. 
Over the-last decade. large companies have invested 
heavily in the technology and built up significant in-house 
experience. The following table shows-the change in the 
institutional . origin of. genetic engineering literature 
published by universities, - research, institutes and 
companies over the period 1980-1985. 
TABLE 5.1 INSTITUTIONAL ORIGIN OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 
LITERATURE. (% 
Universities Other Institutes Companies 80/81.84/85 80/81 84/85 80/81 84/85 
USA 80 52 15 17 5 30 
Japan "45 59 '35 16 8 25 Europe 44.. 45 52 35 4 20 
. 11 1, 
Source: Orsenigo (1989), Stankiewicz (1986). 
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The trend toward increased in-house activity by- 
companies does not mean that university or extra mural 
research will become unimportant; companies constantly need 
outside scientific input. In a field as diverse and 
complex as biotechnology even large companies cannot hope 
to bring all relevant research in-house. The combined 
pressures of increasingly science and technology intensive 
production and the broader changes in the balance between 
private and public funding of R&D have been significant 
influences in the way large companies have managed their 
biotechnology innovation. The companies in this study 
showed a diversity of approaches to the new situation. 
MNC 1 invested heavily building up in-house, R&D 
facilities, collaborating with universities and DBFs. As 
noted in earlier chapters, collaborative ventures form an 
important element of MNC l's biotechnology strategy. The 
company invests directly and indirectly, via its venture 
capital company in DBFs. It also has considerable long 
term research collaborations with universities. For 
example, it has invested $100 million in Washington 
University over a period of 12 years and $20 million in 
Oxford over 5 years. In return for its investment, -the 
company gets commercial rights to potential discoveries or 
inventions. The fact that money is provided over a longer 
term also means that university research will be more 
directed by the company. Webster and Etzkowitz, however, 
do not think that firms will be able to fully dictate the 
direction of research, rather research programmes will 
be 
the result of negotiation between the. two types of 
institution. They describe the terms under which longer 
term collaborations take place as follows. 
185 
=J 
"... while companies will only support research 
that complements their long-term development 
plans, this research is - where it is not 
directly contract-research focused on a very 
specific applied problem - normally within areas 
where the science or at least its technological 
application is still relatively immature such 
that the sense in which agendas could be set is 
less obvious. The objective behind collaboration 
is often to fund long-term work in as broad a way 
as possible and to avoid interfering with 
scientists in the labs: it is often said that 
this would kill the goose that lays the 
(genetically engineered! ) egg" (Webster and 
Etzkowitz, 1991: 31). 
MNC 2 also favored this broad thrust approach to 
financing university research, although on a significantly 
more limited scale. This approach, which moves away from 
more traditional arms length transactions, while costly, 
may I have-advantages over more piecemeal collaborative 
strategies. This type of collaboration allows for the 
tacit dimension of both science and technology development, 
which is not transferable in the'same way as a research 
paper or machine. 'Again, Webster and Etzkowitz say, 
"... technology has a tacit dimension wherein 
professional expertise and technical skills are 
--brought to bear-on a particular problem, a 
problem which. is then only likely to be resolved 
through the direct'interaction of technologists. 
Policies for`-collaboration may or may not 
recognize this:... those that do acknowledge the 
elasticity of the technological boundary within 
=which the collaborative agreement can work" 
-(Webster and Etzkowitz, 1991: 19). 
MNC 1's approach to`collaboration has much in common 
with the approach taken by Japanese companies, which tend 
to invest large amounts of money in universities over 
longer periods of time. There is also a similarity in the 
approach to collaboration with other companies, as noted in 
chapter 3. Roberts and Mizouchi (1989) in their study of 
biotechnology strategy in Japanese companies suggest that 
longer term collaboration with other companies is partly 
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based on a recognition of the importance of tacit knowledge 
and particular cultures which develop in research teams1. 
The other large companies in this study took a 
variety of approaches to collaboration, both with 
universities and DBFs. MNC 3 had a significant 
collaboration with one DBF, but this was pursued for 
specific purposes2. It did not represent a strategic 
change in the way the company approached collaboration with 
other companies. MNC 4. collaborated with universities and 
outside research institutes but not extensively. Neither 
of these companies had significant collaborations with 
DBFs. MNC 5, a French firm, had extensive links, with 
universities and research institutes, but did not have 
significant collaborations with DBFs. However, given the 
lack of data about this firm and the context it was 
operating in it is not possible-to discuss the company's 
approach to collaboration in detail3. 
MNC 2 had extensive links with universities and 
research institutes. In addition to funding given to 
departments and established academics, the company funded a 
large number of postgraduate students4. Moreover in 
developing the slower ripening tomato there had clearly 
been an ongoing relationship between company and university 
in developing the technology. MNC 2's decision to 
establish a small company, within the large corporation, 
1 Another primary reason is that collaborative 
ventures can reduce the cost and risk of innovation 
(Roberts and Mizouchi, 1989) . 
2 MNC 3 collaborated with a US based DBF in order to 
develop and market biopesticides. 
3 It is likely that MNC 5, a nationalized company 
France which has a more interventionist industrial policy 
than the UK or US is in a different position from other 
companies in the study. 
4 MNC 1 funds about 230 CASE awards. CASE funding 
for postgraduates is split between government and industry. 
18 7 
which'would collaborate extensively was an innovative move 
and which recognized the limits of the larger company's 
ability to buy in appropriate knowledge. 
However, all three British based companies had a 
clear view of universities and research institutes as 
suppliers of fundamental research. Most of the managers I 
talked with in these firms expressed concern at the cut 
backs in government funding of basic research. Many of 
them were worried that industry would have to increase its 
level'of funding. They also expressed concern that 
universities would be pushed into doing more applied 
research as a result of increased industry funding. This 
would, in the longer term work against industry; the more 
fundamental work upon which industry builds would not be 
available. Cut backs in funding to universities must 
constitute a real threat to the UK's science base, but 
managers' concerns must be seen in the context of a 
widespread belief in the linear model of innovation. 
Managers see the university as being a repository of 
knowledge which they can tap into. However, if the model 
is called into question, the issue of availability of 
'fundamental'y_science, mustalso be viewed differently. 
Recent studies suggest that innovation is often the result 
of a more iterative process,, which requires constant 
communication between different parts of the production 
process (Massey et al, 1991; Best, 1990; Webster and 
Etzkowitz, 1991). Initial discoveries, may open up new 
possibilities-in technological terms (such as the discovery 
of the double helix), but sustained and successful 
innovation-requires, communication between scientists and 
those involved further downstream in the production 
process,; such. as engineers, technicians, designers and 
salestaff. t - 
The view of many-managers in large British firms 
seemed-,, 'to tend toward the Taylorist view that conception 
ýr 
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and execution must remain separate. Universities represent 
the uppermost point on a linear continuum which churns out 
basic ideas which feed through to product development. 
Given this and the traditional approach taken to 
collaboration with universities and other companies, the 
status of university based research is considered key. The 
worry about future lack of skills and basic science is 
echoed in a recent report by the NEDC (1991). The risks of 
a decline in the science base are stated strongly in the 
report. However, the conclusion to the section on 'The 
Science Base In Biotechnology', seems strangely incongruous 
with the overall argument and contains a reference to 
Japanese success which is curious. The report says, 
"It must be accepted that in technology 
generally, the UK weakness has been in the 
translation of discoveries into commercial 
products. Nevertheless it must also be accepted 
that a strong 'science base' is necessary to 
ensure that the UK can continue to move into more 
'high-tech. ' markets, including biotechnology. 
Japan has been the most prominent example of a 
country, which has prospered by trawling 
discoveries from elsewhere and converting them 
into commercial products. It is now extremely 
anxious to build a strong 'science base' of its 
own in order to continue to prosper" 
(NEDC, 1991: 77) . 
The conclusion calls for increased spending on the 
science base but acknowledges that increased spending will 
not necessarily solve the problem. Moreover, the, reference 
to Japan accepts that Japanese success in innovation was 
not based on a strong science base, but rather on 
improvement of existing techniques. Japan is thought 
by 
many to represent a new, more interactive, model of 
innovation. 
The more interactive approach, takes into account 
knowledge acquired by workers, engineers and those working 
further upstream in the production process and 
feeds it 
back into basic science. It also allows for the existence 
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of tacit knowledge both at the-science and production end 
of the spectrum; this knowledge can only be revealed over 
time and with intense communication. This more interactive 
model of innovation, was not represented among the British 
companies. At the level of developing technologies, MNC 1 
does seem to pursue a more interactive strategy which 
stresses the importance of communication and different 
research cultures. However, given MNC l's problems in 
marketing its products, the interaction between production, 
marketing and public relations were not so evident. 
The chapter thus far has focused on the science-push 
end of the innovation spectrum and examined the impact of 
changes in the institutional environment on biotechnology 
innovation. It has looked, at the impact of changing 
collaborative arrangements"between universities and 
industry and new technology transfer mechanisms. While 
these changes between public and private spheres were 
designed with the intention of making science increasingly 
availablefor exploitation increased rates of innovation 
have been limited by-, institutional and organizational 
hurdles and the prevalence of linear model thinking. The 
following sections examine the markets into which 
agricultural and food biotechnology products feed and 
considers the impact of the market on innovation. 
5.2. MARKETS AND INNOVATION. 
5.2.1.. AGRICULTURAL AND FOOD MARKETS AND AGRICULTURAL 
SUPPORT POLICIES. 
Agricultural and food markets are, of course, very"` 
diverse and can only be talked about in general terms here. 
Nevertheless, there are. some features of these markets and 
their. structure. which have. influenced biotechnology 
innovation in important ways. The current flux in 
agricultural markets creates a climate of confusion and 
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insecurity for innovators. Not only are non-market 
developments directly related to biotechnology, such as 
patents and regulations, unclear, but concerns about the 
impact of changes in agricultural policies add to 
difficulties in predicting the shape of future markets. 
Additionally, this study's findings show that managers are 
concerned with identifying higher value added markets for 
biotechnology products, in order to recoup R&D costs. The 
combination of, uncertainties in agricultural markets and 
the need to target products carefully in order make 
sufficient profit have, as shown in chapters 3 and 4 
presented managers with a difficult task. Chapter 1 
referred to Goodman et al's (1987) analysis of long term 
agricultural trends. They identify two principal 
strategies, both of which 'industrialize' agriculture, 
which are pursued in capitalist systems. Appropriationism 
is the term used to describe "the discontinuous but 
persistent undermining of discrete elements of the 
agricultural production process, their transformation into 
industrial activities, and their re-incorporation into 
agriculture as inputs" (Goodman et al, 1987: 2). Examples of 
this include, fertilizers, herbicides, hybrid seeds, 
machines. The authors say of this strategy, 
"In its fullest sense, appropriationism is 
constituted by the action of industrial capitals 
to reduce the importance of nature in rural 
production, and specifically as a force beyond 
their direction and control. This was achieved 
initially by relaxing the constraint of land as 
space via mechanization, and subsequently by the 
continuing struggle to transform the secrets of 
biological production into scientific knowledge 
and industrial property" (Goodman et al, 1987: 3). 
Biotechnological examples include herbicide 
resistance, insect and disease resistance and tissue '-; 
culture techniques. Some of the institutional changes 
which accompany technical transformations were discussed 
in 
the previous chapter. Substitutionism is a simpler concept 
and signifies the replacement of agricultural products with 
o- 
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industrial ones. For example, the replacement of natural 
fibres with synthetic fibres. This analysis provides an 
extremely useful way of classifying innovation and 
analyzing industry strategy. This section looks at the way 
in which longer term trends in agriculture and food 
industries interact with current market and industry 
structures. 
5.2.2. THE SPECIFICITY OF AGRICULTURAL MARKETS AND INDUSTRY 
STRUCTURE. 
Agricultural markets are,, and have been throughout 
the 20th century,. politically sensitive. They have been 
heavily manipulated to ensure politically desirable ends. 
Specifically,, -these ends 
have included incentives to 
increase 
. 
food production, to increase earnings of farmers 
and to provide incentives for people to stay in rural 
locations 
. rather. 
than flooding, urban centres. While 
agricultural support exists still in many forms, during the 
times of-the 'green revolution', in the 1960s and 1970s the 
marketing environment differed from today's. At that time, 
government agricultural policies had the primary aim of 
increasing food production. A range of instruments 
including the provision of free advice on the use of new 
high-technology, inputs,, subsidies on such inputs and 
various forms of support for crop prices were employed to 
achieve 
r, 
the, objective. 
P.. 
The result was a virtually 
guaranteed.. market for any agrochemical industry product 
that would increaseY`crop yields, and the launching of 
farming-onto what, häs been-described as 'the pesticide 
treadmill'. '' At'the same time, public research institutes 
promoted competition. 
r 
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"The results of this research have not only been 
more generally available for adoption, but also 
continuous infusion of advances has made it 
difficult to maintain high profits or inputs over 
the long term. In addition, the Extension 
Service has generally maintained extensive trial 
or test plot demonstrations of the effectiveness 
of a wide range of purchased inputs. This has 
tended to provide incentives for competition 
among input suppliers on the basis of product 
quality and performance" (Knutson et 
al, 1983: 242) . 
Appropriationist strategy, involving the development 
of agricultural inputs, thrived during this period. 
The manipulation of agricultural markets over time 
has meant that the supply of food has in many cases, been 
greater than demand. Thus, while supports, combined with 
public research efforts, have in the past provided 
incentives for innovation, now there are system-wide 
disincentives to innovation. Price supports create an 
incentive for individual farmers to adopt new inputs and 
compete even though this may be inefficient in terms of the 
overall system. In the absence of reforms to agricultural 
policies, like the CAP, there would still be a market for 
products such as herbicide resistance or insect resistance 
plants, if they cut costs or increased profits to 
individual farmers. However, given current plans for the 
reform of agricultural policy in the EC, innovations which 
increase productivity are unlikely to be attractive to 
farmers. However, if reform is directed at making 
agriculture more competitive, some of the managers 
interviewed thought that even though food prices would 
decrease, there would be more demand for agricultural 
inputs which increased efficiency. The problem is whether 
the lower prices would be sufficient to recoup costs. 
In areas where quotas have been introduced there is 
even less incentive to adopt innovations that enhance 
productivity. Previous chapters have noted the 
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unpopularity 'of sich products as rBST which increases milk 
production. In 1984, the EC introduced production 
restrictions on diary products. Junne and Bijman explain 
the emergence and effect of this measure. 
"The rise in production in the past ten years has 
meant large surpluses of dairy products within 
the EEC. The surpluses cost the EEC large sums 
in intervention payments, storage costs and 
subsidies on sales. Exports on the world market 
offer little relief,. since the EEC already 
accounts for, 60 percent of world trade in dairy 
products... A quota system was introduced, under 
which eachýMember State was assigned a maximum 
quota of milk to be produced. Such a system is 
of. fundamental. importance'_for the, distribution of 
the effects, of increased productivity. Under a 
quota system, ` productivity increases will force 
producers out_of. the market where the increases 
are the highest, whereas unbridled market forces 
would lead to a decline of producers in regions 
with the lowest. productivity increases (Junne and 
Bijman, 1989: 77). ' 
Again, while individual farmers still have incentive 
to lower costs,, the_case of rBST. shows that in a situation 
of over production,, agricultural innovation aimed at 
increasing. output'tends to be viewed as superfluous at best 
and counter-productive-at worst. The combination of 
concerns about future profitability of agricultural markets 
and negative public opinion have both influenced managers' 
decision making about. biotechnology, and in some instances 
have been identified as primary catalysts for companies' 
changing their innovation plans and identifying markets 
more carefully., --- While biotechnology has the-potential to 
make. agriculture more efficient, market and policy 
conditionsmake this a questionable strategy at present. 
Bye notes°this. contradiction between biotechnology's 
potential.: and<existing market conditions, saying, "Advanced 
biotechnology can modify... market conditions. It will thus 
be-contributing, - in already saturated agricultural markets, 
to a swelling of stocks and 'a downgrading of price levels" 
(Bye, 1989: 70) 
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It is too early to say how agricultural reform might 
affect market conditions, but it is likely that future 
conditions could be more favorable to innovations which 
would lead to increased productivity than at present. In 
the EC-the Common Agricultural Policy, is undergoing 
drastic revision in conjunction with The Uruguay round of 
the GATT talks., (FT, Sept, 17,1991) It is likely that 
price support of many agricultural products will be reduced 
as will direct support to large farmers5, leading to 
increased competition and maybe opening up of markets for 
new cost-cutting technologies. Additionally, plans to 
reform the Common Agricultural Policy indicate a preference 
for reducing the amount of land use for farming and 
increasing productivity. (FT, Sept 17,1991) Thus, in the 
future there could-be more incentive on the systemic level 
for increased productivity in farming than there is 
presently. 
Over the next few years, however, a number of 
pesticides will come off patent. One manager commented 
that it was hard to introduce new biotechnologies into a 
climate where chemical alternatives were "so damned cheap. " 
This poses a challenge in terms of both substitutionist and 
appropriation'ist strategies. The findings in this study 
suggest that most firms have realized these difficulties 
and are targeting innovation much more carefully as a 
result. Work is certainly continuing on innovations 
related to large acreage crops, such as maize. As several 
managers pointed out, even if only small amounts of market 
share can be captured with innovations, it represents large 
5 An FT article summarizes the latest proposals to be 
put forward by the EC agricultural commissioner in the 
following way, "... the complex plan can be summarized as 
the deepest price cuts the EC has ever contemplated, 
combined with full compensation to small and medium-sized 
farmers, and scaled recompense to large farmers, contingent 
on the medium-to-large farms taking significant swathes of 
land out of production" (FT, September 17 1991). 
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sales. Additionally, with crops as significant as maize 
there is a 'defensive' pressure for companies to invest in 
R&D; the consequences of a competitor creating an important 
innovation is a significant incentive to innovate. 
It may be, additionally, that agricultural inputs and 
markets will become increasingly segmented to incorporate a 
lower value, lower quality-chemical based area and new 
higher value biotechnology based techniques. Certainly, 
some of the companies in this survey were interested in 
portraying biotechnology' as a 'greener' technology or 
selling improved quality (for instance the MNC 2's 
"improved tomatoes'"in terms of appropriationist strategy 
and the high value meat substitute in terms of 
substitutionist strategy). In this way both 
appropriationist and=substitutionist strategies for 
biotechnology`which focus on improving quality, as well as 
quantity have been adopted. 
Biotechnology will potentially decrease the need for 
certain agricultural=products, by creating alternative 
products. 
"The introduction of biotechnology is... not 
always synonymous with-the opening of new outlets 
for agriculture... It can lead on the contrary to,, 
the reduction or even the destruction of its 
traditional outlets, thanks to improvements in 
the . techniques, for exploiting the biomass. For 
example, the possibility of`introducing new 
feedstuffs"enriched with synthetic proteins 
:$ considerably reduces the outlets for cereal 
crops. The recycling of milk whey in animal 
-production- has -similar implications for 
ý.. -G. vegetable-based proteins. The processing of 
effluent for food purposes {decreases, rather than 
increases the use of agricultural products for 
food purpo=ses" (Bye, 1989: 70). 
Substitute products such as high fructose syrup (high 
'fructoseýýsyrupis'not, 'asubstitutionist product in the 
Goodman et al sense, as it is still derived from 
agricultural products) have had a dramatic impact on sugar 
196 
1 
markets. In this case, the price of sugar was not a major 
influence on the viability of a substitute; the substitute 
would have large market appeal on diet and health grounds6. 
However, other substitute products are highly dependent on 
price fluctuations. Hacking (1986) provides an excellent 
analysis of the impact of price fluctuations on 
biotechnology derived substitute products. The success of 
fermentation ethanol is highly dependent on the relative 
price of oil, although in a number of cases, governments 
intervene to, support the industry (Hacking, 1986: 11). The 
future success of fermentation processes will rest on 
political commitment and the extent to which policies are 
directed toward creating alternatives to petroleum or using 
up agricultural surplus. Hacking says, 
"These policies can be criticized on the basis 
that they divert resources into propping up 
inefficient industries, or they may force 
manufacturers to pay more for indigenously 
produced feedstocks, which may make their 
products less competitive on world markets. They 
can, however, reduce foreign exchange losses and 
create employment. Perhaps more beneficially they 
can divert agricultural resources away from 
supplying already glutted world markets with 
prices below production costs in some instances. 
With many agricultural products, notably cereals 
and sugar, producing nations must either divert 
use into new applications or cut production. 
This may well be the greatest single influence in 
the development of large scale biotechnology. If 
the'competitive threshold is lowered in this way, 
the subsequent process developments... can 
radically improve the economics" 
(Hacking, 1986: 288) . 
Current indications-are that agriculture policy 
reform will be directed at reducing agricultural land and 
surplus, rather than the sort of policy changes Hacking is 
describing. In this case the outlook for the bulk end of 
6 Indeed because of the potentially devastating 
effects on sugar production, high fructose syrup based on 
imported maize was effectively blocked by EC sugar beetF 
producers. 
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the market seems limited. If one looks at the strategies 
being, adopted by large companies, it seems that they do not 
consider support for these kinds of projects likely and it 
was not a possibility that was discussed by managers. 
Another example of the effect of relative prices'has 
already been described in this study. The failure of the 
single cell protein project undertaken by MNC 2 was'due to-' 
decreases in soya prices and increases in oil (used in the 
production process). As Hacking says many agricultural and 
food related biotechnology products have a high elasticity 
of demand. 
In general the bulk products of biotechnology 
all show high elasticity of demand because they 
are challenged by other products or other methods 
of production. ' Single cell protein is perhaps 
the example with the'highest elasticity because 
it is competing with other products, notably soy 
and fish meal which can substitute more or less 
directly", (Hacking, 1986: 21). 
5.2.3. THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF AGRICULTURE. 
New biotechnology based products will not necessarily 
be incorporated into the existing parameters of the 
agricultural sector. Some products,: cross sectoral 
boundarieýs'"°and biotechnology-is ; likely to contribute to 
further diversification in agricultural and food markets. 
There is evidence -of this', trend in °the study; 
pharmaceutical and agricultural markets have already begun 
to combine with the production of animals for 
pharmaceutical`testing. `Sheep are being-used to produce a 
bloodýclotting'agent. 'MNCT2's biological plastic, grown in 
a potatöis another example. The attraction of this 
strate y i's that 'a riculture g5 products can be transformed 
into higher, value output. The strategy is'in addition, 
likely-to_, be--associated with increased collaboration (both 
between university ý'a'nd industry- and between firms) , as 
companies endeavour to incorporate new knowledge and 
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diversify. In Bye's view biotechnology will contribute to 
much more radical changes in technological paradigms. This 
is as much a function of the emerging structure of the 
industry and market as it is of technological properties. 
But it is a longer term, discontinuous process because of 
the need to develop new systems rather than just products. 
The thrust of many agricultural support systems was 
increased food production and maintenance of smaller farms. 
However, the trajectory of the agricultural inputs sector 
has been towards ever higher levels of market 
concentration. 
"Concentration. in purchased inputs used in 
agricultural production is generally high in 
absolute and relative terms. Concentration in 
inputs such as machinery, energy, seeds, credit, 
and chemicals, with the four largest firms 
frequently having over 50 percent market shares" 
(Knutson et al, 1983: 241). 
In the areas which relate to this thesis, seeds and 
chemicals, it would be wrong to attribute high levels of 
market concentration to agricultural support systems, 
nevertheless it is legitimate to surmise that market 
support systems (price supports and quotas) have provided 
stable environments which contributed to established firms' 
ability to move into consolidation of existing markets. 
During the sixties and seventies, innovation in 
agricultural inputs mostly happened in large firms (Walsh, 
1988: 1-4). However, the combination of concerns about 
chemical inputs into agriculture on the one hand and 
opportunities offered by biotechnology on the other hand, 
seemed likely to open up space for new small firms to 
produce new kinds of agricultural inputs, based on 
biotechnology rather than chemicals. Added to this, 
institutional changes noted in the first part of the 
chapter seemed to offer new opportunities for smaller 
5 competitors. While some opportunities have been grasped 
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and developed by DBFs, smaller companies have found it hard 
to penetrate these markets. Although biotechnology, close 
to the science base and highly specialized, spawned new 
small firms, it also increased the tendency toward fewer 
and larger companies in the agricultural and food related 
sectors. The concentration of producers for agricultural 
markets began during the 1970s as competition intensified 
and has continued to the present day. 7 MNCs began to 
combine their agro-chemical work with plant breeding in new 
ways, breeding crops "under the chemical umbrella" (Tait et 
al: 1990). Biotechnology, offered both opportunities to 
agro-chemical companies with the prospect of new products 
and a threat to the existing product base. For both of 
these reasons, MNCs continued to acquire plant breeding 
companies. From'1973 to 1988, major chemical and drug 
multinationals bought into more than 60 seed-producing 
companies (OECD, 1988: 28). Additionally, large food 
companies, eager to protect essential raw material invested 
in the new technology. 
This confluence of, on the one hand, increased levels 
of vertical integration by large diversified MNCs, combined 
with, on the other hand, limited"opportunities in many low 
value areas of agriculture and difficulties of protecting 
genetically engineered p"lants, 'influences biotechnology in 
important.,, ways. Larger firms are in a position to use 
biotechnological knowledge in diverse ways and are thus 
able to redirect science. towards more profitable outlets. 
Moreover, DBFshave, also used the common technological and 
scientific-base to innovate in a , number of areas. Some 
instances of this sort of activity have. already been 
mentioned. ' Diversification activity occurs in a number of 
7 Henk.. Hobbelink notes,. "Where 30 manufacturers were engaged in pesticides development in the mid-1970s in the United States, -there are only a dozen today; the situation in Europe is.,. similar., - With a global market of some $20 billion, the top ten companies are now controlling a full 3/4 of it (Hobbelink, 1991: 43). 
} 
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ways. First, the knowledge base can be put to work in 
different areas. For example, MNC 4's diversification into 
medical diagnostics, an area-in which it had not previously 
been involved, on the basis of newly acquired knowledge. 
DBF'10's diversification into pharmaceuticals, from the 
core business of plant biotechnology is another instance of 
this. Second, there are instances of firms using 
agricultural innovations for other higher value output.. - 
MNC 2's use of its single cell protein innovation-for a 
high value meat substitute, -rather than animal feedstock 
would fall into this category. So would DBF 1's use of 
genetically engineered animals for pharmaceutical purposes 
rather than agricultural. As these firms travel further up 
the 'learning curve' it is likely that diversification will 
increase. Large MNCs in particular, are likely to use the 
same scientific and technological knowledge across a wide 
spectrum of activity. 
Bye thinks that this will eventually lead to the - 
redefinition of the functions of agriculture. The 
agricultural sector, as it becomes ever more 
industrialized, he contends, will become less specialized, 
feeding into a number of different sectors. 
".. one can predict a challenge to the 
organization of agriculture and food processing 
in a specialist sector. Upstream, the adoption 
of biotechnology leads to stronger links between 
engineering, chemicals and biology. The aim is 
less to produce in ever-increasing quantities 
, than to produce at better cost, and with a view 
to downstream openings, which are no longer 
purely concerned with food, but also with energy 
and chemical applications. One no longer sees an 
increasingly specialised product derived from 
agriculture, undergoing successive 
transformations in order to become a specific 
food product. What must be envisaged, on the 
contrary, is that a complex product arising from 
agriculture or other biological or physical 
settings could be decomposed and then 
reconstituted to make a large new range of non- 
specific products" (Bye, 1989: 72). 
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Bye's argument is very. similar to Goodman et al's. 
The technological trajectory will not be determined by 
technical factors, but a, combination of technical and 
socio-economic factors. The concentration of production 
and increase of vertical integration by large producers is 
one of the most important of these factors. Pressure to 
'free' agricultural markets, reduce the over production of 
food and reduce support to farmers gives companies an 
incentive to develop innovations which will cut the cost of 
agricultural production and to identify higher value 
markets for. =agricultural factors of production. As noted 
in other chapters, however, regulation, patent legislation 
and public opinion will also influence developments, as 
will the political and economic decisions taken by 
producers. 
Several features of the interaction between 
innovation, markets and industry structure emerge from this 
discussion. T', 'Markets and prices clearly influence the -, 
direction and rate of,, innovation'. However, markets and 
prices must, be considered in conjunction with industry 
structure, with the broader institutional, arrangements 
discussed in the first part of the chapter and viewed as 
social constructs and the products of policy decisions. 
Given-the ''historical tendency "toward -substitutionism 
and appropriationism noted_byGoodman et al (1987) and 
corporations' ability 'to =use"` biotechnology "in a flexible 
way'to maintain both strategies, it seems likely that 
further industrialization'of agriculture, based on new 
biotechnology and older, -techniques 
will occur.. In what 
form, however, and the--1extent`to which they involve current 
biotechnology_ý. techniques, - did not,. seem, clear to many 
managers"in this'survey. The -shape of the new 
industrialized agricultural = system, will. depend on the 
complex-interaction between institut 'ons (public and 
private) and the markets. In the shorter term uncertainty 
2 02 
in agricultural markets and the cost of the technology 
seem, from findings presented in the case studies, tobe 
delaying these innovations. Herbicide resistance, 
combining both chemical and biotechnological, inputs is 
being pursued vigorously, most of companies in this study, 
with the. exception of MNC 1, however, were not pursuing 
policies which would replace chemical with biotechnological 
inputs.. Many managers in the study voiced concern about 
the competitiveness and effectiveness of biotechnology in 
relation to other technologies. The extent to which these 
transformations will 
. 
take. place, in the short term at 
least, will depend on comparative prices of inputs, and 
therefore on improvements in technology. and, to. some 
extent, on, agricultural . reform. 
In the case of substitutionist strategies comparative 
prices will also play a role in the extent to which 
biotechnology is used to replace agricultural goods with 
industrial ones. -. Findings in this study, particularly the 
experience of MNC 2, in producing single cell proteins 
suggest that substitutionist innovations will take place in 
higher value areas initially where R&D costs can be 
recouped and where competition takes place in terms of 
quality rather than quantity. Regulations may also 
influence the extent to which substitutionist policies are 
adopted; high regulatory costs associated with the release 
of GMOs may encourage companies to look for alternatives to 
agriculture. 
5.3. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS. 
In both sections of this chapter, the emphasis has 
been on how factors associated with the changing nature of 
relevant institutions (both university/industry, industry 
structure and inter-firm relations), markets and policy 
have impacted on innovation. Organizational issues 
associated with the changes in university/industry and 
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inter-firm relationships and internal management issues 
related to technology transfer were not talked about 
extensively in interviews, particularly in the UK 
companies. 'When managers did express concern, it was 
usually related to the lack of funding for the science 
base. MNC 1, however, has seemingly given more thought and 
devoted more resources to the problem. The same is true of 
the impact of'policy'on markets. While managers talked 
about market' opportunities and the lack of them, this was 
not often related to"public policy issues or longer term 
trends-in-agriculture . The absence of analysis in the 
business world of'the dynamics of market creation and 
broader issues of institutional change was also noted by 
Green (1991) in his study of healthcare markets and DBFs. 
The lack of analysis in both areas is perhaps indicative of 
a gap in management thinking which more generally affects 
the capacity for successful innovation. in the UK. 
On a more'' analytical, level, this chapter, combined 
with previous detailed consideration of firms' strategies 
demonstrated 'the importance of viewing innovation as a 
process of change` both" within the firm and in the external 
environment". ""Amendola and Bruno characterize this approach 
in the following way: 
... we must look at 
innovation as a 
, 
process in 
itself: that is', not as the adjustment to 
" something, but as the construction-of, something 
new.. and different. Its identification with an 
active learning process, and the stress on the 
crucial role that subjective factors play in this 
kind of"process, does not mean that there are no 
regularities in it or, worse, --that-we'can say 
nothing about it. It means that we must change 
the perspective from which we look at the 
"problem" Y-(Amendola , and . 
Bruno, 1990: 432) . 
This is an important point which relates back to the 
discussion, in-chapter 1 where I argued that it is necessary 
both to view innovation in 
'thecontext 
in which it occurs, 
but also to recognize that firms in industrially advanced 
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societies play a primary role in creating new processes and 
products. The 'subjectivity' of firms, the importance of 
decisions made by leading actors, and the wide range of 
factors which contribute to decision making in those firms 
must be kept firmly in mind and balanced with the more 
structural and contextual influences. 
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CHAPTER 6. REGULATIONS. PATENTS. PUBLIC 
OPINION AND LEGITIMATION. THE POLITICS OF 
INNOVATION. 
This chapter examines debates over regulations and 
patents, and relates them to political and social 
pressures'. Chapters 3 and 4 showed that regulation, 
patentlegislation and public opinion influence managers' 
decisions about biotechnology. Where regulatory issues 
have not'been fully considered or where assessments have 
been inaccurate, companies have incurred significant 
penalties, as in the case of rBST. Regulation and public 
opinion and political pressure-are intimately related; 
public opinion and political lobbying has an impact on the 
stringency of regulation and, on the other hand, risk 
regulation can be used to reassure people that 
biotechnology does not present a hazard. For this reason, 
companies engage in significant public relations efforts 
and some companies take public opinion directly into 
account in decisions about R&D. A recent survey, 
(EBIS, 1991) however, shows that there is widespread 
distrust of industry in EC countries. In the light of 
this, the effectiveness of these public relations efforts 
is likely to be limited. In terms of patents, industry 
argues that R&D costs have to be institutionally recognized 
and that patents provide one way of ensuring that R&D costs 
can be recouped. 
The point of this chapter is to demonstrate that 
innovation is a social and political process and integrally 
v 
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linked to social trends and institutions of the political 
economy. The conclusion suggests three levels at which the 
issue of the politics and sociology of risk regulation and 
patents can be analyzed and thus makes connections between 
debates about risk regulation and patent legislation and 
the broader FRS concept of regulation. First, at the level 
of broad social and political trends relating to" , 
technology, widespread distrust'of industry and the 
'hardline' taken by industry representatives in terms of 
regulation of the technology and patent legislation, has 
not helped in defusing concern about biotechnology. The 
most intractable problem for industry is value-based 
opposition to the technology;. while many interest-based 
arguments can be tackled on the grounds of economic 
efficiency, value-based arguments pose a more intractable 
problem for industry. Second, the exploitation of 
agriculture and natural resources have their own dynamics 
which have generated controversy over along period of 
time. Third,; the political activity of the firms involved, 
and their need tobe legitimate as. well as efficient 
producers, needs to be , considered. - 
6.1. REGULATION. - 
6.1.1. BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE OVER REGULATIONS. 
Regulation of'biotechnology could mark a new era in 
environmental risk regulation8. Regulation focuses on both 
contained use and on the release of Genetically Manipulated 
Organisms (GMOs). EC regulation of GMO release has 
provoked bitter argument between industry, commission 
directorates (directorates argue amongst themselves and 
with other protagonists) and pressure groups. 
8 Regulations are primarily focused on the contained 
use'and release of genetically manipulated organisms. 
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Tait explains the shift represented by the pro-active 
regulatory approach which emerged with biotechnology. 
-, "When-the MNCs that are now operating in the 
biotechnology area were developing drugs and 
pesticides in the 1950s, 60s and 70s, the climate 
of risk regulation was entirely reactive. New 
products were assumed to be harmless until proved 
conclusively to be otherwise. Once a hazard had 
been identified, regulations were put in place to- 
ensure that new products developed subsequently 
did not pose the same set of risks. No organized 
attempt was made to anticipate previously 
unforeseen hazards... In the case of 
biotechnology, an attempt has been made to learn 
from the mistakes of the past, to move beyond the 
previous reactive approach to risk regulation and 
to set up a system that is pro-active" 
(Tait, 1990: 15-16) . 
A pro-active approach signifies an attempt to 
identify problems in advance of the development and 
distribution of products. One member of the UK Advisory 
Committee on Releases to the Environment, which advises the 
British government on release and regulation, said when 
interviewed by a researcher, " We consider novel organisms 
guilty until proven innocent" (Levidow and Tait, 1991: 5). 
Pressure for a more pro-active approach derives from recent 
experience with nuclear technology and chemical based 
agricultural inputs. Increased consciousness about health 
and environmental impact of technologies has added to 
pressure for more extensive and pro-active evaluation of 
risk. Tait identifies two major challenges to regulatory 
authorities which result from the new approach. First, 
prediction of risks and hazards is an extremely difficult 
task., "The human imagination can be boundlessly inventive; 
but we can fail to see outcomes that are, with hindsight, 
blatantly obvious" (Tait, 1990: 17). Second, pro-active 
regulatory regimes necessarily complicate the politics of 
regulation. The pro-active approach requires public input 
into the regulatory process; the procedure is after all 
based on the perception of risk. Perceptions of risk, 
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indeed, the definition of risk, will depend in part on who 
is doing the perceiving. A person's or group's perception 
of risk will in turn'be influenced by world view and 
political outlook and interests. Thus, the pressure for 
more pro-active approaches to regulation is linked to other 
political demands which call for more accountability and 
democracy in the process of technological innovation. 
These challenges for., regulatory bodies also constitute new 
worries for industry. Industry is put in the position of 
having to fulfill contradictory aims; on the one hand it 
has to act in sucha way as to maximize profits and on the 
other it is subject to demands for increasingly complex 
safety procedures and the'worthiness of its aims and 
products. Brunsson makes the point that it is. no longer 
sufficient for businesses to be efficient and commercially 
legitimate, they must also be legitimate in a broader 
normative sense (Brunsson, 
ý1989). 
These rather abstract. notions of re-active and pro- 
active regulation are intimately connected with a 
discussion about the merits of 'product-based' or 'process- 
based' regulatory regimes (Tait and Levidow, 1992). The 
terms"havefbeen used indifferent ways and this has led to 
confusion. The distinction sometimes means that there is a 
substantive disagreement; 'whether or not one agrees with 
product-based°'or process-based regulations depends, to some 
extent, on the perception of=risk. Those who claim that 
the"behaviour of genetically altered plants can be 
predicted by the behaviour°. of traditionally modified plants 
(plants which have: been bred to-express certain 
characteristics) tend to favor product based regulations. 
In effect, when used in this sense, product-based 
regulations signify., a"regression to reactive regulation. 
Supporters of process-based regulations express concerns 
about the` sometimes, unpredictable or damaging behaviour of 
GMOswhen released. into the field (RCEP, 1989) . Thus, 
supporters of process-based regulations tend to think that 
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release of GMOs represents new risks and the regulation 
based on the fact that final product is the result of 
genetic engineering is warranted. Tait, distinguishes 
between the two types of regulation: 
"A process-based approach can be defined as one 
where: (i) all products derived from the 
process of genetic manipulation, and designed to 
be released into the environment, are considered 
to have the potential to give rise to unique 
environmental hazards, not possessed by previous 
generations of products; and (ii) we need to 
devise new types of environmental oversight and 
regulation to ensure that any products giving 
rise to environmental hazards are excluded from 
further commercial development. A product-based 
approach is defined as one where: "(i) it is 
assumed that GMOs do not present any unique 
environmental hazards arising from the process by 
which they were developed; and (ii) any 
environmental hazards that they do possess can be 
regulated effectively by the systems set up to 
deal with foods, drugs and pesticides" (Tait, 
1990: 27). 
However, in a number of cases individuals and groups 
who clearly favor process-based regulations as defined 
above, claim that they favor product-based regulation and 
the term has become confused (Tait and Levidow, 1992). The 
RCEP (1989) report is an example. A reason for this could 
be that industry is widely thought of as supporting 
product-based regulations. Perhaps the RCEP use of 
language constituted an attempt not to alienate industry 
from the outset, but rather to put forward suggestions 
which appear as compromise, thus allaying the public's 
fears, while giving industry a diplomatic victory. The 
RCEP position is that while regulations should be product- 
based, meaning that final products should be put forward 
for inspection rather than inspecting the techniques used 
in development, a special regulatory agency, with adequate 
knowledge should be formed to assess risks. Others, 
including industry representatives, stick to the 'line' 
that existing structure for regulating products are 
sufficient. However, even those managers who support a 
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strictly product-based approachl, agree that field trials 
should be monitored. In Britain, ACRE is the body which 
does this. Ultimately, however, countries within the EC 
will have to follow Commission directives with regard to 
regulation of biotechnology. The content of directives, 
however, remains controversial. At the heart of the debate 
is whether GMO products need to be regulated by a new 
structure at the commercial testing stage or whether 
existing structures will suffice. 
6.1.2. THE REGULATORY REGIME. 
In Britain,. ACRE assesses proposed releases of GMOs 
on a case by case basis. -Membership of the committee 
includes academic scientists,, industrialists, 
representatives from such groups as environmental health 
officers and the Forestry Commission, the Green Alliance 
(appointed as an individual 'environmentalist') and 
assessors from relevant government departments (Levidow and 
Tait, 1991). ACRE is administered by the Health and Safety 
Executive, but is financed, by the Department of the 
Environment (DoE), whose minister takes the final decision 
about release. The statutory framework for the regulation 
is Part VI of the Environmental Protection Act- (Levidow 
and-Tait, 1991: 1)., The committee has only approved one 
product thus far, a relatively uncontroversial bakers' 
yeast. Other releases are at the stage of small scale 
field trials. 
There are four Community Directives which relate to 
future release of'GMOs: - 90'(219) EEC, covering the 
contained use 6f-GMOs in laboratories an industrial 
installations; - 90 (220) EEC, covering the deliberate 
release '6f GMOs for experimental and commercial 
development.; - 90 (679)`EEC, -'covering worker protection 
(NEDC, 1991: 66). These three directives had to be 
implemented by member states by October 1991. A more 
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recent pesticides directive includes articles relating bio- 
pesticides and constitutes the fourth EC regulation 
relating to products of genetic engineering. 
Because EC directives will be binding on all nations 
within-the community, the fight over what constitutes 
appropriate regulation has largely taken place in this 
arena. Battles over regulations take place ona number of 
fronts. Controversy has centered around regulation of the 
deliberate release of GMOs, but has also included debates 
about whether biotechnology should be subjected to further 
assessments which would judge their socio-economic impact 
and the 'need' for products. 
The basic controversies can be broken down into the 
following categories: 
THE FOURTH HURDLE. 
Advocates of the fourth hurdle proposed that certain 
GMOs should be subject to the same sort of assessment 
procedure which-governs pharmaceutical products. The first 
three hurdles are safety, efficacy, and quality. The 
fourth would be "need". The definition of need has never 
been made clear, but it is generally accepted that what the 
fourth hurdle would require that products should constitute 
qualitative improvements' or give quantitative benefits in 
areas where this was warranted. Many managers interviewed 
suspected that an informal 'fourth hurdle' already operates 
at the EC level and that obstacles being placed in the way §. ' 
of rBST were not based on worries about the product's 
impact-on animals or humans, but on the 'need' criterion. 
These. suspicions are not without basis. The decision to 
implement a moratorium on rBST in 1989 reflected concern 
about health and safety aspects, but also made explicit 
reference to socio-economic impact. EC Commissioner 
McSharry called for a study examining such matters which 
would be taken into consideration in any final decision 
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about a rBST license9. Indeed, the principle of non- 
scientific judgement being used to evaluate products has a 
non-biotechnological precedent; the agriculture commission 
has already banned certain steroids in meat solely on the 
basis of public opposition, even without scientific grounds 
for concern. (Roush, 1991: 36) Additionally, and of more 
directs relevance, a policy document outlining EC 
biotechnology strategy released in 1991, clearly stated 
that the commission would reserve the right to make 
judgements based on socio-economic impact of biotechnology 
products in` controversial cases. (FT, 19 April, 1991) 
Industry's response to suggestions of either an 
institutionalized'or an ad-hoc fourth hurdle has been 
largely negative and is based on two principle objections: 
first, that a fourth hurdle on biotechnology products would 
be discriminatory; second that it would work against the 
whole'dynamic ofkinnovation. An interviewee claimed that 
had the motor car been subjected to a 'need' criterion at 
its inception it would-not have been developed. His point 
is an interesting one;, industry creates 'needs' for new 
products. `' Markets are created in a context; which arises 
from the intersection, of culture, marketing, institutions 
and material` resources in`societies. The project of 
identifying=needs is far more complicated than one might 
initially think and-begs the question of who would decide 
what was needed. ` 'A third and related point- is that the 
eventual usefulness ofýa product sometimes only becomes 
apparent after `: it- has developed and then modified. One 
manager gave an example 'of a product which had originally 
been intended as'a contraceptive. After it had-been on the 
market-for somhe"time, 'it, became "apparent that it was more 
useful'-as an anti-cancer drug. 
9 In Dec1991, the tommission decided to extend the 
ban on rBST-until 1993. 'MNC'1-was widely quoted accusing 
the commission of using the need criteria to judge the 
product (Independent on Sunday, 15 Dec, 1991). 
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As noted in chapter 4 some managers did not reject 
the idea of 'socio-econo'mi'c assessment , altogether. One 
manager of MNC 4 suggested' that 'a European equivalent of 
the US OTA might be the solution to the problem; this would 
generate more information about technologies and cater to 
demands for increased democratic control, without giving a 
statutory basis to legislation. Another manager in MNC 2 
also suggested that internal assessments might be made 
public. Industry, representatives, particularly SAGB, have 
been clearly opposed to any form of study or assessment of 
socio-economic impact. 
PROCESS vs. PRODUCT or VERTICAL vs. HORIZONTAL REGULATION. 
The process vs. product debate has already been 
outlined. As the exact meanings of product-based and 
process-based became distorted, and the language became 
increasingly identified with polarized positions, two new 
terms evolved to distinguish between positions. The US 
system, whereby GMOs are assessed through existing 
structures set up to regulate non-biotechnology products, 
became commonly referred to a vertical system and the 
proposed European, system which would involve a separate 
assessment body for GMOs, a horizontal one. Industry has- 
taken a strong position in favor of US style vertical 
regulations, the Commission, or at least influential 
elements, within-the Commission favor a horizontal system. 
On the surface, the two systems seem to differ mainly in., 
administrative terms. Indeed, Jan Brinkhorst, director 
general of the EC Environment Directorate, claims that this 
is -the -case ., He says, "[The US authorities] 
have made 4! 
J 
special rules for GMO evaluation under existing laws --we 
made a new law. The result for industry is the same". (FT, 
Nov. 29 1990). I'd 
While in certain respects this statement is true, 
it 
does not explain why, if the issue is. purely an 
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administrative one, both industry and the supporters within 
the EC are so. determined to get their way. Underneath. the 
argument about administrative systems, there is. a belief 
amongst supporters of-'horizontal' regulations that this 
new system will provide a more, rigorous assessment of the 
impact of, GMOs. Brinkhorst, links horizontal regulations 
with apro-active approach. He says the EC approach is an 
attempt. to act"before the event rather than afterwards (FT 
Nov, 29,1990). Industry representatives claim that 
horizontal. regulations will be more expensive, time 
consuming and complicated. 
SAGB has lobbied the commission extensively over this 
issuer . While, as we have seen, each company has a 
different way of viewing and responding to regulations, 
SAGB has given industry'a strong and unified voice in favor 
of product based regulation. It has had some success in 
promoting its views, but DG Xi, 'the Environment Directorate 
remains strongly opposed. 
Many managers`interviewed complained that the most 
damaging aspect of regulation of biotechnology was the 
confusion and unceArtainty about future stipulations. 
However, the EC directive governing release', as noted, was 
greeted with"-widespread dissatisfaction by industry. 
Industry accused the Commission of "political hostility" 
toward the technology, (FT, - Nov 29, '1990) and produced 
figures purporting to show that, -largely as a result of a 
damaging'regulatory, environment,,, new investment-in 
biotechnology -in' the, EC' had dried up. (SAGB, 1991) 
Brinkhorst'responded that, EC, regulation "cannot be made the 
scapegoat`'for-the somewhat slower development. of 
10 National biotechnology industry associations are 
also active in promoting the technology and there are other ' EC `initiatives; 'such as The European; Biotechnolog y 
, 
Coordination Group, which aim toicommunicate industry's 
views to the Commission. Nevertheless, SAGB, since its inception, has become the most prominent. 
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biotechnology in Europe" (FT, 29 Nov 1990). Additionally, 
he claimed that a comparison of the number of field tests 
being undertaken in the US, Europe and Japan showed that 
regulation was not having an adverse impact on innovation. 
The approximate figures up to mid-1990 were US 115, EC 110, 
and Japan 1. 
A policy paper, introduced in April of 1991 also 
engendered negative reaction from most parties. The policy 
paper "promised to limit the regulatory burden on Europe's 
biotechnology industry and to set up a committee to tackle 
the ethical problems of genetic, environmental and human 
embryo research" (FT, 19 April, 1991). One Green MEP 
commented that "It's as though the biotech industry had 
given the Commission its wish-list, and the Commission 
turned it into their basic position paper" (FT, 19 April, 
1991). On the other hand industry representatives 
complained "that the Commission could still discriminate 
against biotechnology products by subjecting them to an 
extra level of testing and regulation, irrespective of the 
type of product" (FT, ' 19 Nov, 1991). This 'extra level' of 
testing refers to an assessment of the environmental impact 
of GMOs regardless of the final product in which they are 
embodied. Industry was also annoyed about the fact that 
the document implied that the EC would retain the 
prerogative to take 'political' decisions about 
biotechnology when controversy arose about adverse socio- 
economic impact of products. rBST was mentioned 
explicitly. 
The Commission's directive on pesticides, devised 
largely by the Agriculture Directorate, on the other hand, 3Y 
was welcomed by industry. In seeming contradiction to the 
former directive, which implemented horizontal regulatory 
principles, the pesticides directive stipulated that 
biopesticides should be assessed through the same 
administrative channels as other pesticides. 
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6.1.3. REGULATION, LEGITIMATION AND PUBLIC OPINION. 
Public opinion about biotechnology, or more precisely 
genetic engineeringeµconstitutes a, significant worry for 
industry. Opinion polls show that there is concern about 
the impact of biotechnology, particularly in terms of food 
and agricultural applications (Tait, 1990). - At. the same 
time, the polls show a high level of ignorance about what- 
biotechnology actually is. However, the belief expressed 
by many managers, -that education about the technology will 
solve the problem may also be mistaken. 
Tait distinguishes between the_NIMBY syndrome (not in 
my backyard) and the NIABY syndrome (not in anybody's 
backyard). She points out that many. opinion polls only 
give superficial data about people's perceptions and do not 
"indicate the extent, to which opinions are motivated by 
concern, for, the. interests of protagonists or by ethical and 
value-based. considerations" (Tait, 1990: 34). This 
distinction. is important to, understand, she says, because 
it,. will affect the effectiveness of efforts to resolve the 
problem. 
, .; 
, °'". '.. aýconflict of interest can sometimes-be 
resolved simply by giving more or better 
information to change', the public understanding of 
the potential-impact=on their interests. Where 
there. ýis,, a genuine divergence, of interests, the 
various'parti-es-can bargain with one another 
until a-satisfactory"settlement is reached. 
Conflicts of value,, on the other hand, - can be 
exacerbated by both tactics. Protagonists in a 
value conflict will only accept information that 
'is, in accordance-with their, beliefs; everything 
else will be treated as. propagandaand its source 
""'discredited. -`Attempts at bargaining to reach a 
settlementswill. -be`treated as bribery, trading- 
principles for cash, - again leading to a. 
worsening of the'conflict. The traditional adage 
"I cannot hear! ä-word, you-say. because what you 
are shouts-so loudly,. in my ears", epitomizes this 
situation" (Tait, 1990: 36). 
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Tait notes that in any group of people, concern will 
be based on a mixture of value and interest considerations. 
Different biotechnology products create different 
levels of opposition and give rise to different concerns. 
In the 'case of rBST, opposition is both interest-based 
(small farmers) and value--based (animal welfare groups, - 
amongst others). Plant biotechnology and biopesticides are 
also likely to, give'rise to both types of concern. It is 
unlikely, as Tait'points out,, that value conflicts can be 
fully resolvedby increased information, -especially 
if 
parties with interests at stake are providing the 
information. 
The resolution of concerns about biotechnology by 
means of increased information appears even more unlikely 
in light of a recent survey which indicated high levels of 
distrust of'industry. ' The detailed survey, called the 
Eurobarometer was undertaken by the EC, involved interviews 
with 12,800 people in member states (EBIS, 1991). Only 
about 50% of participants thought that biotechnology would 
improve their lives. 7% fear that it would 'make things 
worse'. When asked about genetic engineering specifically, 
47% of interviewees thought that it would improve their 
lives and 15% thought it would make things worse. The most 
worrying part of the survey, however, must have been the 
response to questions about whom the public trusts to tell 
them the truth about biotechnology. The following figures 
are percentages of interviewees mentioning the various 
possible sources: ' 
1. Environmental organizations 52.6% 
2. Consumer organizations 52.4% ;, g 
3. School or university 37.2% 
4. Animal welfare groups 29.1% 
5. Public' authorities 20.4% 
6. Religious organizations 9.7% 
7. Industry 6.0% 
8. Trade Unions 5.3% 
9. Political Organizations 4.9% 
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(EBIS, "1991: 18). 
Given this situation and the high degree of value- 
based opposition to biotechnology, a 'resolution' of bitter 
arguments about regulatory regimes would probably require 
evidence of change-in industry values. While industry has 
increasingly tried to portray itself as 'green' and has 
claimed that biotechnology can create safer agricultural 
practice, its stance on regulation undermines faith in this 
conversion. Public-, relations efforts which attempt to 
portray biotechnology as, 'green' and 'modern' will probably 
not suffice-if-industry is seen to oppose regulation and 
develops unpopular products such as rBST. Some managers 
interviewed in this study tended to belittle the concerns 
not only of"envi'ronmental'groups, but also of EC 
regulators. 
Roush, (1991),; analyzes the struggle over the 
acceptability . and-regulation, of biotechnology in terms of 
this wider framework.;; Biotechnology, he says has become 
the:, focus for. new types-of social activism. Tracing the 
debate rover , rBST; = she <highlights the, level of distrust that 
exists betweenýpublic... interest groups and industry. There 
is alsoa feeling that . regulatory authorities are not to be 
trusted. "AllegationsPof,: overly. close cooperation between 
the_. chemical=companies and the, FDA have surfaced throughout 
this-controversy", (Roush, 1991: 32). The key to 
understanding.: the--idynamics, of the battle of rBST, he 
suggests,.. lies; note: only in, the, specifics of the technology, 
and worries over impact on human and animal health, but 
over the-broader question of, who should control 
technological development andwho can be trusted to 
innovate responsibly. Fears about''rBST tapped into a 
strong'current'of mistrust about.. industry, governments and 
universities interests in technological development. Anti 
rBST activists are keen that the public should have more 
say, not in regulation of technology, but in setting R&D 
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priorities. Thus, while the immediate goal is to stop use 
of rBST, activism "... is fueled by an underlying belief in 
the public's right to participate in technological decision 
making" (Roush, 1991: 36). 
6.1.4. INDUSTRY STRATEGY AND LEGITIMATION. 
Interviews with industry managers suggested that 
confusion over regulation and worries about 'inappropriate' 
regulations have, in the case of small firms in particular, 
had a pronounced influence on strategic and R&D decisions 
about biotechnology. Small firms, inexperienced in dealing 
with regulations and, in many cases, desperate to rectify 
cash flow problems, viewed regulations as a constraint on 
production. Regulations constituted an added incentive to 
license, or develop intermediates in order to avoid lengthy 
regulatory procedures. However, only in decisions about 
final drug production was regulation cited as the major 
constraint; in general it was viewed as a constraint in the 
context of other problems relating to lack of finance and 
management expertise. In all but one of the DBFs involved 
in plant, and agricultural biotechnology managers viewed the 
new EC regulatory regime as something which could be lived 
with. Moreover, three managers in DBFs stressed that 
regulations offered opportunities as well as constraints; 
regulations could be viewed as setting standards which 
firms could aim for11. 
In the case of large firms, who have naturally been 
in a much better position to lobby for favourable 
regulatory conditions, the concrete impact of regulation 
was hard to detect. While managers spoke a great deal 
about regulation, it was usually in the context of future 
consequences and not on previous impact. In the case of 
11 This conceptualization of regulation has gained 
currency recently and is explained and advocated by Porter 
(1990). 
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MNC 4, regulation was cited as one the factors which 
contributed to the company's decision to pursue a more 
cautious approach to biotechnology. However, in this case, 
public opinion was an equally important factor in 
influencing innovation. The intimate connection between 
regulation and public opinion complicates the discussion of 
impact of regulation and industry strategy. 
If the connection between regulation and public 
opinion is kept in mind, the argument about which set of 
regulations should be implemented becomes more 
comprehensible. The immediate questions of impact of 
regulations and comparative costs are not the only, or 
perhaps even primary question for large companies. Large 
firms are perhaps more concerned that biotechnology be 
widely conceived of as nothing different from older 
techniques. Thus, the administrative question of whether 
biotechnology is assessed bymeans of existing or new 
structures becomes significant. 
'Thus, while managers in 
different companies had-varied opinions about the way in 
which biotechnology should be promoted, and even about the 
risks, involved, they were keen to have regulatory 
authorities acknowledge, that genetic engineering poses no 
special risks. 
'Given the lack of concrete evidence that a 
'horizontal' regulatory regime would add significant cost 
or complexity to the process of licensing products, 
industry's claims in this regard should be treated with 
skepticism. However, if the principle of more pro-active 
regulation, were adopted in the case of biotechnology, it 
might eventually become the norm, rather than the 
exception. This could have far reaching implications for 
industry and could be ä second, reason that industry 
representatives of large MNCs are lobbying hard for more 
reactive types of legislation. The extension of the 
demöcratic'principl'e involved in pro-active regulation does 
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not appeal to industry. Additionally, industry is very 
keen that regulation should not involve any socio-economic 
assessment,, despite the fact that large companies do 
internal assessments of this kind. Companies appear to 
favor keeping the guiding economic hand invisible, rather 
than visible. 
The battle over appropriate regulation should be 
considered in light of industry's overall motivations for 
adopting the technology. The industry viewed biotechnology 
as a way of increasing, not maintaining profitability. 
Disappointments resulting from limited possibilities 
offered by seeds and agricultural markets have perhaps 
translated into calls for less regulation. Whereas the 
pharmaceutical market has high enough profit margins to 
withstand high regulatory costs, agricultural markets now 
offer less lucrative opportunities. This, in combination 
with longer lead times than expected and higher costs of 
R&D, make industry keener to cut regulatory costs. 
The problems which industry has encountered with 
respect to regulations can be seen in terms of the 
conflicting demands to which it has to respond. On the one 
hand, as shown in the company case studies, industry has 
'hyped' the technology in order to gain support from 
shareholders, acquire money from investors and gain 
political support and assure public enthusiasm. On the 
other, hand, industry has tried to argue that genetic 
engineering-does not represent anything new in terms of 
potential risk. It has done this in order to argue for 
lower levels of regulation. However, given its own claims 
for the power of the technology and the complicated 
politics surrounding biotechnology, industry insistence 
that 'vertical regulation' will suffice as an evaluative 
procedure, has-to some extent backfired, causing public 
concern. Given high levels of distrust of industry and 
politicians and, conversely, faith in. environmental 
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organizations, further dispute over the technology seems 
likely. Moreover, as concern about biotechnology has 
grown, industry seems to have become more, not less, 
unwilling to compromise about regulatory issues. For 
example, one manager told me in an interview that 
Greenpeace was an organization that his company could work 
with and seemed confident that understanding could be 
reached. At the end of. the study, when I sent interview 
notes back to managers in. order that they could check them, 
the manager wrote back to say that he had changed his mind 
about Greenpeace and now thought of them as a 'closed mind' 
organization. 
Many environmental organizations have expressed grave 
concern about biotechnology's impact on the environment. 
In Britain, a group called The Genetics Forum has been 
formed specifically to monitor developments in 
biotechnology. Recently, Greenpeace opposed all further 
developments in genetic engineering of plants and animals. 
In the US, recent attempts to further deregulate 
biotechnology have caused "a storm of criticism" (New 
Scientist, 25 May, 1991). The new proposals, drafted by 
the White House Council on Competitiveness, hold that GMOs 
"shall not be subject to federal oversight" unless there 
is strong evidence that they present "unreasonable" risks. 
Even where possible risks are established, federal 
regulators should not get involved if those risks can be 
"addressed by other mechanisms" such as the recovery of 
civil damages through the legal system (New Scientist, May 
25,1991). 
The proposal, which clearly'marks a complete reversal 
to reactive -regulation, '-was greeted with outrage from 
environmental groups and the Environmental Protection 
Agenýcy. ° Even industry representatives expressed concern. 
The New Scientist reporter notes, "Earlier versions of the 
government's regulations had defined a set of genetically 
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altered organisms that would not require approval" (New 
Scientist, May 25,1991). This exempted organisms that 
could be produced by traditional plant breeding methods or 
those that contained new genetic material which causes no 
change in the original organism's function. "The new draft 
dropped all mention of these exemptions, instead proposing 
that regulators ignore the process by which an organism is 
produced. " The article goes on to quote an ICI Americas 
spokesperson, who said that the new approach risked 
regulatory chaos and that it could mean going back to 
square one (New Scientist, May, 25,1991).. 
The SAGB document, (SAGB, 1991) on the other hand, 
makes constant reference to the need to compete with the US 
and therefore, have similar regulatory regimes. A recent 
NEDC report makes the same point. (NEDC, 1991). Yet, if 
regulations are widely perceived as insufficient in the US, 
and concerns in the EC are not adequately addressed, this 
line of argument could have serious unintended consequences 
for industry. 
The context of heightened awareness of environmental 
and health issues and ethical concerns about genetic 
engineering could well combine with. -. a more general crisis 
of legitimation in industry and political institutions, and 
demands. for and extension of control over technology, to 
make life harder, - rather than easier for industry. Many 
managers interviewed in this survey understood the demand. 
to increase legitimation and confidence by implementing 
regulations which are perceived as rigorous. Some even 
agreed that socio-economic assessments might be 
appropriate. Yet, the 'official line' represents a very 
different attitude and one that-calls for minimum 
regulations. The new pesticides directive which 
represents a victory for industry has already given rise to 
increasing concern amongst Greens and their European 
Parliament representatives. According to this directive, 
5ý 
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the decision to license'a pesticide will be made by a 
committee of experts in Brussels. The new directive does 
not include specific rules for GMOs and although the 
agriculture directive has promised to add new criteria 
within two years, Greens worry that the rules will not 
provide'the same protection as they will be applied 
directly by a committee whose interests lie with 
agribusiness. The new committee will "bypass the expertise 
and concerns of'national environment ministries" (New 
Scientist, May 25,1991). Industry's intransigent position 
over regulation fuels public suspicions. Their claim that 
biotechnology represents a greener technology and one that 
will contribute to a more 'sustainable' agriculture could 
be as misleading and therefore likely to contribute to both 
interest based and value based opposition. Short term gain 
from reduced regulatory hurdles may well be outweighed by 
longer term, sustained pressure from environmental groups, 
consumer groups, sympathetic politicians and other pressure 
groups and may, in the end, prove more costly to industry. 
6.2. PATENTS.: 
6.2.1. PATENT LEGISLATION. 
The question 'about whether life forms' should be 
patentable has- proved"equally as controversial as risk 
regulation, ' although-the issues have a lower profile. An 
eärly-laIndmark`, in',, thedebate'over patenting life was a US 
court case, biamond v. Chakrabarty which' established that 
the "inventor of a'new micro-organism could not be denied a 
patent"-solely, 'because the invention was alive" (Orsenigo, 
1989: 46). In the US0" in -1985 `full''patent rights were 
extended to"plants; arid in 1987`to animals. However, 
ti. 
biotechnology patents are the"subject'of considerable 
litigatiön: "° In the EC, the 'question of what should be 
patentäble-remains-'extremely contentious. In the area of 
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plant breeding, the granting of patents extend the 
traditional protection given to plant breeders through 
plant breeders rights. In some sense the granting of 
patents can be seen as a logical next step in the 
commercialization of agriculture, a legal and institutional 
equivalent to recent advances in genetically engineered 
hybridization techniques. As such, patents would extend 
capital's control over' agriculture; 'industrialization' of 
agriculture, to use Goodman's (1987) terminology would be 
taken to another stage by allowing patents on seeds. The 
issue is, however, technically complex and politically 
explosive. 
The EC has been relatively slow in drawing up patent 
legislation and the issue remains controversial. It now 
seems, likely, however, that patents will be granted on 
animals and on certain genetic innovations in plants (FT, 
May 29,1991 and Bio/Technology, July, 1991) but the 
institutional framework for the protection of genetically 
altered living things remains contentious and unstable. 
The following sections discuss some aspects of the debate 
about patenting life. 
6.2.2. PATENTS ON LIFE. 
A patent is, 
"... a right, granted to an inventor by the state 
to exclude anyone but the inventor from 
commercially exploiting the invention, except 
under license from the inventor. Such licenses 
normally demand the payment of a royalty fee. In 
return for this right, the inventor must provide 
a full description of the invention (Genetics 
Forum, 1991: 1) . 
For a process or product to be granted a patent it 
must be: 1) novel, that is produced by human intervention 
and suitable for industrial application; 2) unobvious 
in 
that it requires some specialized innovation and applied 
skill; and 3) it must be an invention, rather than a 
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discovery. -This last clause precludes the'products of 
nature from being patentable and is at the centre of many 
of the legal and technical wrangles over the patenting of 
biotechnology products. 
In 1985, Harvard University submitted an application 
for a patent on the 'Onco-Mouse', a mouse genetically 
altered to develop cancer. The European Patent Office 
originally rejected the application under Articles 53 and 
83 of the European Patent Convention (EPC) (Bio/Technology, 
July 1991). Under this convention, animal 'varieties' 
should not be granted patents and due to confusion over the 
definition of 'varieties', previously taken to mean natural 
differentiation, the patent was denied. Another objection 
was'that the patent claim, which covered all non-human 
applications was too broad given that only one genetically 
altered animal'was put forward. The application then-went 
to an Appeals Board, who reversed the decision. The 
reversal of the decision, granting a patent for the Onco- 
Mouse established important guide-lines for future patent 
applications. (Bio/Technology, 1991: 619) One of the key 
principles established is that animal varieties can be 
patented, if they are the products of a "microbiological 
process" (Bio/Technology, 1991: 620). Another clarification 
which will have far reaching applications relates to the 
judgement that broad patent claims which include all 
applications of specific genetic transformations was viewed 
favorably (Bio/. Technologyy, 1991: 620). Using the onco-mouse 
as an example, ' this means that the stretch of DNA is 
protected in:: any application The Appeal-Board reserved 
the right-'for the Examining Division'to consider the moral 
implications and possible resulting animal suffering on a 
case by case basis.. 
While the onco-mouse was granted a patent, the more 
general issue of biotechnology patents remains unclear, an 
EC drafts directive leaves many questions unanswered. The 
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situation regarding plant patents is made more complicated 
by previous legislation and agreements on protection of new 
plant varieties. Intellectual property on new crops is 
currently protected by an international convention called 
UPOV (the International Union for the Protection of New 
Varieties of Plants). The convention dates from 1961 and 
has been signed by 18 countries. UPOV gave legal status to 
Plant Breeders Rights (PBRs). PBR encouraged the 
privatization of plant breeding, setting the stage for the 
first wave of MNC investment in seeds companies 
(Hobbelink, 1991: 105 and Kloppenburg, 1988). As chemical and 
food companies increased levels of investment in 
biotechnology R&D and the focus of that investment became 
living organisms rather than chemical in-puts, demands have 
been made to extend protection and allow for the 
application of industrial patents on plants. The UPOV 
convention has recently revised its provisions in order 
that patent protection and PBRs will not overlap. PBRS 
will continue to apply to vegetal and plant varieties; 
patents could then cover specific parts of the plants. 
This is congruent with patenting of stretches of DNA, 
rather than specific applications. The new convention 
removed the prohibition on double protection of plants; 
genetically manipulated varieties could be covered by both 
PBR and patent protection. 
A major difference between patents and PBRs is the 
scope of protection granted. 
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"The convention is designed to provide some 
incentive for the creation of new plants, but at 
the same time'to allow free access to plant 
material. "Plant. breeders' rights" protect new 
plant "varieties", which the convention defines 
as new plants that are distinct from other 
species, homogeneous and stable from generation 
to generation. The convention allows only the 
breeder of the new variety to sell any resulting 
crops although, under. the "breeders' exemption", 
other breeders may experiment with the protected 
variety. Under the "farmers' exemption", farmers 
may store and re-sow seed taken from the initial 
protected crop. In contrast, under the terms of 
a patent, farmers and plant breeders must ask 
permission to. use, a protected plant or animal, 
and pay a royalty on every 'subsequent generation 
they produce. Also, patented plants or seed will 
not automatically become available for at least 
three years'after a patent is granted" (New 
Scientist, -12, January, 1991: 59) . 
A proposed EC directive puts forward the view that 
all genetically engineered plants and animals should be 
patentable. Indeed, a number of plant patents have been 
granted _ already. 
in 
. the EC, although not 
as many as in the 
US, where,. patents have been regularly granted since 198512. 
But technical problems, and political opposition persist. 
One of. therprincipal problems involved is judging the level 
of. invention in. genetically engineered products. One of 
the criteria for granting of patents is that the product 
must be a new-invention, not a discovery and it must not be 
obvious., '. ý . -, ý r. _. , 
"Lawyers will have to decide whether 
scientists, in making use of stretches of DNA, 
have invented something and are therefore 
entitled to patent rights, or whether they have 
. merely discovered a sequence of genes and have no 
.. such entitlement", 
(New Scientist, 12 January, 
1991: 57). 
12 In 1985, The United States Board of Patent Appeals 
and Interferences granted Kenneth Hibberd and his co- 
applicants-apatent on the tissue, culture, seed and whole 
plant of a corn line selected from tissue culture setting a 
precedent for future decisions about patenting plants. 
(Kloppenburg, 1988: 263) 
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Contradictory legal precedents in the US portray the 
complexity of the issue. In 1989, the Court of Appeal held 
that human tissue plasminogen activator (an enzyme that 
dissolves clots in°blood vessels, produced by Genentech 
using'rDNA technology) was not patentable. In the 
judgement of two intellectual property lawyers, "The ruling 
seems to suggest that where there are many research teams 
working'towards the same goal, any products generated using 
recombinant DNA technology are unlikely to satisfy the 
statutory tests Of novelty and obviousness (New Scientist, 
27 July, 1991: 8). However, the University of California 
was granted a patent for a-process known as "immortalizing 
the'cell line', whereby white blood cells, found in the 
spleen were persuaded to reproduce indefinitely. A number 
of other patents on human cells have also been granted in 
the US, " on the grounds that they would not exist but for 
the intervention of the "inventor" who extracted and 
manipulated them to reproduce indefinitely" (New Scientist, 
12 January, 1991: 57) . 
The situation in the EC is unclear. The European 
Patent Convention maintains that essentially biological 
processes cannot be patented. The EC draft proposal 
classes all, products of genetic engineering as not 
essentially biological and therefore, patentable. "This 
means that the tiniest and most standard piece of genetic 
engineering could render a process patentable, even if the- 
bulk of that process takes place by straightforward 
biological means" (New Scientist, 12 January, 1991: 58). 
This clashes with the European Patents Office guide-lines 
whichstate that human intervention must play a 
"significant part". The draft proposal would allow "even 
the process of purifying a natural substance to identify, 
its genetic sequence constitutes human intervention, and so 
renders the product patentable - even the sequence is 
unchanged" (New Scientist, 12 January, 1991: 58). This 
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interpretation of significant human intervention is 
disputed by manyl3. 
The directive classes-any manipulation of a plant or 
animal as "microbiological", and therefore patentable. 
This definition runs in potential contradiction to the 
scientific definition of microbiology as the study of 
single-celled organisms, such. as yeasts and bacteria. 
Hobbelink'-calls this "redefining biology to fit patent. law" 
(Hobbelink, 191-: 106)-. This, clash over the definition of 
natural and the extent-to which genetic manipulation is a 
product of human intervention--is at the heart of the 
dispute-over patents., Industry's main argument is that if 
huge R&D costs-are incurred,, patents are necessary in order 
to ensure that-sufficient profits can be made to justify 
further innovation14,. 
41, 
Another major technical difficulty involves enforcing 
patent protection. Because plants and animals reproduce 
themselves, and therefore their distribution and sale is 
difficult to track and patents are hard to enforce. 
Enforcing patents in the case of, offspring of a genetically 
manipulated cow would mean monitoring the breeding of the 
cow. TheM, same principle applies in the,. case of plants. 
One of the . small, companies 
involved in this, study, 
recognizing the problem, -developeda genetic 
technique for 
hybridization, which would go some way to resolving the 
problem.,. This would mean, however, that plants would 
conceivably 
--incorporate 
various different patented parts. 
-13 4David, King, a microbiologist and head ' of , The Genetics Forum,, for example holds that "... purification 
involves only standard cloning techniques, which are the 
staple diet of'biotechnology, and'is, not enough on its own to constitute significant human intervention" (New 
Scienti'st', ''-'12 , January, 1991: 58). 
14 It is not clear, however, whether industry will benefit°'if -broad , patent`s- are granted to university 
researchers,,, who will then be able to license their strips 
of DNA and demand royalty payments. 
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Multi-patented plants would be significantly more expensive 
and'it seems unlikely that the economics of plant breeding 
and farming would allow for this. 
Socio-economic factors create difficulties for 
patents on animals and plants. Interest-based opposition 
comes in particular from. farmers who fear that patents 
would significantly increase costs. Farmers would have to 
pay royalties on every generation of plants and livestock 
they buy and reproduce. Patented proprietary products 
would be more expensive. Opponents of patents also worry 
about increased farmer dependence on MNCs 
(Hobbelink, 1991: 109). Patents could also have a negative 
impact on independent breeders. 
"Breeders will no longer have free access to 
germplasm for developing new varieties of plants 
and animals. Genetic resources, including genes, 
cell lines, protoplasts and even characteristics 
(like 'high yield'), will become the exclusive 
property of top biotechnology firms. Licences 
will have to be obtained and royalties paid for, 
in order for breeders to be able to incorporate 
patented genes and characteristics into new crop 
and animal varieties. Most independent breeders 
will go out of business. As a result, the only 
innovation in the breeding sector will be found 
in the legal departments of large corporations 
where patent lawyers will dictate the direction 
of biological research" (Hobbelink, 1991: 109). 
The findings of. this study suggest that Hobbelink's 
conclusions are not exaggerated. In the case of MNC 4, the 
decision to invest in biotechnology largely rested on 
manager's fears that other companies' patented products 
would give them competitive advantage. MNC 4's R&D was to 
some extent directed by the objective of developing 
patentable products which could then be used in swop 
situations; MNC 4 would offer to license its product 
in 
return for the same agreement from other countries. MNC 
2 
is adamant that in order for R&D to continue on plant 
biotechnology, patent protection must-be granted. The 
implication, of course, is that research will be done 
in 
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areas where patents are obtainable. While Hobbelink argues 
that patents will increase' market concentration and work 
against the smaller producer, managers of DBFs tended to 
see patent protection as vital to their efforts. One CEO 
of a DBF concentrating on plant biotechnology and 
agricultural inputs stated in response inquiries about 
where R&D projects are originated stated the following; 
"We've had instances where we've had the patent 
lawyers go in and speak to people. And the 
patent lawyers, -in the conversation, say, 'what 
kind of thing are you doing that you think 
potentially could be patented... and we've had 
ideas come from`, that there. " 
Patents were far from being the only consideration in 
determining the direction of R&D, but they were mentioned 
in a number-of, cases as one of the more important 
influences., In the case of the Belgium based DBF, patents 
also influenced'R&D-decisions but with a very different 
outcome; the difficulties, of securing patent protection led 
the company to, develop a genetic ' hybridization technique 
with which new inventions and varieties could be protected 
without resorting . 
to patents. Two papers written for an 
assessment of-the, 1980 Spinks, report, called Biotechnology: 
Spinks Eight Years"°On, call attention to the impact of 
patents on innovation. "A paper on plant biotechnology and 
agriculture points out that winning "major patent 
positions" is an important objective of innovators. 
(Flavell, '1989: 88). ` Ina paper on animal biotechnology, on 
the-other"hand, Cross`includes the following point in a t. a 
section`-ön'"potential hazards'to animal biotechnology" 
(Cross, ' 1989: 133) 
"-Intellectual- property constraints. The 
negotiation of sustainable cont1racts between 
research workers and commercial developers can be 
. -lengthy. aand 
delicate. Exclusivity and 
confidentiality terms expected by companies cane 
be"detrimentalýto'scientific progress. Pursuit 
of knowledge and pursuit of profit are not always 
compatible" (Cross, '1989: 133). 
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Cross alludes to concerns held by many that patents 
taken out on biotechnology R&D will hinder the practice of 
science. 
I 
There are concerns about the wider impact of patents 
on market structure, the environment and developing 
countries. While many managers claim that patents will 
lead to further innovation, opponents claim that decreased 
competition and broad patents which cover all applications 
of a particular genetically manipulated micro-organism, 
will lead to less innovation. 
The argument about increased market concentration is 
linked to another concern about biodiversity. Biodiversity 
became a major concern during the late 1980s. Dangers 
involved in loss of genetic diversity constitute a serious 
threat. - A high profile report, written by representatives 
of NGOs, private industry and the UN stated "We can hardly 
imagine a greater threat to the future well-being of the 
people of the world than the loss of genetic variability of 
plants" (Keystone International Dialogue Series, quoted in 
King, 1991: 1). The worry is that biodiversity, (already at 
risk from environmentally damaging development projects, 
destruction of rainforests, etc. ) will suffer erosion as 
fewer producers gain greater control and products become 
more homogenized. 
Most of the world's genetic resources come from 
developing countries. Thus, efforts to conserve genetic 
diversity are focused on countries in developing countries 
in The South. A conference to be held in Brazil in 1992, 
under the auspices of the UN will focus on biodiversity as 
a major issue. Numerous issues are involved, which would 
require an entire Ph. D. to explicate and discuss them15. 
15 --Contradictions exist, for example between GATT 
efforts to implement international patent and conservation 
of biodiversity. 
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The issues involve both interest-based and value-based 
concerns; one of the principal arguments against granting 
patents on plants Iis that while essential germplasm, 
derived mostly from developing countries, is claimed as The 
Common Heritage of Humankind and is free, costly propriety 
products would have to bought back by countries in the 
South16. 
Ethical considerations are also an important part of 
the debate. A document put out by Patent Concern, a 
coalition of pressure groups, formed by the Genetics Forum, 
summarizes some of the issues in the following way, 
"The patenting of animals clearly raises ethical 
concerns which are distinct from the more general 
question about whether genetic engineering itself 
is unethical. ' Critics of patenting have objected 
to the, 'ownership, of life', which they feel would 
debase it to the status of a mere 
commodity.. 1'. Patenting°of life forms... rests upon 
the claim-that they are our 'invention'. 
Traditionally, living things have been viewed as 
not patentable, since they are products of 
nature,, -rather, inventions. Viewing animals as 
our invention may weaken ethical constraints in 
our treatment, of them, ýsince they are ' not, thought 
of. as', 'independent,, creatures, but as totally 
dependent'on us. -, In the context of a society 
which, Over-'the last few, centuries, has developed 
an increasingly exploitative and arrogant-- 
attitude towards the rest of nature, patenting 
appearsto`-be' yet another twist in the spiral of 
exploitation" (Patent Concern, 1991: 3). 
16'"Strong-arguments are`now, made"that germplasm from 
developing countries should be paid-. for. Jack Kloppenburg 
and , 
Daniel Kleinman have coined the phrase 'Seed wars' to 
describe-, these'battle. LThey suggest that all breeding 
lines. should-be considered, common, heritage. This, they 
recognize is politically"ünfeas'ibl'e and therefore argue 
thatll, germpläsm should bei considered as national 
sovereignty.; -. They, suggest, -<however, e, that countries in the South--should---bargain with their genetic resources, not just 
for cash; 'but, for'technology transfer and training in the 
areas of. plant breeding and genetic conservation. These 
suggestions have gained currency and are being debated by 
various UN--agencies--, and international agencies in the run 
up toýthe_. 1992sconference.. (See J. Kloppenburg. and D. 
Kleinman, 1987) 
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Religious*gröups have also"expressed `concern over the 
issue of patents for genetic manipulations. The patenting 
of human genes raises particular issues. Patents have 
already been issued on human cells in the US, "... on the 
basis that they would not exist but for the intervention of 
the "inventor", who extracted and manipulated them to 
reproduce indefinitely" (New Scientist, 12 January, 
1991: 57)17. The US Patent Office has said that it will not 
allow the patenting of human beings; patenting of humans 
would contravene anti- slavery legislation. It has not 
made clear, however, how it intends to distinguish between 
human cells and human beings. The EC draft directive does 
not prohibit the patenting of human cells or beings. As 
the human genome project, an international effort to work 
out the functions of all genes in humans, progresses, and 
patent applications begin to be filed by researchers, 
concern about the issue seems likely to escalate. 
The EC, recognizing that the ethical quandary over 
biotechnology and over patenting, and recognizing the lack 
of trust between parties involved in the debate and between 
the general public and industry, decided to create an 
advisory body, "capable of dealing with ethical issues 
where they arise in the course of Community activities", in 
an effort to defuse the issue. In light of the 
Eurobarometer poll mentioned earlier, however, the 
effectiveness of this body to "(facilitate the acceptance 
of [biotechnology's] benefits" (EBIS, 1991: 2) remains to 
be seen. 
17 A landmark court judgement with regards to this 
matter was the State Supreme Court of California's ruling 
in the Moore Vs. University of California case which gave 
the university patent rights over cells extracted from 
Moore's spleen. 
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6.2.3. INDUSTRY STRATEGY AND IMPACT OF PATENT LEGISLATION. 
Industry has been less vocal in its support of 
patents for biotechnologically derived agricultural and 
food products. This could be because the issues are 
complex and less amenable to public relations campaigns 
which play down self interest and emphasize public, good. 
The argument for patents necessarily revolves around 
increased remuneration for developers of the technology. 
Industry makes the case that patents will ensure 
innovation. If patents are not granted, there will be 
insufficient incentive to undertake expensive R&D. 
"Companies claim that they would not bother to spend money 
on research without guaranteeing financial returns for 
innovation" (New-'Scientist, 12 January, 1991: 59). 
Opponents claim that this is untrue. "They note that many 
biotechnology companies have conducted research on genetic 
modificationLfor at-least 10 years, before it was clear 
that they would., gain-patentsvon their work" (New Scientist, 
12 January, 1991: 59).. 
-, 
There is evidence that patents are also becoming less 
attractive as a means of, protecting R&D. As the speed of 
innovation' becomes ever faster, firms find that secrecy 
works better than patents as a means of protection; patent 
protection demands that, the innovation be described and key 
information made public which perhaps gives competitors a 
better chance of making improvements. Additionally, in the 
area of biotechnology, where the patent legislation has 
been tenuous and where firm precedents are few and far 
between there is more incentive to opt for secrecy rather 
than patents (Orsenigo, 1989). ' However, while firms may be 
using secrecy-to protect R&D, patents protect innovations 
when they have been-- marketed'and. carve out a company's turf 
in `--'a-, -way -that `; secrecy , cannot . -Thus, patent protection, as 
many managers in this''stüdy confirmed, is particularly 
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important to companies when they are dealing with a 
radically new technology (Orsenigo, 1989). 
While patents may play a very important role in 
rewarding companies for initial investment, as an industry 
moves through the product cycle, there is evidence that 
they become less important as incentives to innovate. 
Cumulative knowledge and place in market structure become 
more important (Orsenigo, 1989: 47). 
An important impact of patent protection would be on 
the price and market structure of agricultural and food 
markets. In the context of reform of agricultural 
supports, which will lower the price of agricultural and 
food products, patents could play an essential role in 
creating higher value market opportunities for agriculture 
and food. related biotechnology. It may be that without 
patent protection, which would add significant value to 
crops, -biotechnology innovation would be slower. -Patents 
will not only provide protection over a company's R&D and 
products, but will add value to the product. Agriculture 
could be transformed; there is the potential of further 
segmenting the marketing, allowing for higher value, more 
specialized market niches. Patent protection then, by 
increasing the amount of value added which can be acquired 
in agricultural markets, would perhaps increase incentive 
for investment-. Without patent protection, or some 
institutional shift which would reverberate on agricultural 
markets, making them more profitable, it is unclear whether 
or not this transformation would take place. If higher 
value markets are available, DBFS may find life easier. 
This depends, however, to what extent the predictions that 
patents will favor larger producers and increase 
concentration of production prove accurate. --It also 
depends on whether orýnot agricultural markets have 
sufficient elasticity to support higher value products. 
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The process of promoting new institutions for new 
technologies, of negotiating with interest groups, of 
campaigning and persuading is similar to the type of 
activity which pharmaceutical firms had to undertake to 
ensure that over the counter diagnostic tests were accepted 
in the example given in chapter 3. While, large firms are 
far better equipped to undertake this activity than DBFs, 
the value-based opposition to patents on life, may present 
them with public relations problems. 
6.3. CONCLUSION. 
This chapter has shown that regulations and patents 
are 'highly political-issues. The outcome of current 
debates will be'decided by the way in which contending 
arguments are judged and the relative strength and 
bargaining power of participants. The debate takes place 
in the-context of an established industry with a long 
history but also at a-time of changing technological, 
institutional 'an'd social` conditions. This makes outcomes 
hard to predict. ""Aniincreasingly powerful and credible 
Green movement, ' will play a role in influencing decisions 
and is 'a social''factor- of 'which industry is becoming more 
aware. ' Pressure groups=concerned with animal welfare, 
impact of new-technologies and new institutions make'life 
difficult for-industry,. " The eventual regulatory regime 
which emerges', will depend on public opinion and the level 
of activity of pressure' groups., Stringent regulations make 
life difficult for DBFs, and public policy aimed at 
supporting the DBF sector should take this into account, 
perhaps designing appropriate support systems. It is very 
difficult'-to establish what the effect of different 
regulations' would be on large MNCs. Whether the-extra cost 
would'actually'deter investment, -will depend on how 
profitable the industry is and this will depend on a host 
of factors, including patent legislation. 
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Patents take a lower profile in the rhetoric 
surrounding biotechnology, but the implications for the way 
in which agricultural and food markets and therefore 
related biotechnology innovation evolve are, no less 
significant. Indeed, patents may well have a more profound 
impact on the, future shape of agricultural and food 
biotechnology and markets than risk regulation.. This 
chapter ends with a brief discussion of three theoretical, 
dimensions of the political economy and sociology of 
innovation of biotechnology. -The connections 
between 
changes in risk, regulation and patent legislation and, 
broader systemic changes (regulation in the FRS sense) are 
made more explicit in this concluding section. The 
discussion, however, is in no way comprehensive. 
First, biotechnology innovation is politically 
controversial. Sociologists have identified the 
depoliticization of technology, as it becomes increasingly 
identified with 'logical' economic development, as a 
characteristic of the 20th century. The logic of 
capitalism justifies innovation with reference to 
efficiency, competitiveness and the necessity of technical 
progress, obscuring the fact that innovation works to 
sustain a class based political economy. Habermas (1973) 
refers to this as 'technocratic consciousness' which 
pervades advanced capitalist societies. In this context, 
politics is delegated to experts who manage political and 
economic structures. The logic of system requisites 
becomes so pervasive that interest-based concerns, 
principally class politics are relatively easily dismissed. 
Habermas identifies the most serious threat to modern 
capitalism arising from a 'legitimation crisis', based on 
economic crisis and value conflicts (Haberman, 1973). 
Value conflicts do not rest on class interest, but on 
challenges to the culture of capitalism, which elevates the 
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profit motive . 
to the guiding normative principle in 
capitalist societies. 
There is, at least a superficial parallel between 
Habermas' analysis and Tait's identification of NIABY based 
protest potentially being the most intractable. Conflicts 
between different interest groups, as we have seen, are 
subject to negotiation; industry puts forward a very strong 
argument in favor-of technical progress and the need for 
increased competition. Their victory is not automatic or 
complete (the farming lobby manages in some instances to 
win interest based arguments and industry may have to make 
some conce'ssiöns to farmers in terms of patents and farmers 
rights) but, in-general, the tide flows in favor Of 
industry, which with relative ease can equate its interests 
with the universal economic interest with reference to 
competition and efficiency. 
"Höwever, while industry may, be' able to win arguments 
on the basis of - economiýc'necessity, it' is not considered 
legitimate'; ' it- -"is not trusted in terms of Hits' judgement 
about the envirönmental, -heälth'ör moral aspects. The 
NIABY "opposition-to"biötechnology comes from those who 
question its `impäct__''än "the environment and, who are 
skeptical aouttechnicäl progress in general. " Both in 
terms of reulätion and patents, ' 'industry will have to deal 
= witY opponentswh'o represent a differentVvalue'system, one 5.. e 
whichý st resses"theheälth "of the, planet 'in 'general terms. 
While "I äm"unable to`-explore -this 'dimension of the politics 
of biotechnology innovation in` connectionIwith larger 
seciai"trends, ° it is-''an-area which warrants further 
research... 
Second,,, these_struggles-over biotechnology relate-to 
the . political. economy and sociology. of agriculture. 
Although-biotechnology-. has forced the issue of protection 
of agricultural production anew, the arguments are old. 
The struggle over the commodification of agriculture and 
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food, the implications it has for the role of public vs. 
private seed development and plant breeding have a long 
history. The renewed fervor which has arisen about 
patenting products of genetic engineering extends a debate 
about who should control plant breeding. Technical 
possibilities offered by new biotechnology could extend 
private capital's grip of agricultural output. Kloppenburg 
(1988) provides an analysis of the seed industry since the 
15th century and analyzes previous and current battles over 
who should control agriculture. He makes 'a comparison 
between the type of struggle which ensued in light of new 
hybridization techniques in the 1920s and the 1970s. The 
similarity lies in private commercial breeders' efforts to 
"subordinate public science to its own purposes" 
(Kloppenburg, 1988: 279). His argument is that public 
breeders, who have not been subject to profit criteria have 
shaped agriculture in important ways, keeping the price of 
seeds and the costs to farmers of continuously improved 
products low. This has played an important role in keeping 
the costs of agricultural production down and maintaining 
the objective of plentiful production, rather than the 
highest profit. The issue of patenting of life forms 
arises in the context of other efforts to privatize 
agriculture, represented in Britain by the selling off of 
public agricultural research and plant breeding stations 
and discussed in the previous chapter. The battle over 
regulations and patents must be seen in the context of this 
broader historical context of privatization and the 
extension of commodification of agriculture. In turn, the 
future shape of agricultural and food markets and 
biotechnology will be influenced by the outcome of this 
process. Kloppenburg, whose history is couched in the much 
wider context of capitalist dynamics, says, 
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"Indeed, what is striking is the extent to which 
scientific objectives and outcomes in 
agricultural plant science have been and are now 
being shaped by forces originating in the larger 
political economy. Advances in genetic knowledge 
in the 1920s and the 1970s clearly opened new 
historical. possibilities. Yet these advances in 
the forces of production did not contain specific 
characters that unilaterally determined the 
direction of technical change. Rather, existing 
relations of production molded the manner in 
which the new technologies developed... Hybrid 
corn galvanized extensive changes. in social 
relations, and the new biotechnologies are now 
stimulating an even more comprehensive social 
transformation. The model of change that emerges 
from this analysis is fundamentally dialectical - 
the forces and relations of production are 
mutually conditioning" (Kloppenburg, 1988: 281). 
The third set of theoretical perspectives which 
emerges'from this discussions'is related to the firm. 
Firms in this study have played a very active role in 
promoting biotechnology I and lobbying for favored regulatory 
regimes and patent legislation. °This'activity has called 
for political decision making and 'action. 'Brunsson, (1989) 
contends that firms are increasingly subject to pressure to 
act as political actors, partly as a result of increasingly 
obvious blurring of-the-boundaries between state and 
industry18. '' Firms must consistently try to legitimize 
themselves and'gain public acceptance. He says, 
18 Many sociologists'-(Burawoy, (1985); Braverman, 
(1974); Habermas (1973) have also noted the opposite depoliticizing trend as a result of increased state 
intervention in the economy, although in the cases of Burawoy and Habermas the tension between politicisation and depolitization is dealt with in sophisticated ways which incorporate both aspects of the dynamic. 
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"Organizations in modern societies are public not 
only in the sense that their structures, 
processes and ideologies are open to observation, 
but also in their ultimate dependence on public 
acceptance, i. e. of positioning themselves in 
relation to the perceptions and policies of 
society at large. Organizations in modern 
societies base their legitimacy on society's 
perception of their contribution to the public 
good; they are part of the 'modern project of 
justice and progress'" (Brunsson, 1989: 216). 
Managers in this study have generally shown either 
high levels of ignorance or disinterest in the political 
consequences of their actions. In the cases where managers 
were much more concerned with public acceptance and 
legitimation, (notably in MNC 4, a company which has long 
been at the coal face of consumer relations) these concerns 
have tended to be overridden by SAGB, the organization 
which claims to speak for large biotechnology 
organizations. SAGB's position is based on European 
industry's need to compete with the US and Japan and 
strenuous denials that biotechnology represents any unknown 
risks. Constant references to the need to compete may well 
backfire as it does not address the NIABY based opposition 
questions such as ethics, and the environmental and health 
impact of biotechnology. Their claims that biotechnology 
does not represent new hazards may not reassure an already 
skeptical public. The politics and sociology of 
biotechnology innovation, at the level of broader trends, 
sectoral patterns and the response of firms, may well play 
a key role in the future of the technology. It is an area 
which is ripe for further research. 
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CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS. 
Two questions guided this thesis: What are. the 
primary influences on biotechnology innovation in the 
spheres of agricultural and food production? How does this 
relate to theoretical approaches to innovation? This final 
chapter addresses those questions directly. 
Mo- FACTORS INFLUENCING BIOTECHNOLOGY 
INNOVATION. 
A range of factors influencing biotechnology 
innovation have been identified. Factors internal to the 
firm and on the boundary between the firm and external 
environment (see chapter 2) included, organizational 
styles, cultural attributes, management expertise, sectoral 
positioning and orientation and the way in which companies 
pursued collaborative ventures. All these factors impacted 
on strategy. External factors included regulations, patent 
legislation, market opportunities, changes in the 
relationship. between industry and universities, social and 
political pressures and, particularly in DBFs, the 
availability of finance and funding. 
It is the interaction between different constraints 
and opportunities in the area of agri-food biotechnology 
innovation which is of importance in explaining the rate 
and direction of, biotechnology innovation; looking at any 
one of these factors in isolation gives an incomplete and 
often inaccurate picture. For example, regulatory problems 
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are compounded by market constraints. Additionally, 
companies have not only to be concerned about the letter of 
regulatory law, but also about public opinion. Changes in 
the relationship between universities and industry 
seemingly contribute to an increased rate of innovation, 
but as chapter 5 argued, the extent to which this 
institutional changeýfavoredxrapid==technical change 
depended on other factors such as the nature of firms' 
internal organization and collaborative agreements, or the 
quality and quantity'of funding and management expertise in 
DBFs. Having said this, it must be noted that-the 
constraints on DBFs resulting from-their lack of technical 
expertise and knowledge` about development and marketing and 
often their separation from more downstream activities, 
have a more intrinsic nature. The differences between 
small microelectr6n1ics firms ändDBFs; pärticülarly those 
working in the areas of food and agriculture, are profound. 
The technological trajectory, a term which describes the 
interaction of`technology'and markets differs significantly 
in the area of mi'cro'electronics; the' requisites for 
microelectronic production are highly'skilled personnel but 
relatively low capital requirements., Microelectronics is a 
relatively"cleärly identifiable sector but which feeds into 
a, wi"de range of", other'-sectors.. Biotechnology, on the other 
hand remains much more' diffuse and'generic. Its 
applications depend to a far greater extent on accumulated 
knowledge in sectors"into which it` "is"being 'fed. ' Thus, the 
outlook -for DBFs xis a'difficult 'one. If a success story is 
defined as"a' DBF"which manages-to-grow independently into a 
fully integrated production' unit, then success stories are 
likely to be few and far between. As I will suggest later 
in this chapter, however, DBFs, can contribute usefully to 
biotechnology innovation. - 
The impl-ications'of the analysis presented in this 
thesis-ha4e an added dimension; constraints and 
oppörtünit-ies-exist both, 'internally in-firms and in the 
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external environment. Thus, successful innovation, as 
Amendola and Bruno (1990) suggest, results from a positive 
match between internal strengths and external 
opportunities, just as failed or problematic innovation 
often results from a negative match. The role of the firm 
in this process is not passive; firms, as we have seen in 
previous chapters, play an active role in trying to mold 
the external environment to their desired image. I 'will 
mention just two examples from the thesis to illustrate the 
point, although there are numerous examples from both DBFs 
and MNCs. MNC 1 had accumulated experience in the area of 
BST production. The company's previous expertise combined 
with new rDNA techniques and appropriate strategic 
collaborations allowed them to develop rBST. Despite all 
MNC l's PR and lobbying efforts, however, external 
constraints, -including negative public opinion and interest 
based opposition to the new technology from a politically 
powerful sector of the farming community, thwarted the 
success of the innovation. The second example is MNC 2's 
experience with its single cell protein product. Here the 
initial innovation, an animal feed substitute, again a 
combination of new biotechnology with accumulated internal 
expertise, failed as a result of changed relative prices 
and market conditions. The company's effort to rescue the 
technical achievement of the project and transform it into 
a higher value, -lower volume meat substitute for human 
consumption appears to be have been more successful. 
This analysis adds detail to, Dosi's point, mentioned 
in chapter one, that innovation is an uncertain process. 
One important implication is that, given the fluidity of 
successful matches between internal and external factors, a 
diversity of strategies is important to national or supra-- 
national innovation efforts. Thus, the diversity amongst 
firm 'strategy detailed in the thesis is not necessarily an 
indication that some firms have misjudged situations 
(although in some cases this may be true), but rather that 
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different institutions incorporate different strengths and 
weaknesses and will be able to relate to different facets 
of a changing external environment. 
Two important general points arise from the analysis 
so far. First, the specific properties of biotechnology 
innovation, the context in which it arises and the sectors 
into which developments are channeled are vitally 
important. The rate and direction of biotechnology could 
not be understood without in-depth analysis of the 
technology, markets, innovating firms and context. It 
could not be derived from a study of general technological 
trends. Second, and a related point, the findings of the 
study are historically contingent., The study related 
current regulatory conditions to increasing concern over 
environmental and health issues and control over 
technology. Today's biotechnology innovation would have 
faced very different constraints and opportunities thirty 
years ago., Similarly, twenty, years hence, different 
pressures maybe, felt., It is possible, for instance, that 
concern over social and economic impact will increase and 
will stake a statutory 
form. Similarly, biotechnology 
innovation has arisen. in the-context of institutional 
change in university/industry, collaboration and changing 
agri. -food,. markets. Markets and institutions are currently 
in a state ofenormous flux in western capitalist countries 
(Aglietta, J987; Lipietz, 1987; Best, 1990; Lash and Urry, 
1987; Piore and Sabel, 1984) Widespread restructuring in 
both public and . private' spheres has impacted on innovation 
in important ways. - Added to this, third generation 
biotechnology"-psis still°-. young. Combined with social and 
economic-instabil'ity}this=makeS' it hard to predict the 
nature of future trajectories-in the spheres of agriculture 
and: food. Moreover, new sectors seem likely to arise as a 
result:. ofTtechnological. and market conditions, adding to 
the complexity. 
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By focusing on the particularities of biotechnology 
innovation and the importance of historical context in 
which innovation is currently taking place, I am not 
deriding the efforts of those who endeavor to construct 
broader theoretical approaches to innovation. 
Understanding of technical change and indeed, change in 
general, moves forward by the constant construction of 
abstract theories and subsequent critique based on 
carefully observed behaviour. Lipietz refers to the 
interaction of deductive and inductive logic, meaning the 
movement from study guided by abstract meta-theory to study 
which takes a more empiricist approach. (Lipietz, 1987) 
Both are necessary and both are incomplete. This thesis, 
does not pretend to rise to the high ground of theoretical 
abstraction, nor has it steadily remained on the low road 
in the sense that it is a purely descriptive or empirical 
work. It is an analytical work which posed questions and 
looked for answers both from interview data and from 
research and theoretical work done by others. The next 
section discusses implications of the study for theoretical 
perspectives of innovation. My aim is not to create any 
alternative meta-theory of technical change, but to provide 
some observations which'could feed into such an endeavor. 
7.2 THEORETICAL APPROACHES. 
The introductory chapter laid out several reasons why 
the future for new biotechnology seemed bright. This 
study then identified reasons why innovation has proved 
more complex and problematic than some anticipated. These 
complicating facets of biotechnology innovation, in turn, 
shed light on broader conceptions of technical change. 
I 
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7.2.1. LIMITS OF THE LINEAR MODEL AND DOSI's STYLIZED FACTS. 
The linear model of innovation, ', outlined in chapter 
1, has been shown in this thesis to be inadequate in a 
number of ways. Dosi's assertions that innovation is 
increasingly the result of learning by doing and learning 
by using and that cumulative activity is an important 
component of technical change have been borne out by a 
number of examples in this study. DBFs, although 
characteristically science intensive, were often hampered 
by their lack of experience in the development and 
production stages of innovation. They also suffered from 
lack of management experience and knowledge of the markets 
into which their innovations were feeding. DBFs, without 
experience of production and marketing suffered from their 
, inexperience, of doing' . 
The concept of learning by doing implies certain 
things. First it suggests, that the actual production 
process is . important; . 
learning does not happen in a linear 
fashion,, rather technological and commercial developments 
often inform basic science. Second, it recognizes the 
importance, of. tacit knowledge; the. people actually 
developing the technology will have an understanding of the 
technology which would not and very, likely could not be- 
written down in journals (Massey et al, 1992). The small 
intensive environments of DBFs should have been ideal for 
. )ß` explo'iting' tacit' knowledge. The environment should also 
have been conducive to learning-associated with the 
development andlproduction aspects. However, because firms 
in many cases did not have the resources to pursue 
innovation' in` development and marketing stages, or even 
identify appropriate areas, and to fully integrate R&D 
functions with downstream activity, this type of learning 
was limited. 
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Examples of the innovation process in large firms 
also point to the importance of learning by doing and 
using. MNC l's development of its meat substitute is a 
classic example of producing a final product from previous 
technical experience. MNC l's rBST was developed on the 
basis on previous work with BST. MNC 3 has built on 
experience with biopesticides to develop genetic 
engineering capabilities. MNC 4's whole approach is based 
on using biotechnology to improve processes and products in 
which the company has very significant technical and 
development skills. Their main innovative thrust is 
planned for areas where they are already established. 
i Initially one , might, 
think that the last of Dosi's 
five 'stylized' facts which-characterizes innovation as a 
cumulative activity would apply less to a radical 
innovation such as biotechnology; that discontinufty rather 
than continuity would characterize radical innovation. 
However, in a number of respects, the point was borne out 
by this study. Dosi's point is expanded upon by Massey et 
al. 
"Technological change is not a simple response to 
changes in market conditions. Directions of 
technical, change are influenced by the state of 
technologies already in use. The existing shape 
of a technology often, or even usually, 
determines the range of adjustments of products 
and process. This 'evolutionary' view of 
technological change has led to concepts such as 
technological paradigm and technological 
trajectory - that there are patterns along which 
technological change is constrained. That is, 
future knowledge and practice are constrained by- 
the present... This is so at the level of whole 
technologies (such as microelectronics and 
synthetic chemistry) and also at lower levels, so 
that 'What the firm can hope to do 
technologically in the future is heavily 
constrained by what it has been capable of doing 
in the past'', (Massey et al, 1992.: 83) . 
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However, the importance of learning by doing and 
cumulative activity should not be, overestimated in the case 
of biotechnology.. As important is the process of un- 
learning by doing and finding ways to break with 
accumulated knowledge and previous technology development. 
In a number of cases, innovation depended on the ability of 
companies to 'relearn' and to-break the accumulated ties. 
Sometimes this. involved. organizational restructuring, 
acquisitions and establishing new collaborations. MNC 2 
set up an internal, equivalent of a DBF, collaborating 
widely with outside influences, in order to do this. MNC 
3, a company with considerable in-house expertise and a 
fully owned plant breeding company, decided eventually, to 
pursue a considerable element of its biotechnology activity 
via collaboration with a DBF. -, -MNC 1 has established a wide 
array of -longer term collaborations-with DBFs and 
universities 'in order not-to'facilitate its change from one 
technological base to-, another. In'a wider sense, large 
companies"accustomed to-dealing with large markets-are 
coming to terms with the fact that higher value niche 
markets, seem both technologically and economically 
appropriate`,: in-a,, °number_of cases. This also requires an 
ability to adapt ' and change and"'relearn''. ' Moreover, it 
may be that future success depends on an on-going ability 
to pursue flexible and diverse"strategies. The following 
section. 
-considers,, the 
role 'of DBFs in biotechnology. 
innovation further. 
7.2.2. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRITIQUE OF LINEAR MODEL FOR DBFs. 
`At a`conceptual- level, - the small biotechnology firm 
not only-fits well_in'"the linear model, but has a key-role 
to-play,, in transferring'new scientific discoveries into 
technology. The findings suggest that DBFs have enormous 
problems in reaching high levels of radical innovation. 
Moreover, the implications of the critique of the linear 
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model discussed here, i. e. importance of learning by doing 
and cumulative activity (which contradict the linear 
model), also suggest that small firms, which often do not 
have the advantages bestowed by long established production 
and marketing facilities, are disadvantaged by their very 
nature. 
However, while small firms are undoubtedly 
disadvantaged in some respects, these disadvantages can be 
ameliorated by constructive collaboration with large firms. 
The tension between viewing innovation as a cumulative' 
activity and recogni-zing the importance of 'learning by 
doing' on the one hand, but on the other hand, accepting 
that discontinuity, flexibility and capacity to un-learn 
and-re-learn are increasingly important principles in these 
times of intensive innovation puts collaborations on centre 
stage. 
The'model of collaboration, based on more horizontal 
links as well as vertical integration, as pursued by 
Japanese companies and MNC 1 towards DBFs, allows them 
greater possibilities. It allows them time and space in 
which to produce as well as develop scientific 
competencies. MNCs and DBFs work in parallel, each 
potentially benefiting from the activity of the other and` 
building a whole body of knowledge about the development-of 
products. 
Even if, as seems to be case in Japan, according to 
Roberts and Mizouchi, the end result of collaboration is 
either sale or incorporation of the small firm, this still 
constitutes a very different model of innovation from the 
linear model. It is a model which acknowledges the 
importance of collaboration over a longer period of time 
and the importance of tacit forms of knowledge 
characteristic of both scientific expertise, which is often 
concentrated in high levels in DBFs and development 
activity in which MNCs have more experience. Given the 
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increasing pace of innovation, MNCs cannot hope to bring 
all useful skills in-house. In a number of ways MNCs 
potentially benefit from collaborations with DBFs. 
Specialized, highly skilled DBFs, s it was argued in chapter 
3 have the advantage of being able to learn rapidly. Thus, 
they may, given'adequate resources, be able to develop 
technologies more radically than larger counterparts. 
Additionally, the fact that DBFs lie outside established 
sectors and do not have large stakes. in existing 
technologies and markets perhaps. puts them in a better 
position to move rapidly into new areas. They can act as 
prods, to larger firms. Potentially, a model based on 
horizontal links can incorporate both the 'learning by 
doing' and cumulative aspects of technical change, together 
with the need to continually introduce new life and ideas 
and re-learn by doing. 
,., Thus, 
DBFs could have .a positive role to play, both 
in terms-of innovative activity, in large firms and in terms 
of. national levels, of, innovation. However, their success 
is likely to depend to. some. extent on changes in large firm 
attitudes to collaboration. -,,,, These new, arrangements imply, 
certain paradoxical,. forms of cooperation and competition 
paradoxes., The paradox. could be thought of, as-follows: why 
would, large,, firmsA support smaller. counterparts when by 
giving their support-they will be forcing themselves to 
increase 
. 
their rate of innovation and therefore 
expenditure? ; Additional'ly, in some cases, by supporting 
these companies-theymay`also be creating direct 
cömpetition-, for, I themselves. ý', iIt mI ay be 'that only firms 
which have aClonger term perspective and cultures which 
prioritize'scienc`e*'and technology will undertake this form 
of toll-aborätion-: - 
This paradoxical, combination of cooperation and 
competition; has., been recognized by Best (1990) who 
considers, it_, an increasingly important feature of new 
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production strategies. It is not an idea which has yet 
taken root on a large scale amongst industrialists and 
policy makers in western industrialized countries. Without 
industrial policy-to encourage these new forms of 
competition, large firms are perhaps unlikely to change 
their mode of collaboration. Without that, DBFs, and 
perhaps other'types of small-high-tech firms, are less 
likely to succeed and-large firms may fall behind in their 
own capacities to innovate. 
The extent to which collaborations are crucial for 
the health of other small high technology firms, rather 
than DBFs, will depend on the nature of the technology and 
the sectors into which small, firms are feeding products. 
The general points made., are likely to apply in most cases. 
Small firms have certain advantages: they are quick off 
the ground; their cultures are often highly conducive to 
R&D and innovation in science intensive, areas and they are 
able, to respond quickly to changes in the external 
environment. On the other hand, their size makes, them 
vulnerable, particularly when lead times are long and R&D 
expensive. Moreover, their inexperience. with the 
production process means that they cannot access an 
important source of innovation and lack important technical 
and largely tacit knowledge of the process. Their success 
or otherwise in taking advantage of their positive 
attributes and overcoming their constraints will depend, 
however, on a large range of specific market and technical 
conditions. - 
7.2.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR POST FORDIST THEORY. 
Chapter 1 briefly outlined some of the basic premises 
of theories, which attempt to explain the shift from Fordism 
to Post Fordism. The findings of this study relate in 
rather limited ways to these theories (this study did not 
examine labour process issues, for example, which are a key 
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component of the theories), but the relation between the 
study and these theories is nonetheless worth discussing. 
This study found, in particular, that some 
characteristics of flexible specialization were absent and 
problematic. The prospects for small independent DBFs, as 
noted in chapter 3, do not, in most-cases, look bright. 
Flexible'accumulation, characterized by the emergence of 
new markets, new sectors and greatly intensified rates of 
commercial, technological and organizational innovation was 
certainly in evidence in this study. A crisis of mass 
production, in this case of'commodity chemicals, propelled 
MNCs into biotechnology innovation. The interviews also 
indicated'that both large and small firms were in some 
cases trying to identify higher value, lower volume markets 
in which"to'_pursue innovation perhaps indicating a move 
away from 'standardization and mass marketing. The 
breakdown of -institütionälforms related to production and 
traditional markets, 'discussed`in chapter 5, which figure 
as important elements in the analysis, were clear. The 
study'föund multiple-"expressions of'-restructuring which 
could be thought-`Of'as 
evidence of a shift away from 
Fordist production norms. "- , 
"However', ', many, managers in both large and small firms 
noted, the; limitations. of: niche marketing in, a--lower-, value 
area, 'such-`as; agriculture.: -,, Although-the logic of 
biotechnology-; is to l-increase _the , specificity- of 
agricultural and food products, managers were unsure if 
financial, reward would be sufficient to make this strategy 
an integral part of" product ` development. This constitutes 
an important. critique of one variant of Post Fordist 
thinking-which` focuses on the-shift to small batch 
prodüctiön: While the theories have advanced%the notion 
that technological' forms-are related to socio-economic 
conditions, they have tended to 'see the relationship in 
linear terms; niche , technologies and new flexible forms of 
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industrial relations, it is-implied by some authors, will 
lead to new socio-economic conditions in general. It may 
well be that increased flexibility (in the sense of 
increased ability to adapt to changes in the environment 
and more interactive patterns of organization within the 
firm, which allow firms to capitalize on knowledge 
developed in production) is proving increasingly necessary, 
but this does not automatically imply the widespread 
success of small scale production units or radical 
decentralization-of activity in large firms. Nor does it 
mean an inherent tendency toward niche products and 
corresponding markets in every area. This the study 
suggests that the situation-is considerably more complex; 
not only is innovation.. cumulative, limiting the extent to 
which 'pure'-flexibility occurs, but the study suggests 
that market, and industry structures, institutions involved 
in innovation, regulatory systems also have a cumulative 
element. Moreover, they are all inter-connected; one set 
of variables can provoke changes in the others. The shift 
to 'purer' forms of flexible specialization will be limited 
to sectors where a confluence of socio-economic 
opportunities and constraints match new forms of technology 
and firm level organization. This confluence will happen 
'naturally' in some instances, as perhaps in the 
microelectronics industry in Southern California, or 
garment production in the Third Italy, but these limited 
examples of flexible specialization cannot be equated with 
a major shift in capitalism towards smaller scale producers 
in all areas. 
Even if the broader category of Post Fordism is 
considered, rather than flexible specialization, it must be 
recognized that there is no linear correlation between Post 
Fordist practice at the firm level, flexible production and 
the emergence of appropriate institutions or marketing 
conditions. Thus, even though MNC 1 could be characterized 
asa Post Fordist producer, in that it makes extensive use 
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of networks and is moving away from reliance on the 
production of commodities, it is not the case, as discussed 
in chapter 4, that success is automatic. Moreover, the 
relative lack of Post Fordist characterstics in large firms 
perhaps suggests that a reexamination of the concept is 
neccesary. 
Several points follow from this analysis. This thesis 
has argued that innovation is a social and political, -as 
well as economic, process; this is true at the level of the 
firm itself and in terms of the relationship between firms 
and their external environment and thirdly in terms of the 
external environment. itself in which firms have to sell 
products. Markets are often conceived of as neutral 
constructs,: whereas-'markets studied in this'-thesis were 
clearly political and social creations., All three levels 
of social, 'political and economic activity interact and 
influence each': other`. The significance of these links is 
often missed by'po'licy makers and analysts. Many DBFs, ` for 
example, "fulfil-led-a=great'many-requisites of Post Fordist 
production units . ''-This "was -thought' to ; be a good thing by 
national änd'EC'based'-policy-makers who support small 
firms. -H6wever, other elements of policy either directly 
contribute to'the failure-of the same small firms (heavy 
regulatory costs and"th&lack of venture capital, . for 
example) `or4areaignored asimportant - elements of success 
(the'-impörtance of, encouraging collaboration between large 
and small firms, or'the basic issues of existing industry 
and market structures). As'a consequence many DBFs have 
failed to achieve commercial success. The point here is 
that at'atime of' industrialrestructuring, and crisis in 
Fordism, the' re"is undoubtedly` the potential for new forms 
of socio-economic and technological structures. But the 
process of-change isexceedingly' complex. The type of Post 
Fordistfuture based on horizontally linked small'- 
production units cannot becreated'by'entrepreneurs and new 
technology alone, itwouldrequire a" politicalcommitment 
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to strategic change in a wider system. As the system 
exists, DBFs cannot compete with larger counterparts. It 
may be that. the existing system is not the most efficient 
economically or desirable politically, but it is not clear 
whether small production units would prove more efficient 
in all sectors. 
, 
Whether or not small or large units would 
prove more efficient depends on the existence or absence of 
economies of scale, potential for market segmentation and 
diversification and the type of knowledge and capacity 
needed to pursue these opportunities. For example, we saw 
in the case of biotechnology and plant breeding, that while 
there was potential for niche marketing the economics of 
product development in this area remained unclear. 
Moreover, even though genetic engineering was key to new 
opportunities, new technology could only be used 
successfully in conjunction with traditional techniques and 
knowledge. 
The second point, then, which is worth raising on the 
basis of findings of this study, is whether the equation of 
small "craft producers" in the terminology of Piore and 
Sabel and future competitiveness is an accurate one. In 
the debates about Fordism, Post Fordism and flexible 
specialization there has been a confusion between analysis 
which tries to more clearly identify the links between 
different aspects of economy and society, discuss the 
politics of technology and identify the potential of 
increased flexibility to resolve a crisis in Fordism and an 
approach which more resembles Schumacher's 'Small is 
Beautiful' approach (Schumacher, 1973). In the flexible 
specialization approach, flexible is small scale and is 
equated with successful innovation. One of the important 
constituents in Piore and Sabel's analysis is the 
identification of 'craft knowledge', whereby producers 
compete on the basis of traditional skills and specialize 
in areas where they compete on the basis of intimate 
knowledge of relevant. processes; they learn by doing and 
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gain invaluable tacit knowledge. -However, Piore and Sabel 
do not deal with the fact that in order to build up tacit 
knowledge, some form of stability'is required and large 
firms are in many respects better equipped to learn by 
doing. There is a contradiction in the idea that small 
firms can compete on the basis of tacit knowledge, when the 
environment requires that they are in a constant state of 
flux. Being in a state of constant change and pursuing 
survival tacticsis not the same as being flexible. What 
is actually likely to happen in these situations is that 
small firms become'inflexible; they do not have the time or 
resources to'pursue a wide range of production 
possibilities;. ' 'In this study it was seen that instability 
in the markets, ' regulations, patent legislation and public 
policy created'ä'difficult atmosphere in which to innovate. 
In"a tay ä high`level-öf instability ofithe environment 
limited the amount of flexibility which could take place in 
firms. This was especially true of smaller firms which 
often had to limit their 
"flexibility both in terms of R&D 
prioritiesand_production and which were, in the context of 
instability, in many cases ill-equipped to cope with high 
R&D expense and long lead times., Thus, although they could 
respond quickly to new advances in science, they were in 
many cases not able to translate research into a wide range 
of-developed products. The situation of DBFs, as noted in 
chapter 3, did not fit happily with the role assigned to 
them by flexible specialization theorists such as Piore and 
Sabel. Large firms, on the other hand, although slower off 
the ground, where able to be more flexible in the sense 
that' they could'apply accumulated knowledge over a wide 
range ofproduction processes and products. 
WhileiDBFs did have important forms of tacit or craft 
knowledge"relatingIto'R&D, "Teece's (1986) analysis that the 
owner of'''complementary assets'-, -such as development and 
marketing'skillswill tend to benefit from innovation, 
rather than'those at the science end of the process seemed 
262 
J 
to apply in this case. The most likely candidates for 
flexible production are perhaps those large firms which 
manage to use their facilities to learn by doing and 
communicate the learning. Small firms engaged in longer 
term collaborations with larger firms do have a potentially 
beneficial role to play as explorers and promoters of new 
techniques to large firms and could have a much greater 
contribution to make in this respect if large firms were to 
change their behaviour patterns. However, the capacity of 
large firms to build up knowledge over a wide range of 
areas, to learn by doing and build cumulatively broad areas 
of expertise, makes it likely that they will be more 
efficient innovators in many areas. The conclusions of 
this study suggest that while types of collaborative 
agreements may benefit--both large and small firms, large 
firms have some-significant advantages over smaller 
counterparts in the areas studied. 
The findings of the study seem congruent with a 
number of components of the analysis which focuses on the 
breakdown of Fordism, but point to gaps in the more 
predictive analysis, such as that of Piore and Sabel, which 
focuses on new opportunities for small firms and flexible 
specialization. The problems of DBFs, it has been 
suggested are both contextual (lack of finance, and 
specificities of agricultural and food related 
biotechnology innovation for example, reluctance of large 
firms to engage in longer term collaborative efforts) and 
more innate in that they are separated from other parts of 
the production process. Some Post-Fordist theorists, 
particularly those who are very enthusiastic about flexible 
specialization have not acknowledged the problematic 
aspects of small firm innovation which this study of DBFs 
has shown and which the critique of the linear model of 
innovation established. Neither does the theory provide 
adequate conceptualization of sectoral and market 
specificities. 
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Areas which are in need of further research include: 
the nature and value of collaborative ventures; the role 
of small firms in innovation and in industrialized 
economies; and the nature of flexibility in production and 
industry needs'both empirical investigation and conceptual 
clarification. 
Another theme which has run through the thesis is the 
social and political nature-of , 
innovation. The following 
section. discusses these points. 
7.3 THE POLITICS OF INNOVATION. 
Issues, to do with firm organization and collaboration 
are undoubtedly political in the sense that they are 
intimately connected with public policy and social context 
This thesis also pointed out another set of political and 
social issues which impact on innovation. The influence of 
regulations and patent legislation on biotechnology and the 
response of firms have been detailed in previous chapters. 
The impact of these, factors on innovation was discussed in 
chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 6 expanded upon this discussion 
and also examined firms' responses to what are essentially 
issues of politics, political economy and social movements. 
A number of issues are salient in, terms of theoretical 
approaches., The first is that theories of innovation which 
limit themselves to examining the interaction between 
economics and technology miss important sociological and 
political dynamics. There has been significant work done 
in the area of the social shaping of technology, but much 
of the writing has glossed over the central importance of 
the firm (Green, 1991). The firm as the channel for 
innovation "isalso the vessel - which has to be guided 
through the social and political waters. This thesis has 
focused on how managers in firms perceive that emerging 
regulations and patents will impact on innovation and how 
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they act to shape the environment to their best advantage. 
Chapter 6 suggested that it is not sufficient that firms, 
in order to be competitive, be efficient and productive, 
but that they also be must legitimate. 
In using the term politics of innovation, I am 
suggesting that attention needs to be paid to the issues 
discussed in chapter 5; to the dynamics between broader 
institutional factors, --(the balance between private and 
public institutions, for example)--economic factors and 
related policy which affects market conditions and 
technological innovation. But, -I am also thinking of the 
need to pay more attention to two additional areas. First, 
Chapter 6 focused on the perceived impact of regulations, 
patents and influential social movements and 
environmentalist-organizations. It was suggested that it 
is no longer sufficient for firms to produce efficiently, 
but that they must legitimate themselves in normative 
terms. The extent to which firms will have to confront 
this kind of pressure, of course, depends on the type of 
innovation, with . some technologies 
being much more 
controversial than others. It will also depend on the 
level and nature of social and political concern at any 
time, legitimation being much harder to establish at some 
points than others. The access which each group has'to- 
political power structures also has to be considered. In 
this respect, it is interesting to note the centrality of 
EC structures and institutions in the battle over 
biotechnology regulations and patents. The new structures 
which have come into operation for evaluating risk and 
establishing institutional ground rules for technology have 
certainly. changed the. operating environments both for firms 
and for pressure groups. Beyond very general statements 
such as these it is difficult without more research to 
identify possible changes in the balance of power. 
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The second point relates to the consideration of 
firms operating-in biotechnology innovation as political 
actors, particularly the large firms which have much more 
political influence. The political activity of firms, as 
the thesis has suggested, goes beyond public relations 
exercises, with extensive lobbying of policy makers. The 
interaction is obviously key to market creation. Yet, 
policy makers have different concerns and are engaged in 
internal political disputes. This aspect of the social and 
political construction of markets is an area which would be 
extremely interesting to-investigate further. In terms of 
biotechnology further analysis of the type of opposition to 
biotechnology and a more detailed examination of firm 
strategy and the'motivation-behind it would be a useful 
contribution to further understanding the politics of 
innovation in this area. This type of study would have to 
attempt to assess,; the real impact of horizontal vs. 
vertical regulatory regimes. "` More theoretical work would 
include conceptualization of-, political-. power in relation to 
market structure, political-structures, type of technology 
and product, amount of state ownership or regulation and 
business cultures. 
7.4. CONCLUSION. 
This thesis identified factors' influencing 
biotechnology'innovation in- large and small firms. The 
analysis focused-on decision"making in firms. The thesis 
also considered wider dynamics implicated in'the innovation 
process. In Large firms, external ` factors' shaping decisions 
about the technology included economic and political 
percepbns, regulatory issues concerning both risk 
regulation and'patenting. Factors internal to these firms 
which influenced`key-relevantµdecisfons were company 
culture, organization, and previous areas of corporate 
activity., Factors influencing decision making and 
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innovation in small firms were in some cases similar to 
those in larger counterparts but DBFs were heavily 
constrained by lack of funding, difficulties associated 
with venture capital and lack of appropriate knowledge 
relating to technical and non-technical aspects of 
innovation. The findings of the study highlight a series 
of erroneous assumptions built into the linear model of 
innovation. Together with problems identified in DBFs, 
cumulative aspects of innovation and the importance of 
'learning by doing' constitute elements of the critique of 
the linear model. For overlapping reasons, aspects of Post 
Fordist theories, particularly those emphasizing flexible 
specialization as a new model of industrial organization in 
advanced industrialized countries were also seen to be 
problematic. 
The thesis examined social-economic and political 
aspects of innovation of biotechnology, both within the 
firm and in the wider business environment. Institutional 
and market structures of significance to the future 
direction of the technology were examined in some detail, 
as were debates and controversy over risk regulation and 
patents. 
Many studies of innovation look at the process either 
from the point of view of how forces external to the firm 
shape technology or how the firms itself innovates. This 
study holds that innovation can better be understood if 
both these perspectives are adopted; the firm is the 
primary institution in which innovation occurs in 
industrially advanced countries, but it cannot be 
considered in isolation or in narrow economistic terms. 
Recent theoretical and methodological works have begun to 
adopt this approach which views innovation as a process of 
change in both the firm and external environment. The 
description and analysis presented here hopefully 
267 
contribute to an ongoing effort to better understand the 
nature of technical change. 
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APPENDIX. 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS. 
Amino Acid. Basic building block of proteins. 
Antibody. Protein produced in response to exposure to a 
specific antigen and characterized by its specific binding 
to the complementary antigen. Important in defense against 
disease-causing organisms. 
Asexual. Describes the reproduction of a living organism 
without sex; characteristic of microbes, and also 
alternative form of reproduction in many plants. 
Bacterium. Small single-celled organism. 
Biocatalyst. Biological catalyst; can be either an enzyme,, 
or a cell with the required enzyme activity. 
Biochemistry. The study of the chemistry of living things. 
Biofuel. Biologically produced fuel, e. g. biogas, ethanol. 
Biomass. Total of organic material in living and dead 
plants and animals. 
Biosynthesis. The production of complex chemicals from 
simple precursors, carried out by all living organisms. 
Catalyst. A substance which speeds up a chemical reaction 
without itself-undergoing any net change during the 
reaction. 
Cell. The basic unit of which living organisms are made; 
some organisms are just a single cell (e. g. bacteria, some 
algae and protozoa while many are multicellular. 
Cell culture (tissue culture) The in vitro growth of cells 
isolated from multicellular organisms. 
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Chimera. An animal whose cells are derived from two or 
more different individuals, even ones of different species. 
Culture. Collective term for cells and the medium in which 
they are grown. 
DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) The genetic material. The 
genetic message coded in the sequence of DNA bases is 
transcribed into mRNA and this message then translated into 
protein. 
Embryo. Early stage in the development of an animal or 
plant. 
Enzyme. A biological catalyst. All enzymes are proteins. 
Eukaryote. An organism composed of cell(s) with membrane- 
bound structurally discrete nuclei. Eukaryotes include all 
organisms except viruses; bacteria and blue-green algae 
these are called prokaryotes. 
Feedstock. Starting-material used in 
industrial/biotechnological orýfood processing. 
Fermentation. Any process in which microbes metabolize an 
organic substrate.. 
Gene. The basic unit of hereditary: a sequence of 
nucleotides comprising a segment of DNA (the information is 
in the sequence of bases; a basic is part of a nucleotide. 
Gene : Expression. The whole process by'which the message 
(information) contained in a gene directs the synthesis of 
a specific protein. 
TV. 
Gene Probe. A short piece of DNA that can recognize and 
bind'to complementary DNA:. in a specific gene, thus 
indicating the presence of that gene. 
Gene therapy The treatment of an inherited disease by 
inserting normal versions of the faulty genes into the 
patient's-cells. 
Genetic diversity. Heritable variation within a species. 
Genetic engineering., General term used to describe any 
artificial procedure whereby genes are transferred from one 
organism to another. 
Herbicide. -: ° -Weedki-ller. 
High Fructose Syrup. Sugar syrup produced commercially from maize (corn) starch comprising glucose and fructose. 
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Hormone. Chemical messenger in the body; carried in the 
bloodstream from the hormone-producing gland to the target 
cells which respond to the 'message'. 
Hybridization. The binding (annealing) which occurs 
between two complementary strands of DNA (or DNA-mRNA). 
Hybridoma. A cell which is produced by the fusion of a 
myeloma cell (cancer cell which divides continuously in 
culture and is 'immortal') can an antibody-producing cell; 
the resulting cell grows in culture and produces monoclonal 
antibodies. 
Immobilization'of enzymes or cells. Confinement by 
attachment to or entrapment within an inert material. 
In vitro. Literally, 'in glass'; relating to biological 
processes taking place outside the whole multicellular 
organism. 
In vivo. Literally, 'in life'; relating to biological 
processes taking place'within a living cell or organism. 
Inorganic Compound (inorganic chemical). Substance not 
containing the element carbon. 
Insecticide. A substance that kills insects. 
Methane. A gaseous hydrocarbon used as a fuel, more 
usually known as natural gas. The main component of 
biogas. 
Microbe (micro-organism). A microscopic organism 
(generally single-celled); e. g. bacteria, protozoa and many 
fungi are microbes. 
Monoclonal Antibodies. Homogeneous antibodies produced by 
a single clone of cells. Monoclonal antibodies are used 
medically in diagnostics and industrially for high- 
resolution chromatography). 
Mutation. Any change in the genetic material; mutation can 
be at the level of the whole chromosome as in Down's 
syndrome or just a change in one or a few bases within a 
gene. 
Nucleic acid. Biological polymer (e. g. RNA, DNA) composed 
of chains of nucleotides. 
Nucleus. The structure within a eukaryotiC cell which 
contains the chromosomes. 
Organic compound (organic chemical). 
the element carbon. 
Substance containing 
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Pesticide. Chemical used to protect crop plants. 
Protoplast. A plant or microbial (e. g. yeast, bacterial) 
cell from which the rigid cell wall has been removed. 
Protoplast fusion. The process by which two protoplasts 
are brought into close contact so that their cell membranes 
become continuous and their cytoplasms can mix freely, thus 
forming a single hybrid protoplast (cell). 
Recombinant DNA (rDNA) The hybrid DNA produced by joining 
pieces of DNA from different organisms together in vitro. 
Selective breeding. Procedure of carrying out crosses 
(matings) between desirable individuals to produce next 
generation of plants or animals. 
Single Cell Protein (SCP) Cells, or protein extracts, or 
microbes grown in large quantities for use as human or 
animal protein food. 
Somaclonal variation., The variation observed between 
plants grown from cells or protoplasts isolated from an 
identical genetic source. 
Splicing DNA. The joining of one DNA molecule recombinant 
DNA. 
Virus. The smallest and simplest form of living material. 
A virus": consists-often of a small piece of genetic material 
surrounded by a protein coat. It is dependent upon a host 
cell (microbial, animal or plant) for multiplication. 
Adapted from The 
Biotechnology. 
Open University (1986) PS621_ 
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